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ABSTRACT
Facebook is an integral part of today’s social landscape, but Facebook use involves compromising one’s 
privacy in relation to both other users and to the Facebook corporation and its affiliated businesses. This 
analysis explores respondents’ reasons for using Facebook together with their Facebook-related privacy 
concerns, and how these factors influence self-disclosures and privacy management strategies on the site. 
Also explored are respondents’ perceptions both of what the Facebook corporation ‘knows’ about them 
and with whom it shares their data. The research is based on the concepts of user-user and user-corporate 
privacy concerns versus the social needs of self-portrayal and belonging. Self-portrayal (inspired by 
Friedlander, 2011) is explored in the contexts of both strategic self-presentation and expression of the true 
self, and belonging is explored in the contexts of both intimacy and affiliation. These concepts have been 
drawn from a combination of psychological theories together with existing research on privacy concerns 
and social needs on social networking sites.
Respondents completed an online questionnaire over a six week period from late August to early October 
2014, and a focus group was held in November 2014. The questionnaire was largely quantitative but 
allowed for qualitative input via text boxes. There were 404 completed and valid responses, and of the 
demographic factors tested, gender was most strongly associated with Facebook-related privacy concerns 
and age was most strongly associated with reasons for using Facebook. Respondents indicated a clash 
between fulfilling their social needs on Facebook and their privacy concerns on the site. However, these 
concerns did not, for the most part, stop them using Facebook, although in certain instances respondents 
employed tactics to minimise their privacy concerns. This thesis argues that, when using Facebook, 
respondents resolved the privacy paradox to the best of their ability.
It is anticipated that the findings of this thesis will contribute to the ongoing dialogue surrounding the 
benefits and drawbacks of social media use.
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LIST OF TERMS
In this thesis:
• Facebook refers both to the Facebook corporation (Facebook, Inc.) and the Facebook platform, 
• SNS is an acronym for both social networking site and social networking sites, 
• app is an abbreviation of application, and
• ad targeting is an abbreviation of advertisement targeting. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Sonya: “Are you a member of Facebook?”
John: “Isn’t everyone a member of Facebook?”
Facebook was launched in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg and was originally accessible only to Harvard students. 
In 2006 it was made available to the general public (Lynn, 2009), and today it is the most popular social 
networking site (SNS) worldwide, with 2.375 billion monthly active users (MAU) as of mid-July 2019 
(Clement, 2019). Fifteen million of these MAU are based in Australia, comprising “around 60% of the 
country’s population” (Cowling, 2019, para. 2), and “50% of the country [logs] onto Facebook at least once a
day” (Cowling, 2019, para. 2). These figures illustrate the extent to which Facebook touches people’s lives, 
both globally and in Australia.
Facebook’s popularity lies largely in its ability to meet users’ social needs (Zhang, 2017; Utz, 2015; Niland, 
Lyons, Goodwin, & Hutton, 2015; Indian & Grieve, 2014; Vitak & Ellison, 2012). However, there are privacy 
concerns related to Facebook use (Waldman, 2016; Wisniewski, Xu, Lipford, & Bello-Ogunu, 2015; Vitak, 
Blasiola, Patil, & Litt, 2015; Milazzo, 2014; Trottier, 2012). The aim of this study is to investigate the 
relationship between users’ privacy concerns and social needs on Facebook, as manifested in reported 
behaviours on the site. To this end, I have employed a number of pre-existing psychological concepts to 
develop a model of social needs on Facebook, and I have also differentiated between Facebook-related 
user-user privacy concerns and user-corporate privacy concerns. User-user concerns relate to other users, 
whereas user-corporate concerns relate to the Facebook corporation (which I refer to as ‘Facebook’ in this 
thesis) and businesses associated with Facebook. User-user concerns revolve principally around other users 
seeing content ‘not meant for their eyes’ or misusing this content (Wisniewski et al., 2015), whereas user-
corporate concerns revolve around the surrendering of users’ personal information to Facebook in exchange
for Facebook’s “free” services (Fuchs, 2012; Khan, 2018). This information may be provided by users 
themselves, or their Facebook friends (Wisniewski et al., 2015), or it may be obtained via tracking, both 
within and outside of Facebook (Narayanan & Reisman, 2017).
1.1 Privacy concerns versus social needs on Facebook
Facebook is perhaps the world’s most comprehensive database: Facebook users freely divulge their 
personal details, including their real name, age, gender, employment and study background, political and 
religious beliefs, and relationship status (Fuchs, 2012; Grimmelmann, 2009). In addition, the ‘Facebook 
pixel’ and Facebook’ s ‘Like’ button identify users and track their actions on websites outside of Facebook 
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(Cukier, 2016; Simonite, 2015; Acar, Van Alsenoy, Piessens, Diaz, & Preneel, 2015), and Facebook combines 
its Facebook-derived data with data from its other companies (e.g., Instagram) (Facebook Help Centre, 
2019a; Instagram Help Centre, 2019; WhatsApp FAQ, 2019; Facebook, 2018). Thus, comprehensive profiles 
of Facebook users are assembled, allowing Facebook-based advertisers to direct their material to very 
specific audiences (Treadaway & Smith, 2010).
However, the Facebook corporation and its affiliated businesses are not the only threats to their privacy 
that users must contend with: users’ privacy is also encroached upon by other Facebook users. One of the 
chief attractions of Facebook is that it allows users to watch other users undetected (Trottier, 2012; Child & 
Starcher, 2016). Child and Starcher (2016, p. 484) described three types of “surveillance” on Facebook: 
creeping (“scrutinizing a person’s Facebook profile, photos, posts, and friends”), stalking (“repeatedly 
accessing and viewing [individual pages] in a short period of time”), and lurking 
(“watching...others...interact online from a distance”). Although Facebook users expect to be watched 
(Trottier, 2012), surveillance is still a privacy concern, especially given the fact that Facebook’s 
undifferentiated friending system creates “context collapse” (Marwick & boyd, 2011; Vitak et al., 2015) 
whereby “multiple audiences are ‘collapsed’ into a single group, with the usual context cues for audience 
segregation removed or unavailable” (Marder, Joinson, Shankar, & Houghton, 2016, p. 583). Typically, a 
varied cohort composed of “parents, siblings, grandparents, friends, romantic interests, and coworkers” 
(Child & Starcher, 2016, p. 488) have access to young adults’ Facebook pages, and strict management of 
one’s privacy settings can alleviate but not eliminate privacy concerns resulting from context collapse 
(Trottier, 2012; Burkell, Fortier, Wong, & Simpson, 2014). To preserve their privacy on Facebook, users 
therefore commonly engage in the practices of editing their Facebook content carefully (Vitak et al., 2015; 
Georgalou, 2016), de-tagging photos which portray them in an unflattering or embarrassing light (Lang & 
Barton, 2015), and posting content “they believe their broadest group of acquaintances will find non-
offensive” (Marwik & boyd, 2011, p. 122). Some users also engage in “vague-booking”, which is the practice 
of making certain “post[s] or comment[s] on Facebook...intentionally vague” (Child & Starcher, 2016, p. 485)
so that only a select portion of their audience can decode them. Another key privacy protection strategy 
employed by users is to try to ensure that no inflammatory material (i.e., posts, photos, or videos) 
concerning them is uploaded to Facebook (Trottier, 2012; Marder et al., 2016). Users do this by modifying 
their behaviour offline:
For me to be caught on photo doing something stupid, I had to be doing something stupid in the first 
place. And if I avoid that, which I have been hit or miss about in the past, then it’s a non-issue. They 
can’t post photos of me that didn’t happen. (Trottier, 2012, p. 328 [an unidentified interviewee])
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The influence of Facebook is indeed pervasive when users monitor themselves on its behalf not only online,
but also offline. Marder et al. (2016) stated that:
Just as prisoners in Foucault’s (1977) conception of Bentham’s Panopticon moderated their behaviour
due to the possibility that they were being watched, the possibility of compromising content being 
seen by online audiences moderates decisions offline...[I]t is fascinating to speculate the somewhat 
science-fictional notion that the omnipresence of personal recording devices, facial recognition and 
SNS may lead us with little resistance towards an Orwellian society based on peer-to-peer 
surveillance. (Marder et al, 2016, p. 589)
A crucial issue, from a privacy viewpoint, and one that exacerbates the problem of unwelcome visibility, is 
that users share control of their information on Facebook with other users (Marwick & boyd, 2014). Two 
basic examples of this are as follows: first, any Facebook user can post a photo of you on Facebook, but if 
you want that photo to be removed, Facebook instructs you to “ask the person who posted it to take it 
down” (Facebook Help Centre, 2019b), and second, even if a you “set [your] Facebook friends list to 
private...[it] is really only as safe as the privacy settings used by your friends” (Wagner, 2014, para. 4-5).
Facebook draws its power from its ubiquity: Harari and Gosling (2016) observed that “Facebook has become
a virtually inescapable aspect of modern social life” (p. 261). Despite this, some users resist becoming 
Facebook members but eventually cave in to peer pressure, or in some cases, users open a Facebook 
account for the express purpose of controlling information about themselves that other users have posted 
in their absence (Trottier, 2012). Once they are Facebook members, however, users are captivated by the 
convenience of the site (Trottier, 2012; Krasnova et al., 2010). Facebook provides an easy way to keep in 
touch with people and to organise or find out about events, and, in fact, to not have a Facebook account is 
commonly considered tantamount to self-inflicted social exclusion (Trottier, 2012; Quan-Haase & Young, 
2010). However, despite its convenience, many users have privacy concerns about Facebook, such as 
unwelcome visibility (Harari & Gosling, 2016), cyberbullying (Lowry, Zhang, Wang, & Siponen, 2016), and 
fraud (Al-Shamaileh, 2018), or are irritated by the site (users have described Facebook as “pointless”, “a 
waste of time”, and “distracting” [Harari & Gosling, 2016, p. 267]), and end up closing or deactivating their 
account. However, they usually end up reactivating it because of Facebook’s convenience, or indeed, its 
perceived necessity (Trottier, 2012; Harari & Gosling, 2016).
Users are drawn to Facebook in spite of any privacy concerns they may have, largely because it is part and 
parcel of the way they interact with others (Niland et al., 2015). Motives for using Facebook and the social 
benefits of Facebook use have been explored from a number of perspectives. For instance, some 
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researchers have explored Facebook use from the perspective of two psychological needs: the need to 
belong, defined as “the fundamental motive to connect with and be accepted by others” (Seidman, 2014, p.
368) and the need for self-presentation, defined as “[the need] to convey impressions that will help...obtain 
valued goals” (Leary et al., 1994, p. 664). The need to belong was first postulated by Abraham Maslow 
(1943), it being one of the needs in his hierarchy of needs, and the concept of self-presentation has arguably
been best represented by Erving Goffman in his acclaimed book The presentation of self in everyday life 
(1959). In relation to Facebook, Nadkarni and Hoffman (2012), after reviewing the existing research, 
concluded that “Facebook use is motivated by...[both] the need to belong and...the need for self-
presentation” (p. 243). In addition, Utz, Tanis, and Vermeulen (2012) found that while the need to belong is 
indeed a motivator for SNS (including Facebook) use, the need for popularity, defined as “[the need] to be 
perceived as popular” (p. 38), and, as such, a subset of the need for self-presentation (p. 38), “is the 
strongest and most consistent predictor of SNS behaviors” (p. 37). Also, Seidman (2014) found that people 
who “post...personally revealing and emotional content” (p. 371) on Facebook sometimes do so because 
they have a need for acceptance, which she equated with the need to belong (p. 368). Thus, the findings of 
Nadkarni and Hoffman (2012), Utz et al. (2012), and Seidman (2014) appear to be consistent in that the 
needs for belonging and self-presentation, in various guises, are key motivators for Facebook use. 
Other researchers have viewed Facebook use through the lens of Ryan and Deci’s (2000) self-determination 
theory. Self-determination theory proposes the existence of “three innate psychological needs” (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000, p. 68): “the need for autonomy (a feeling of volition and the absence of external pressures), the 
need for competence (the capacity to act effectively and the feeling of pursuing something meaningful), and
the need for relatedness (a feeling of closeness and connectedness with others)” (Masur, Reinecke, Ziegele, 
& Quiring, 2014, pp. 377-378: my italics). Facebook use has been found to satisfy all three of these needs 
(Reinecke, Vorderer, & Knop, 2014; Lin, 2016), and, in fact, the unfulfilled needs for autonomy, competence, 
and/or relatedness in the offline world have been claimed to be risk factors for Facebook addiction. The 
addiction is said to occur because users compulsively attempt to gratify these unmet needs on Facebook, or 
to escape their lives via Facebook use (Masur et al., 2014). While it is fairly self-evident that Facebook use 
can satisfy the need for relatedness, it is perhaps harder to see how it can satisfy the needs for autonomy 
and competence (Reinecke et al., 2014, p. 423). Reinecke et al. (2014), however, claimed that Facebook 
satisfies users’ need for competence because it gives users “[a] feeling of being in charge of the 
communication process” (p. 423): “In contrast to face-to-face interactions....[users can] take the time to 
reconsider, edit, and optimize the contents of communication” (p. 423). Additionally, Reinecke et al. (2014) 
stated that Facebook satisfies users’ need for autonomy because it “provides access to entertaining content 
anywhere and anytime” (p. 423).
4
Facebook use has also been viewed from a social capital perspective (e.g., Elllison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 
2007; Vitak & Ellison, 2012; Burke, Kraut, & Marlow, 2011). Social capital has been described as “the 
benefits derived from interaction with one’s social network” (Vitak & Ellison, 2012, p. 244). Researchers 
generally divide social capital into two types: bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital is associated with 
strong ties (i.e., ties binding small, close-knit groups), whereas bridging social capital is associated with 
weak ties (i.e., ties spanning small, close-knit groups) (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1360). Strong tie relationships 
(those with close family and friends) typically provide emotional and material support, whereas weak tie 
relationships (those with acquaintances, distant relatives, colleagues, and, in a Facebook context, friends of 
friends) are more likely to provide informational support such as alternative viewpoints, job leads, and 
technical advice (Rostila, 2011; Vitak & Ellison, 2012; Luarn, Kuo, Chiu, & Chang, 2015). On Facebook, users 
can provide emotional support via comments, messages and posts to a friend’s wall, as well as “one click 
feedback” (Burke & Kraut, 2016, p. 265) in the form of likes (Vitak & Ellison, 2012; Luarn et al., 2015). 
However, the real strength of Facebook from a social capital perspective, according to De Meo, Ferrara, 
Fiumara, and Provetti (2014), lies in the fact that it provides an easy way for users to keep in touch with – 
and therefore access help from – weak ties. As noted above, weak ties are beneficial not so much for the 
provision of emotional support as informational support. Vitak and Ellison (2012) found that Facebook users
“noted the benefits of broadcasting requests to their entire network in order to solve an information-based 
problem and described the diversity of their Facebook network as a strength” (p. 252). Thus, according to 
the social capital perspective, Facebook is a tool that allows users to maintain and increase bonding and 
bridging social capital, thereby providing them with ready access to emotional and informational support.
The studies described above illustrate how people use Facebook for relationship maintenance, self-
presentation, entertainment, and the accessing of social capital. However, although there are considerable 
benefits to Facebook use, these benefits are intertwined with drawbacks. For instance, while Facebook is a 
convenient medium for keeping in touch with both strong and weak ties, users have reported feeling 
“tethered” (Fox & Moreland, 2015, p. 171) to Facebook for this very reason: i.e., they felt obligated to 
respond to others’ posts and comments in a timely manner, and viewed the maintenance of relationships 
on Facebook as a never-ending chore (Fox & Moreland, 2015; Niland et al., 2015):
I think Facebook is one more thing that you have to...be accountable for...“Hey, I posted on your 
Facebook wall. Why didn’t you see it?...Like, why didn’t you read my message?”...[I] already have all 
these other things that I need to be doing and keeping track of and Facebook is just one more thing 
you have to be responsive to...it’s kinda like work, like you have to do it. (Fox & Moreland, 2015, p. 
171 [an unidentified interviewee])
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One of the attractions of Facebook is undoubtedly ‘facestalkingʼ (Young, 2011) whereby users view others’ 
profiles undetected. Facestalking can satisfy “social curiosity” (Brandtzaeg, Luders, & Skjetne, 2010, p. 
1021), and joint facestalking, whereby a group of users view others’ profiles together, can be a source of 
entertainment for and bonding between users (Niland et al., 2015). However, another reason for (or 
consequence of) facestalking is social comparison, whereby users compare their lives to those of other 
users (Krasnova, Widjaja, Buxmann, Wenninger, & Benbasat, 2013). Social comparison on Facebook can be 
detrimental to users in that it is associated with envy (Wallace, James, & Warkentin, 2017; Krasnova et al., 
2013) and consequent depression (Appel, 2015; Tandoc, Ferrucci, & Duffy, 2015), and can trigger a “feeling 
of inadequacy” (Nihland et al, 2015, p. 132) or “a negative feeling” (Lee, 2014, p. 253) if users perceive their
Facebook friends’ lives to be ‘better’ than their own. However, comparison to ‘worse-off others’ may make 
Facebook users feel sympathy, which, despite being an unpleasant emotion, could actually be beneficial 
because a) it may remind users of their comparative good fortune and therefore stimulate gratitude, and b) 
it may increase users’ feeling of social connectedness (Park & Baek, 2018, p. 90).
Facebook’s ‘Like’ button, while allowing users to provide low-level social support, also facilitates 
unfavourable social comparison. The ‘Like’ button has been referred to as “a yardstick for one’s popularity” 
(Davey, 2016, para. 4), and Carly Steyer, writing for HuffPost (2014) observed that “when there’s a numeric 
measurement of how well-liked an image is, it’s hard not to compare your own stats to those of your 
friends” (para. 4). 
In summary, the crux of the problem is that there is a conflict between users’ privacy concerns on Facebook 
and the social needs that drive them to use the site. However, I contend that the choices to use Facebook, 
to not read the privacy policy, and to minimise use of the privacy settings are not made ‘on a level playing 
field’: there are five ways in which Facebook tips the balance in its favour.
First, while users may have an uneasy feeling of being monitored by Facebook (Stern, 2018; Castillo, 2017), 
it is hard for those not familiar with the ‘big data’ phenomenon (i.e., most Facebook users) to understand 
exactly what is going on in terms of Facebook’s data gathering and collation practices (Hull, 2015). Yes, 
Facebook does allude to these practices in its privacy policy, but its privacy policy can best be described as 
written in general terms (Meyer, 2018), and those trying to understand Facebook’s privacy practices are 
further confounded by the fact that Facebook’s data-gathering methods and privacy policy are constantly 
changing: Facebook has been described as “a moving target” (Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 2009, p. 
103). In any case, many users do not take time to read websites’ privacy policies (Solove, 2013; Lawler, 
Molluzo, & Doshi, 2012; McGrath, 2011) including Facebook’s (Grimmelmann, 2009). This is partly because 
of the way the policies are written (Wauters, Donoso, & Lievens, 2014), partly because of their length (Obar 
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& Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018), and partly because users are eager to get on with what they came to the website 
to do (Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018). Some website users take the mere existence of a privacy policy as a 
good sign (Waldman, 2016; Solove, 2013; Smith, 2014). However, users who DO take the trouble to read 
Facebook’s privacy policy will be confronted with a purportedly user-friendly policy that, in actuality, 
presents Facebook’s practices in an unclear manner (faux-friendly, vague, oblique, and misleading) (Meyer, 
2018; Hans 2012; Hull, 2015), and these users may therefore underestimate the extent to which Facebook is
monitoring them. Also, users who wish to shield themselves from Facebook’s data-gathering practices may 
not know how to do so in terms of, for instance, installing tracker blocking (aka ‘ad blocking’) – and other 
privacy-enhancing – browser extensions (Narayanan & Reisman, 2017, p. 6; Taylor, 2019).1 2
Second, Facebook takes advantage not only of the “information asymmetry” (Hull, 2015; Khan, 2018) 
described above, but also of cognitive limitations and biases to ensure that users make non-rational privacy-
related decisions on Facebook. It has been found that although Facebook users (along with users of all SNS) 
profess to have privacy concerns, they do not always act in accordance with these concerns (e.g., Hughes-
Roberts, 2013; Reynolds, Venkatanathan, Goncalves, & Kostakos, 2011; Hallam & Zanella, 2014; Taddicken, 
2014). This “dichotomy between privacy attitude and privacy behaviour” (Kokolakis, 2017, p. 123) is known 
as the privacy paradox. The privacy paradox was first noted and researched in an e-commerce context 
(Kokolakis, 2017), with Acquisti and Grossklags (2005) proposing that “[consumers’] decision process with 
respect to privacy is affected and hampered by multiple factors [including]...incomplete information, 
bounded rationality, and systematic psychological deviations from rationality” (p. 26). The authors defined 
“bounded rationality” as “our [limited] ability to acquire, memorize, and process all relevant information, 
[making us reliant] on simplified mental models, approximate strategies, and heuristics” (p. 27), and listed 
“hyperbolic discounting” and “optimism bias” (aka ‘optimistic bias’) as examples of “systematic 
psychological deviations from rationality” (p.27). Hyperbolic discounting theory “suggests...that people have
a systematic bias to overrate the present over the future” (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005, p. 31), thus 
“discount[ing]...future costs or benefits” (Xu, 2012, p. 1088), and the term ‘optimistic bias’ refers to people’s
tendency “to assign a higher probability for an event with a positive outcome but assign a lower probability 
1 While some internet users object to online advertisements because they can be intrusive and annoying (An, 2016), others 
object not to the advertisements themselves but to the practice of tracking for the purpose of targeted advertising, as this 
comment on a blog post entitled “Are ad blocking browser extensions killing the internet?” (Smith, 2011) indicates:
A lot of us don’t care if ads are showing on a web page! What we care about is these so called trackers who [think] they 
have a right to know [our] every move [online]! This has nothing to do with showing ads! This has to do with invasion of 
[one’s] privacy! [And] we will do what we have to [to] stop the invasion! So if people [want] the ad blockers gone, get rid of 
the trackers! (R, 2017) 
Internet users may also object to online ads because they can be a security threat, or because they can make web pages take 
longer to load (An, 2016; Taylor, 2019).
2 Firefox, for instance, has an extension called “Facebook Container”, designed to “[prevent] Facebook from associating 
information about your activity on websites outside of Facebook to your Facebook identity” (Firefox, 2018, para. 6).
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for an event with an unfavorable outcome” (Xu, 2012, p. 1083). Some researchers have applied these 
concepts to an SNS context (e.g., Xu, 2012; Hallam & Zanella, 2016; Metzger & Suh, 2017; Kim & Hancock, 
2015; Debatin et al., 2009; Wauters et al., 2014), with Xu (2012) arguing that “due to the effect of optimistic 
bias, [SNS] users...tend to magnify the degree of control involved in the release of their personal 
information, while they often underestimate the degree of information access by others” (p. 1101). 
Optimistic bias is particularly relevant in an SNS context because the “networked” nature of privacy therein 
(Metzger & Suh, 2017, p. 205) ensures that users do not have complete control over the dissemination of 
their information, and must therefore place a certain amount of trust in their fellow users to keep their 
information safe (Metzger & Suh, 2017; Xu, 2012). Metzger and Suh (2017) also suggested that hyperbolic 
discounting may play a part in Facebook users’ “risky privacy behavior” (p. 227), as “the benefits of sharing 
information in [SNS] (convenience, social perks, peer pressure, etc.) are more psychologically proximal, 
whereas the risks of disclosure are more distal” (p. 227: authors’ brackets). Regarding information 
asymmetry/incomplete information and bounded rationality, Wauters et al. (2014) argued that because 
“searching for information costs time and energy” (p. 10), and “our [ability] to...process information [is] 
limited” (pp. 9-10), SNS users are not able to make informed privacy-related decisions.
Third, some writers claim that Facebook’s interface is not neutral: the interface entices users to ‘share’ 
(https://www.facebook.com) and discourages use of the privacy settings (Waldman, 2016; Jones, 2010; 
Light & McGrath, 2010). Not only are the privacy settings hidden, but they are cumbersome and not 
intuitive to use (Stern & Kumar, 2014; Watson et al., 2015; Hull, 2015; Madejski, Johnson, & Bellovin, 2011; 
Liu, Gummadi, Krishnamurthy, & Mislove, 2011). As is the case with users who do not read the privacy 
policy, users may want to get on with sharing or browsing on Facebook instead of taking the time to 
configure their privacy settings (Light & McGrath, 2010). In contrast, Facebook’s interface invites sharing 
and makes it easy to do so (Light & McGrath, 2010). Kehr, Kowatsch, Wentzel, and Fleich (2015) found that 
online interfaces designed “to elicit positive affect” (p. 626) (i.e., to trigger pleasant emotions) both 
increased user trust in the provider and caused users to “override” (p. 627) privacy concerns in favour of 
self-disclosure. Furthermore, the authors maintained, this process may be unconscious on the user’s part. 
Although the authors’ research did not involve SNS, they speculated that SNS users could fall victim to the 
“affect-eliciting newsfeeds on [SNS]” (p. 627). Waldman (2016) similarly asserted that Facebook “leverages” 
users’ trust in the platform and other users to “nudge us to share” on News Feed, and “because Facebook 
uses trust-based design, users may be confused about the privacy effects of their behaviour” (p. 193).
Fourth, according to Sean Parker (2017), the first president of Facebook (Allen, 2017), Facebook was 
deliberately designed to be addictive.
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The thought process that went into building these applications, Facebook being the first of 
them...was all about: ‘How do we consume as much of your time and conscious attention as 
possible?ʼ...And that means that we need to sort of give you a little dopamine hit every once in a 
while, because someone liked or commented on a photo or a post or whatever. And that’s going to 
get you to contribute more content, and that’s going to get you...more likes and comments....It’s a 
social-validation feedback loop...exactly the kind of thing that a hacker like myself would come up 
with, because you’re exploiting a vulnerability in human psychology....The inventors, creators – it’s 
me, it’s Mark [Zuckerberg], it’s Kevin Systrom on Instagram, it’s all of these people – understood this 
consciously....And we did it anyway. (Parker, as cited in Allen, 2017, para. 2)
There is no doubt that Facebook addiction is real (Caci, Cardaci, Scrima, & Tabacchi, 2017; Marino, Finos, 
Vieno, Lenzi, & Spada, 2018; Koc & Gulyagci, 2013; Chen & Kim, 2013), and research has shown that 
loneliness (Shettar, Karkal, Kakunje, Mendonsa, & Chandran, 2017), low self-esteem (Baturay & Toker, 2017; 
Blanchnio, Przepiorka, & Pantic, 2016), low self-control (Blachnio & Przepiorka, 2016), anxiety (Koc & 
Gulyagci, 2013), and depression (Hong, Huang, Lin, & Chiu, 2014) are associated with Facebook addiction.
Fifth, and this point is related to the above point, Facebook has become an intrinsic part of users’ daily lives.
Its use for many is ritualised, habitual, and a part of daily routines (Debatin et al., 2009; Giannakos, 
Chorianopoulos, Giotopoulos, & Vlamos, 2013; Gwebu, Wang, & Guo, 2014; Mouakket, 2015). As Luedtke 
(2003) stated: “SNS deeply penetrate their users’ everyday life and, as pervasive technology, tend to 
become invisible once they are widely adopted, ubiquitous, and taken for granted” (as cited in Debatin et 
al., 2009, p. 83). Debatin et al. (2009) agreed in relation to Facebook, noting that “interviewees tended to 
underestimate Facebook’s actual importance to them. This can be seen as an expression of the level of 
Facebook’s integration into students’ lives: A truly pervasive technology with a high level of gratification, 
Facebook has become an almost invisible part of students’ everyday life” (p. 101). Because Facebook is so 
deeply entrenched in users’ lives, the option of giving it up is not realistic for many who have Facebook-
related privacy concerns (Blank, Bolsover, & Dubois, 2014).
1.2 Facebook in context
Facebook users’ privacy concerns are part of a bigger problem: the privacy concerns of users of all social 
media, including SNS, and of the internet as a whole. While Facebook is the most popular social media 
platform worldwide, it is but one of many. Social media, in turn, are but one manifestation of Web 2.0 and 
the whole big data phenomenon.
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In 2008, boyd and Ellison defined SNS (which they called “social network sites”) as “web-based services that
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list
of users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those 
made by others within the system” (p. 211). According to the authors, SixDegrees, launched in 1997, was 
the first website to combine these three features, and was therefore the first SNS. It was followed by, 
among other SNS, Friendster (launched in 2002), MySpace (launched in 2003), and Facebook (launched in 
2004).
Because of the large number of teenagers using emergent SNS in the US, a major SNS-related privacy 
concern in that country at the time was the risk of sexual predation (Lynn, 2009, pp. 14-15). However, 
Ybarra and Mitchell (2008) found that SNS did not put teenagers at high risk of sexual predation: instead, 
teens were at far greater risk of sexual predation in the contexts of chat rooms and IM (instant messaging).3 
In 2006, Barnes, as well as Acquisti and Gross, highlighted a (then) new angle on SNS-related privacy issues: 
the privacy paradox. Barnes (2006) observed that teenagers and university students revealed large amounts
of personal information on SNS, and were then surprised when “parents, future employers, and university 
officials” (Public versus private boundaries, para. 6) read their entries. Similarly, Acquisti and Gross (2006) 
“documented significant dichotomies between specific privacy concerns and actual information revelation 
behavior” (p. 21) on Facebook. Barnes (2006) and Acquisti and Gross (2006) also expressed concern over 
user-corporate privacy issues on early SNS, with Barnes (2006) asserting that “marketers who target teen 
consumers can use stated, personal information gathered from social networking sites for purposes other 
than what users intend” (Privacy issues, para. 5), and Acquisti and Gross (2006) similarly noting that 
“misunderstanding or ignorance of...Facebook’s treatment of personal data are...very common” (p. 21). 
Thus, these early studies had begun to identify an SNS-related privacy paradox, as well as user-user and 
user-corporate privacy concerns on SNS.
Social media have been defined as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and 
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content”
(Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61). SNS are considered to be only one form of social media, the others being 
“blogs (e.g., Blogger and WordPress), microblogs (e.g., Twitter and Tumblr), social news (e.g., Digg and 
Reddit), social bookmarking (e.g., Delicious and StumbleUpon), media sharing (e.g., Instagram and 
YouTube), wikis (e.g., Wikipedia and Wikihow), question-and-answer sites (e.g., Yahoo! Answers and 
Ask.com) and review sites (e.g., Yelp, TripAdvisor)” (Gandomi & Haider, 2015, p. 142). SNS, along with other 
3 Chat rooms and IM were popular modes of online communication at the time. IM originated in the 1960s and is still hugely 
popular today, whereas chat rooms (“digital forum[s] where multiple people connect...for the purpose of discussing a shared 
interest” [De Hoyos, 2018, para. 4]) originated in the 1970s and reached the height of their popularity in the 1990s: according 
to De Hoyos (2018), “in 1997, at the height of the chat room craze, AOL hosted 19 million [chat rooms]” (para. 5).
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forms of social media, encapsulate both the user benefits and privacy risks of Web 2.0.
Web 2.0 is conceptualised as the “Web-as-participation-platform”, as opposed to Web 1.0, the “Web-as-
information-source” (Song, 2010, p. 251). The advent of Web 2.0 has given us new ways to communicate 
with one another (Song, 2010), but it has also raised new online privacy issues (Caviglione & Coccoli, 2010). 
Prior to Web 2.0, privacy issues related largely to user-corporate interaction, but now they relate equally to 
user-corporate and user-user interaction. Now, users have to worry about the loss of their privacy to other 
users, while the threat of loss of privacy to corporations grows ever larger due to new data gathering tools, 
the collation of databases, and the application of algorithms to data to glean new facts from the 
information available about us. Corporate data gathering, collation, analysis, and consequent action 
comprise the big data phenomenon (Herschell & Miori, 2017; Schwartz, 2011; Sivarajah, Kamal, Irani, & 
Weerakkody, 2016; Gandomi & Haider, 2015; Krasavac, Sodic-Aleksic, & Petkovic, 2016). 
Central to the big data phenomenon are data, gathered through users’ networked activity. Big data have 
been defined as “high-volume, high-velocity and/or high-variety information assets” (Gartner, 2019). The 
terms volume, velocity, and variety are often used to describe big data, and refer, respectively, to “the 
magnitude of the data”, “the rate at which data are generated, and the speed at which it should be analyzed
and acted upon”, and “the structural heterogeneity of a dataset” (Gandomi & Haider, 2015, p. 138). Big 
data, “when appropriately managed, processed and analyzed, have the potential to generate new 
knowledge [providing] innovative and actionable insights for businesses” (Sivarajah et al., 2016, p. 264). 
However, despite its corporate advantages, the big data phenomenon is a growing concern from a privacy 
viewpoint (Herschell & Miori, 2017; Matzner, 2014). As networked devices become more pervasive, the 
volume of user data is growing exponentially (Krasavac et al., 2016). All networked devices contribute to the
accumulation of user data: these include screen-based devices such as computers, tablets, and 
smartphones, as well as “smart devices”, including fitness trackers and automated home appliances, 
collectively known as “The Internet of Things” (IoT) (Thierer, 2015). The more ‘connected’ we are via the 
devices we incorporate into our lives, and the more we live our lives online via Web 2.0 enabled social 
media, the more vulnerable we are to corporate and fellow-user breaches of privacy (Thierer, 2015; 
Caviglione & Coccoli, 2010).
Third-party website tracking for the purpose of ad targeting, sometimes referred to as online behavioural 
advertising (OBA) (e.g., European Advertising Standards Alliance, 2016),4 is rife across the internet 
4 According to the European Advertising Standards Alliance (2016): “OBA describes a technique to serve online advertisements 
that are targeted to the user’s potential interests. In order to be able to target ads, ad tech companies try to predict a user’s 
interests and preferences based on the user’s past websites viewing record or mobile app use....This information about viewing 
behaviour is collected over time and across multiple web domains or mobile apps” (p. 11).
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(Narayanan & Reisman, 2017; Varnali, 2019): Google has traditionally been the market leader in this type of 
online surveillance, but Facebook is effectively challenging its monopoly (Englehardt & Narayanan, 2016, 
Section 5.1; Weinberg, 2018).5 In addition to being the major third-party web trackers worldwide, Google 
and Facebook also gain user information from their own platforms, including Gmail (in Google’s case) and 
the Facebook SNS. Facebook arguably has the advantage over Google in this respect, because its status as 
the most popular SNS worldwide, together with its requirement that users provide their real names when 
registering for the site, has allowed it to compile an extensive database of personally identifiable 
information about its users. Commentator Tama Leaver (2014) described Facebook’s “real names” policy as 
“vital to the financial success of Facebook” and as “a business strategy masquerading as a moral decision 
about authentic identity” (Leaver, 2014). 
In return for supplying their personal information, users can use Facebook free of charge. 
The thing we sometimes forget...is that Facebook is a free tool we can use to connect with over 1 
billion people. I have a tough time wrapping my head around that. We all do. And it is free!...[T]he 
functionality  of this free tool – mostly – is beyond stunning. A free platform with over 1 billion users, 
where you can store videos and photos and updates that would cost hundreds of bucks for me to 
store, via the cloud, and it is free. (Biddulph, 2017)
However, Facebook users – and, in fact, users of all commercial social media – would be prudent to heed 
this admirably expressed warning from Andrew Lewis (aka blue_beetle) in 2010: “If you are not paying for it,
you’re not the customer; you’re the product being sold” (as cited in Taylor, 2018, para. 3). Commentator Joel
Stein (2011) concurred: “You know how everything has seemed free for the past few years? It wasn’t. It’s 
just that no one told you that instead of using money, you were paying with your personal information” 
(Stein, 2011, para. 7).
It should be noted that neither Facebook nor Google sells personally identifiable information to third parties
(Rogers, 2018; Popken, 2018) (as opposed, in Facebook’s case, to sharing it with them and buying it from 
them):6 they hoard user information in order to retain their market edge in targeted advertising (Rogers, 
2018) (for this reason, both these companies have been referred to as “walled gardens” [de Poulpiquet, 
2017]), and thus need to be differentiated from games, apps, and websites whose primary or secondary 
source of income is from the sale of personally identifiable user data.
5 Google and Facebook also dominate the global online advertising market, together “account[ing] for more than 60% of global 
online ad revenues” in 2017 (Statistica, 2017, para. 2).
6 Facebook “shares” users’ personally identifiable information with its “family of companies”, and from mid 2013 to mid 2018, 
Facebook also purchased personally identifiable information from third party brokers (Reitman, 2013; Facebook Help Centre, 
2019c).
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The Facebook corporation’s major weapon in the battle for supremacy in the online advertising industry is 
the Facebook SNS itself, but among its other weapons, described in Chapter 2, are social plugins and Single 
Sign-On (once known as ‘Facebook Connect’), both of which allow Facebook to track users outside of the 
site. Uruena, Munoz, and Larrabeiti (2014) noted, in relation to Facebook Connect, that “the...huge 
popularity of Facebook...is both its main selling point, but also its main drawback from the privacy point of 
view. In other words, a private enterprise such as Facebook is able to know, not only personal information of
ours and our friends, but also all the Facebook Connect-enables web sites we visit each day, in real time” (p.
17). Social plugins and Single Sign-On (SSO) are not unique to Facebook, however: commentator Baratunde 
Thurston (2015), who uses Twitter’s SSO to create an account with and log into his chosen apps, likened 
Twitter to “the school janitor with a fat ring of jangling keys to various doors in my online life” (Thurston, 
2015, para. 5).                                                                                                         
Twitter knows that in February 2011, I signed up for My Pet Monster, and one month later joined 
UberCab, and one year later gave Instagram access to my Twitter feed. They put a tracker inside me 
and are learning far more about my habits than what I do on Twitter. (Thurston, 2015, para. 6)
Also key to Facebook’s goal of online domination is the Facebook ‘family of companies’. In 2012 Facebook 
purchased Instagram, a photo-sharing platform (Luckerson, 2013), in 2013 it made a failed bid for Snapchat, 
a popular photo-messaging app (Kelly, 2017), and in 2014 it bought the messaging app WhatsApp for a 
record 19 billion dollars US (Covert, 2014). Also, in 2014, despite negative user backlash, Facebook forced 
users who wished to keep using its own messaging platform, Messenger, which had previously been 
integrated into Facebook’s interface, to download it as a separate application (Chowdhry, 2014). Why did 
Facebook purchase, or attempt to purchase, platforms with similar functionality to its Messenger app or to 
Facebook itself, and separate Messenger from the core Facebook interface? Some commentators believe 
that Facebook is trying to gain control of the social media and social messaging market by purchasing as 
many of these platforms as it can, and that by making Messenger a standalone platform, it may attract non-
Facebook users and even “[persuade them] to hit that button to upgrade to a full Facebook account” 
(Gibbs, 2016, para. 12). And the ploy is working: four out of the six most popular social media and social 
messaging platforms worldwide are owned by the Facebook corporation. In July 2019, Facebook itself was 
the most popular platform worldwide with 2.375 billion MUA (Monthly Active Users), WhatsApp was the 
third most popular with 1.6 billion MUA, Messenger was next with 1.3 billion MUA, and Instagram was sixth
with one billion MUA (Clement, 2019). In a twist to this strategy, Facebook is in the process of integrating 
WhatsApp, Instagram, and Messenger “under the hood” (Winder, 2019, para. 1), with a planned completion
date of late 2019 – early 2020 (Isaac, 2019). The planned integration will keep the apps as separate entities 
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but will enable users to communicate between them. The Facebook corporation has been collating and 
cross-referencing data from users of these platforms for years (Instagram Help Centre, 2019; WhatstsApp 
FAQ, 2019; Facebook, 2018), but user-corporate privacy concerns are likely to intensify after the integration 
(Isaac, 2019; Winder, 2019, Cyphers, 2019).
In the preceding paragraphs, I have contextualised Facebook’s data-gathering practices by clarifying that 
Facebook is not the only company to compromise user privacy by tracking users online. So too, Facebook is 
not the only SNS – or, more broadly, social media platform – found to exert both positive and negative 
effects on users. A UK study (Royal Society for Public Health [RSPH], 2017) found that out of five social 
media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, and Snapchat), only one (YouTube) actually had a 
“net positive” effect on users’ psychological wellbeing, whereas the other four had a “net negative” effect, 
Instagram and Snapchat having the worst effect (p. 18). The study found that the negative effects of social 
media included increased anxiety and depression, sleep deprivation, poor body image, cyberbullying, and 
FoMO (Fear of Missing Out), and the researchers even went so far as to recommend “the introduction of a 
pop-up heavy usage warning on social media” (p. 24). However, the study also found positive effects of 
social media use, including “emotional support and community building” (p. 14), “self-expression and self-
identity” (p. 14), and “making, maintaining and building upon relationships” (p. 16). 
Other studies have confirmed the findings of the RSPH study (2017) regarding the benefits of social media 
use. For instance, it has been found that “supportive interaction” on SNS (including but not limited to 
Facebook) increased users’ “sense of community” and “life-satisfaction” (Oh, Ozkaya, & LaRose, 2014, p. 
69), and that social media facilitated the building of bridging and bonding social capital (Phua, Jin, & Kim, 
2017). However, a number of studies have also found an association between social media use and anxiety 
(Vannucci, Flannery, & Ohannessian, 2017), depression (Lin et al., 2016), sleep disturbance (Levenson, 
Shensa, Sidani, Colditz, & Primack, 2016), body image concerns (Cohen, Newton-John, & Slater, 2017), 
cyberbullying (Lowry et al., 2016), emotional exhaustion (Lim & Choi, 2017), and FoMO (Przybylski, 
Murayama, DeHaan, & Gladwell, 2013). Additionally, it has been found that the way social media platforms 
are used may be related to some symptoms of ill-being: Shensa et al. (2017) suggested that it may not be 
the time spent on social media per se that increases the risk of user depression, but the frequency of 
access, and Primack et al. (2017) found that the more social media platforms an individual used, the more 
likely he or she was to suffer from anxiety and/or depression. 
I mentioned above that Facebook is addictive. However, Facebook addiction is part of a bigger picture. 
Receiving much media and academic attention at this point in time are several interrelated phenomena: 
social media addiction (DeJong, 2014), FoMO (Fear of Missing Out) (Przybylski et al., 2013; Elhai, Levine, 
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Dvorak, & Hall, 2016), smartphone addiction (Gokcearslan, Mumcu, Haslaman, & Cevik, 2016), and 
smartphone induced distraction (Duke & Montag, 2017). Social media addiction and smartphone addiction 
are considered subsets of “internet addiction” (Longstreet & Brooks 2017; Lin et al., 2015), a term coined by
Ivan Goldberg in 1995 (Flisher, 2010).
Social media addiction, sometimes referred to as “problematic social media use” (e.g., Shensa et al., 2017), 
has been defined as “being overly concerned about social media, driven by an uncontrollable motivation to 
log on to or use social media, and devoting so much time and effort to social media that it impairs other 
important life areas” (Andreassen, Pallesen, & Griffiths, 2017, p. 287), and is associated with depression 
(Shensa et al., 2017), low life-satisfaction (Sahin, 2017), and FoMO (Blackwell, Leaman, Tramposch, 
Osborne, & Liss, 2017).
FoMO (Fear of Missing Out) was first researched in an academic context by Przybylski et al. in 2013. FoMO 
has been defined as “a pervasive apprehension that others might be having rewarding experiences from 
which one is absent” (Przybylski et al., 2013, p. 1841) and “is characterized by the desire to stay continually 
connected with what others are doing” (Przybylski et al., 2013, p. 1841). FoMO is not experienced solely 
through social media use (Milyavskaya, Saffran, & Koestner, 2018; Przybylski et al., 2013), although social 
media use can exacerbate usersʼ FoMO because it allows them to be more informed about social activities 
that their friends are engaged in (Milyavskaya et al., 2018). Dossey (2014) stated that: “Social media that 
provide the constant opportunity to be ‘liked’, to have friends and followers, and which provide the 
continual possibility for a comparison of one’s status, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, are especially
likely to promote FoMO” (p. 69). FoMO “is negatively associated with both general mood and overall life 
satisfaction” (Przybylski et al., 2013, p. 1847), as well as “fatigue, stress and decreased sleep” (Milyavskaya 
et al., 2018, p. 725), and has also been associated also with smartphone addiction (Elhai et al., 2016).
Smartphone addiction, sometimes referred to as “problematic smartphone use” (e.g., Demirhan, Randler, &
Horzum, 2106; Elhai et al., 2016), has been defined as “the excessive use of smartphones in a way that is 
difficult to control...[thereby affecting] other areas of life in a negative way” (Gokcearslan et al., 2016, p. 
640). Loneliness (Darcin, Kose, Noyan, Nurmedov, Yilmaz, & Dilbaz, 2015) and social anxiety7 (Darcin et al., 
2015; Lee, Chang, & Cheng, 2014) have been found to be associated with smartphone addiction, but so 
have social self-efficacy8 (Chiu, 2014) and extraversion9 (Demirhan et al., 2016). These seemingly disparate 
7 Social anxiety disorder has been defined as “an intense fear of social situations in which the person may be scrutinized by 
others” (Leichsenring & Leweke, 2017. p. 2255).
8 Social self-efficacy is measured by the ability to “[maintain]...social relationships, [cooperate], and manage...interpersonal 
conflicts” (Chiu, 2014, p. 52) and “is significantly correlated to low social anxiety...[and] loneliness” (Chiu, 2014, p. 50).
9 Extraversion is one of the Big 5 personality traits (Demirhan et al., 2016, p. 822). Extraverts are conceptualised as being 
“sociable, forceful, energetic, adventurous, enthusiastic...and...warm” (Demirhan et al., 2016, p. 827).
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correlates of smartphone addiction can perhaps be explained by the fact that smartphones can be used for 
both social and non-social purposes (Elhai, Levine, Dvora, & Hall, 2017). The social features of the 
smartphone (e.g., social media and messaging applications) are of benefit to those who enjoy socialising 
(Chui, 2014), and also to those who become anxious with face-to-face contact, as they may experience less 
anxiety communicating via smartphone (Elhai et al., 2017; Darcin et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2014). Also, anxious
individuals may find that non-social smartphone use (e.g., gaming and web browsing) distracts them from 
their anxiety (Elhai et al., 2017). Interestingly, researchers have found that smartphone addiction is, for 
some users, not related solely to the smartphone’s applications and internet connectivity, but also to “the 
need for touch” (Elhai et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2014): “One addictive aspect of smartphone use is the 
pleasure derived from tactile sensations in holding the phone, and the autotelic touch...required in 
completing tasks with one’s fingers” (Elhai et al., 2016, p. 510). Notably, Duke and Montag (2017) found that
“a common personality type...underlies both Internet and smartphone addiction, with the greatest 
predictor of addiction being low levels of self-directedness” (p. 91). Similarly, Gokcearslan et al. (2016) tied 
“a low level of self-regulation skills” (p. 646) to smartphone addiction, and Cho, Kim, & Park (2017) found 
“self-control” to be “an important factor in the prevention of smartphone addiction” (p. 624).10
Hand in hand with smartphone addiction goes smartphone-induced distraction. Duke and Montag (2017) 
observed that “smartphones can distract us to a point where we are unable to achieve a state of flow at 
work....Flow describes a state in which we are fully absorbed by an activity, forgetting about space and time,
whilst being very productive” (p. 90). Smartphone notifications continually break users’ concentration, and 
“smartphones may facilitate the development of a ‘checking habit’, i.e. brief repeated inspections of the 
phone for new content” (Duke & Montag, 2017, p. 91). Inappropriate smartphone use has been linked to, 
amongst other things, inattentive and possibly dangerous driving (Sambonmatsu, Strayer, Biondi, Behrends, 
& Moore, 2016; Cazzulino, Burke, Muller, Arbogast, & Upperman, 2014), and impaired academic 
achievement in university students (Lepp, Barkley, & Karpinski, 2014; Hawi & Samaha, 2016) and secondary 
school students (Beland & Murphy, 2016).
In fact, France has banned smartphones in primary and lower secondary schools (Wolfe, 2018), the 
Canadian province of Ontario has banned smartphones in public school classrooms “during instructional 
time” (Jones, 2019), and the Victorian government will ban smartphones in state schools “from first to last 
bell” from 2020 (ABC News, 2019). In all three cases, the distraction of students from their work was cited 
as one reason for the ban. Also, a number of Silicon Valley employees reportedly send their children to the 
local Waldorf school where smartphones and tablets are banned from classrooms in order to “remove the 
10 Smartphone addiction can even cause physical harm: links between smartphone addiction and the development of neck 
disability (AlAbdulwahab, Kachanathu, & AlMotairi, 2017) and psoriatic arthritis of the hand joints (Megna et al., 2017) have 
been found.
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distraction of electronic media and encourage stronger engagement between teacher and pupil during 
lessons” (Jenkin, 2015, para. 11). Referring to this fact, commentator Paul Lewis (2017), writing for The 
Guardian, observed that: 
 
It is revealing that many...younger technologists are weaning themselves off their own products, 
[and] sending their children to elite Silicon Valley schools where iPhones, iPads and even laptops are 
banned. They appear to be abiding by a Biggie Smalls lyric from their own youth about the perils of 
dealing crack cocaine: never get high on your own supply. (Lewis, 2017, para. 13)
“Multiplication, division, addiction, and distraction”, anyone?
This research is based in an Australian context, and examines the following hypotheses: The demographic 
factors of age, gender, education, and cultural background help shape both the Facebook-related privacy 
concerns and social needs of Facebook users. These concerns and needs, in turn, shape users’  privacy- and 
social needs-related behaviours on Facebook. Users’ privacy concerns are also partly dependent on their 
perceptions both of what the Facebook corporation ‘knows’ about them and with whom it shares their 
data.
In Chapter 2 I address the definition of privacy, privacy taxonomies, the privacy paradox and privacy 
calculus, and privacy concerns in relation to Facebook. In Chapter 3 I explore the social needs aspect of 
Facebook use, drawing on psychological theory together with existing research on social needs on SNS. In 
Chapter 4 I outline the research design and give the background to the hypotheses. In  Chapters 5 and 6 I 
analyse the study data, and in Chapter7 I discuss the results.
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2. BACKGROUND – PRIVACY CONCERNS
In this chapter I consider definitions and taxonomies of privacy, highlight key privacy issues in relation to 
SNS (the privacy paradox and privacy calculus, contextual integrity, and the non-neutrality of web 
technology), relate Facebook’s history of privacy controversies, overview the twelve user-user and user-
corporate privacy concerns listed in the survey, and lastly, I outline suggested approaches to privacy 
concerns on SNS.
2.1 Definition of privacy
Many authors have difficulty defining the term privacy. Cooper, Faseruk, and Johnson (2010) claimed that 
“there is no clear consensus of what constitutes privacy” (p. 2), and Solove (2006) stated that the concept of
privacy “is in disarray [and n]obody can articulate what it means” (p. 478). A number of definitions of 
privacy, however, have one thing in common: they are based on the concept of control (Houghton & 
Joinson, 2010; Introna, 1997). A classic and oft-quoted control-centred definition of privacy is Westin’s 
(1967): “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others” (as cited in Introna, 1997, pp. 262-263). 
Similarly, Fried (1974) defined privacy as “control over knowledge about oneself” (as cited in Introna, 1997, 
p. 262), and Burgoon et al. (1989) defined privacy as “the ability to control and limit physical, interactional, 
psychological and informational access to the self or one’s group’’ (p. 132). Finally, Ramsey (2010) 
differentiated between the five senses of privacy, one of which was: “control over the flow of [our personal] 
information” (p. 288) (the others being: “freedom from interference and observation” [p. 289], “the 
maintenance of a sphere of inviolability around each person” [p. 290], “our need for solitude” [p. 290], and 
“a shared life [with loved ones, requiring] times of invisibility to the rest of the world”[(p. 291]). In this 
thesis, I favour Tomescu and Trofin’s (2010) control-centred definition of privacy as “the exercise of an 
authentic option to withhold information on one’s self” (p. 308), because the concept of an authentic 
option to withhold information on one’s self is particularly relevant in internet contexts, including 
Facebook.11
2.2 Privacy taxonomies
Some writers have endeavoured to classify the different types of privacy: Solove’s (2006) and Lipton’s (2010)
11 In Chapter 1 I argue that users do not have an authentic option to withhold information about themselves on Facebook, in part 
because they most likely do not fully understand what happens to their information on the site (information asymmetry and 
cognitive limitations), and an option cannot be authentic without access to and an understanding of the relevant information. I 
also argue that the non-neutrality of Facebook’s interface, the addictive nature of Facebook, and the fact that Facebook is an 
intrinsic part of users’ lives, further erode the authenticity of users’ decision to disclose information on the site.
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privacy taxonomies are particularly relevant to this thesis. Solove (2006) proposed four categories of user-
corporate privacy-threatening conduct: “information collection” (“surveillance” and “interrogation”); 
“information processing” (“aggregation”, “identification”, “insecurity”, “secondary use”, and “exclusion”); 
“information dissemination” (“breach of confidentiality”, “disclosure”, “exposure”, “increased accessibility” 
of information, “blackmail”, “appropriation”, and “distortion of information”); and “invasions” (“intrusion” 
and “decisional interference”) (pp. 490-491). Later, Lipton (2010), writing with particular reference to Web 
2.0, proposed five dimensions of privacy: “actors and relationships” (p. 494) (“all those involved in a privacy 
incursion…[and] the relationships between those actors” [p. 494]); “conduct” (p. 498) (“the types of 
activities individual actors may engage in that threaten privacy in one way or another” [p. 498]); 
“motivations” (p. 501) (motivations need to be taken into account, and may include those that are 
“laudable…in a democratic society”, “innocent or…careless” or “for financial profit” [pp. 502-503]); “harms 
and remedies” (p. 504) (privacy harms in the online world “can include shame, embarrassment, ridicule, 
humiliation, economic loss, or perhaps even more serious damage to the person by way of physical or 
psychological harm” [p. 504], and remedies should appropriately fit the harm done); and “the nature and 
format of...information” (p. 509) (“the substance or content” and “the digital file formats” of the 
information [p. 509]). Lipton’s dimensions of internet privacy differ from Solove’s in that she covers both 
user-user and user-corporate privacy breaches, and considers the motivations of actors, as well as the need 
for remedies.
2.3 Privacy paradox and privacy calculus
Key to this thesis are the concepts of the privacy paradox and the privacy calculus. Since the advent of e-
commerce in the late twentieth century, and prior to the immense popularity of SNS, privacy issues have 
concerned online consumers (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999). The e-commerce literature has consistently 
referred to the privacy calculus, whereby consumers weigh up the costs (loss of privacy) and benefits 
(material gain and convenience) of supplying personal information to firms (e.g., Dinev & Hart, 2006), as 
well as the privacy paradox, whereby “an apparent dichotomy [exists] between privacy attitudes and actual 
behavior” (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005, p. 26) on e-commerce websites. The privacy calculus and privacy 
paradox concepts have also been applied to SNS phenomena. The privacy paradox in relation to SNS 
maintains that users display puzzling behaviour in that they claim to have privacy concerns on SNS, yet 
appear to freely divulge their information on these platforms (e.g., Hallam & Zanella, 2017), whereas the 
privacy calculus claims that users weigh up the costs (once again, loss of privacy, but to other SNS users as 
well as to SNS providers) and benefits (including the satisfaction of social needs) of disclosing information 
on SNS (e.g., Dienlin & Metzger, 2016).
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2.4 Contextual integrity
Nissenbaum (2004) defined contextual integrity as a violation of “norms of information flow” (p. 137), and 
argued against “the tendency to treat information dichotomously as either private or non-private, with no 
middle ground” (Hull, Lipford, & Latulipe, 2011, p. 291). Instead, she claimed, all information is context-
specific: “Personal information revealed in a particular context is always tagged with that context and never 
‘up for grabs’ as other accounts would have us believe of public information or information gathered in 
public places” (Nissenbaum, 2004, p. 143). Nissenbaum used the example of the US initiative of putting 
public records (such as court records, and birth, death, and marriage records) online to illustrate this point: 
Although public records have always been available at the local courthouse, the difficulty of traveling 
to the courthouse to get them tended to limit their exposure to those with a significant interest in 
them. Placing records online makes them readily available to those with no connection to the 
information and no particular interest in it. (Hull et al., 2011, p. 291)
Thus, Nissenbaum argued, the context in which information has been provided should always guide its 
future use.  Pierson and Heyman (2011) called upon Nissenbaum’s (2004) concept of contextual integrity to 
argue that SNS users are not in a position to make an informed decision about whether and what to disclose
on SNS because they do not truly understand what happens to their information in a user-corporate 
context: specifically, the authors examined “the lack of user awareness regarding cookies” (p. 30). Similarly, 
Hull et al. (2011) applied Nissenbaum’s concept of contextual integrity to Facebook, arguing that News Feed
and Applications should “[make the] flows of information more transparent to users” (p. 289).
2.5 The non-neutrality of web technology
Brey (2000) argued that technology, including “the design features...of software” (p. 11) is biased, not 
neutral, as is often thought. He gave the example of search engines “which seem to have the innocuous task
of helping users quickly find relevant information” (p. 11) to illustrate this point: search engine algorithms, 
he claimed, “are far from neutral, and are often discriminatory, in giving the highest rankings to sites that 
are large, popular, and designed by knowledgeable computer professionals. In this way the search 
algorithms threaten the idea of the Web as a public space, in which everyone has an equal opportunity to 
let one’s voice be heard” (p.11). Because of the non-neutrality of web technology, Brey (2000) advocated 
the need for a (then) new ethical approach to computer systems – “disclosive computer ethics” – the 
function of which is to subject “technological artifacts...[to] moral scrutiny independently from, and prior to,
particular ways of using them” (p. 11). When Brey wrote this article Facebook did not exist, but other 
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authors have expressed the opinion that Facebook’s interface seems to encourage maximum user disclosure
paired with minimal viewer restriction via its privacy settings (Hull, 2015; Light & McGrath, 2010). Whether 
or not this anti-privacy/pro-openness bias is deliberate on Facebook’s part, it gives Facebook “a moral 
character” (Light & McGrath, 2010, p. 305).
2.6 Facebook’s history of privacy controversies
Facebook, by its own admission, is no stranger to privacy controversy in the forms of negative media 
coverage, adverse user reaction, and lawsuits (Facebook, Inc., 2018). Over the years, both user-user and 
user-corporate privacy concerns on Facebook have been triggered by changes to the privacy policy and 
privacy settings, new interface features, and scandals such as the Edward Snowden revelations, the 
‘emotional contagion study’, and the misuse of user data by Cambridge Analytica. Some of Facebook’s more 
controversial innovations include News Feed (2006), Beacon (2007), Tag Suggestions (2010), Timeline 
(2011), and Graph Search (2013). News Feed and Timeline, while still a part of Facebook today, required a 
period of adjustment on users’ part because they made users’ latest posts (in the case of News Feed) and 
past posts (in the case of Timeline) more visible to their Facebook friends. Graph Search provoked a mixed 
reaction due to its uncanny search capabilities, while Tag Suggestions, Facebook’s facial recognition 
software, was, due to privacy concerns, suspended in the EU and Canada for a time. Beacon, which tracked 
users’ commercial activity and used their actions in advertisements to their friends, was also discontinued.
2.6.1 News Feed (2006)
On September 5 2006 Facebook introduced News Feed (Facebook Notes, 2006a). News Feed is described by
Facebook as “the constantly updating list of stories in the middle of your home page. News Feed includes 
status updates, photos, videos, links, app activity and likes from people, [and] Pages and groups that you 
follow on Facebook” (Facebook Help Centre, 2019e). Although News Feed did not (and does not) violate 
users’ privacy settings, it made users’ posts more prominent by placing them on the home page of their 
Facebook friends’ accounts, thus making them the first thing those friends saw when they logged into 
Facebook. News Feed took users by surprise and some users were embarrassed when their information was
unexpectedly displayed in this way (boyd, 2008). Katherine Losse, who worked at Facebook’s headquarters 
at the time, described the scene at the office on the morning that News Feed was launched:
E-mail after e-mail of the thousands we received that day told graphically of the betrayal and 
evisceration the users felt....Phrases like ‘I feel violated’ and ‘You’ve ruined my life’ were common, 
and the emails were long and passionate, filled with all the personal details and drama that they felt 
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Facebook had exposed without warning. ‘I just broke up with my girlfriend yesterday and thanks to 
your “News Feed” everyone on campus saw a story about it this morning! How would you like it if 
people started publishing stories about your life without telling you?ʼ one user howled. (Losse, as 
cited in Driscoll, 2012)
Within 24 hours, a number of anti-News Feed groups had been set up on Facebook, the largest of which had
garnered 284,000 protesters (Schmidt, 2006). Zuckerberg responded with a Facebook blog post titled “Calm 
down. Breathe. We hear you.” (Facebook Notes, 2006b). In this post, he acknowledged users’ concerns, but 
did not give any indication that News Feed would be withdrawn (as indeed it was not). Instead, he 
counselled users to adjust their privacy settings if they were unhappy with News Feed’s exposure of their 
posts. Despite its ‘teething problems’, however, News Feed is an integral part of today’s Facebook 
experience (Newcomb, 2016). 
2.6.2 Beacon (2007)
Facebook Beacon, introduced in November 2007, allowed users’ actions (such as making a purchase) on 44 
of Facebook’s partner websites to be posted as “stories” (aka advertisements) on their Facebook profile 
(Constine, 2018). Beacon was introduced on an opt-out basis, but after user backlash was changed to an 
opt-in basis (Facebook Notes, 2007), and was discontinued in 2009 in response to a class-action lawsuit in 
the US (Perez, 2009). 
2.6.3 Tag Suggestions (2010)
In December 2010 Facebook introduced Tag Suggestions (Parr, 2010), which used (and uses) biometric 
software to recognise and ‘tag’ the people in photos uploaded by users (Geuss, 2011; Guynn, 2016). Tag 
Suggestions raised privacy concerns because although users could opt out of it, it was on by default, 
enabling Facebook to collect users’ biometric data without their explicit consent (Guynn, 2016). Concern 
over Tag Suggestions sparked a lawsuit in the US, and suspension of the feature in the EU and Canada 
(Guynn, 2016; Brook, 2014; Rosenblatt, 2018). In 2018, however, Tag Suggestions was enabled, as an opt-in, 
in both regions (Facebook Newsroom, 2018a).
2.6.4 Timeline (2011)
Timeline, introduced in September 2011, replaced Facebook’s Wall and Profile pages (techopedia, 2019). 
Before the advent of Timeline, users’ old posts were archived rather than displayed (techopedia, 2019), but 
Timeline, as Zuckerberg explained at a news conference on 22 September 2011, would display all users’ 
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posts in reverse-chronological order, becoming “the story of your life” (as cited in Sutter, 2011, para. 5). In 
other words, users’ old posts, previously hidden by the passage of time, would, with the advent of Timeline,
become much easier for others to view. This prompted privacy concerns (Kamdar, 2013a, para. 7), and a 
number of technology writers advised users to review their every post with a view to deleting or hiding 
sensitive posts (e.g., Paul, 2011; Jacobsson Purewal, 2012): for avid Facebook users, this was set to be a 
time-consuming task (Jacobsson Purewal, 2012). Over time, however, Timeline, like News Feed, has become
an integral part of Facebook.
2.6.5 Graph Search (2013)
Graph Search, rolled out to US English speaking Facebook users from mid-January 2013 (Facebook 
Newsroom, 2013a), was “a powerful semantic search engine” (SitePoint, 2015, para. 1) that allowed users 
to drill down to reveal obscure user content buried by context and the passage of time. Although Facebook 
assured users that Graph Search respected their privacy settings, revealing nothing to audiences that users 
had not allowed (Facebook Newsroom, 2013b), commentators expressed concerns about Graph Search 
because it potentially exposed users’ information to a far greater audience than the one for which it was 
originally intended (e.g., Kamdar, 2013a; Kamdar, 2013b; Garside, 2013). As was the case with Timeline 
(e.g., Paul, 2011; Jacobsson Purewal, 2012), a number of commentators advised users to review the privacy 
settings of their posts, photos, and likes to ensure that they were adequately protected (e.g., Kamdar, 
2013c; Nield, 2013). Over the years, “several members of the open source intelligence community built 
tools” (Cox, 2019, para. 5), including the infamous Stalkscan (Verma, 2017), to more effectively harness the 
capabilities of Graph Search. However, Graph Search was “turned off” (Shu, 2019, para. 1) on June 6 2019, 
without an announcement from Facebook. Privacy concerns were rumoured to be the reason (Shu, 2019; 
Cox, 2019).
2.6.6 Europe versus Facebook (2013)
Commentator David Meyer, writing for Fortune in 2019, claimed that: “Facebook[’s] legal woes in Europe 
over the years have been largely due to the activism of one man: Max Schrems” (para. 1). In 2013 and 2014,
Schrems filed two lawsuits, collectively dubbed “Europe versus Facebook” (http://www.europe-v-
facebook.org/index.html; Bodoni, 2019; Meyer, 2019). The first case targeted, in part, Facebook’s breach of 
the EU’s “Safe Harbour” agreement. This agreement allowed “the transfer of personal data from the EU to 
the US” with the proviso that it not “leave the company in control of it” (Murphy, 2015, para. 3). However, 
‘whistleblower’ Edward Snowden revealed that Facebook, along with other corporations including Apple, 
Yahoo, and Microsoft, had allowed the National Security Agency (the United States’ government intelligence
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organisation) to have access to – and to conduct mass surveillance of – user data (Greenwald, 2013a; 
Greenwald, 2013b). On 6 October 2015, the EU’s Supreme Court (the Court of Justice of the European 
Union [CJEU]) ruled that this surveillance, and Facebook’s complicity, breached EU privacy law (Murphy, 
2015). Schrems’ response to the ruling was:
I very much welcome the judgement of the Court, which will hopefully be a milestone when it comes 
to online privacy. This judgement draws a clear line. It clarifies that mass surveillance violates our 
fundamental rights. Reasonable legal redress must be possible. The decision also highlights that 
governments and businesses cannot simply ignore our fundamental right to privacy, but must abide 
by the law and enforce it. This decision is a major blow for US global surveillance that heavily relies on
private partners. The judgement makes it clear that US businesses cannot simply aid US espionage 
efforts in violation of European fundamental rights. At the same time this case law will be a milestone
for constitutional challenges against similar surveillance conducted by EU member states. (Schrems, 
as cited in Murphy, 2015, para. 19-21)
However, the “Privacy Shield” agreement and “Standard Contractual Clauses” which replaced the Safe 
Harbour agreement were challenged by Schrems, who argued that they did not solve the problem of US 
surveillance of EU data, and on 3 October 2017, Schrems won the right to have the case heard by the CJEU 
for a second time (Schrems, 2016; Schrems, 2017; Orlowski, 2017). The CJEU’s decision on the case is 
expected in 2020 (DLA Piper, 2019).
 
The second case was a class action lawsuit, capped at 25,000 claimants with another 55,000 “registered to 
join the procedures at a later stage” (Gibbs, 2015a, para. 4). The lawsuit focussed on the following user-
corporate privacy concerns: 
• Data use policy which is invalid under EU law
• The absence of effective consent to many types of data use
• Support of the NSA’s ‘PRISM’ surveillance programme
• Tracking of Internet users on external websites (e.g. through ‘Like buttons’)
• Monitoring and analysis of users through ‘big data’ systems
• Unlawful introduction of ‘Graph Search’
• Unauthorised passing on of user data to external application
(Schrems, 2014, para. 4: author’s bullet points)
The case was originally filed against Facebook in Vienna, Austria, on 1 August 2014 (Prodhan, 2014), but was
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passed from court to court till it was finally referred to the CJEU (Meyer, 2016). One of the difficulties faced 
by Schrems was that class actions were “a relatively novel concept in Europe” (Meyer, 2016, para. 3), and 
the Austrian courts did not know how to deal with the case. In January 2018, the CJEU ruled that Schrems 
could not bring a class action against Facebook, but “has the right to personally sue the company for the 
alleged misuse of his personal data” (Scott, 2018a, para. 2). Following this judgement, Schrems started a 
non-profit organisation called none of your business (noyb), to hold companies accountable for privacy 
violations, and filed a lawsuit against Facebook under the EU’s tough new General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) (Schrems, 2018; Corfield, 2018; TheJournal.ie, 2018).
2.6.7 Emotional contagion study (2014)
In 2012 two researchers from Cornell University in the US, Jamie Guillory and Jeffery Hancock, in 
conjunction with a Facebook data scientist, Adam Kramer, ran a study using 689,003 Facebook users, 
without their knowledge or explicit consent. The study involved altering the unwitting participants’ News 
Feeds to display either predominantly “positive” or “negative” emotional content (Kramer, Guillory, & 
Hancock, p. 8788) for one week in January 2012, the stated aim being to see whether this content affected 
participants’ mood, as evidenced by their ensuing posts. The answer was ‘yes’ (Kramer et al., 2014). When 
the study was released in 2014, it “spark[ed] widespread public outcry” (Klitzman & Appelbaum, 2014, para.
10). A Facebook representative responded by saying that the aim of the study was “to improve our services 
and to make the content people see on Facebook as relevant and engaging as possible” (Booth, 2014, para. 
8), and Kramer (2014), the Facebook data scientist who led the study, justified the research thus: 
The reason we did this research is because we care about the emotional impact of Facebook and the 
people that use our product. We felt that it was important to investigate the common worry that 
seeing friends post positive content leads to people feeling negative or left out. At the same time, we 
were concerned that exposure to friends’ negativity might lead people to avoid visiting Facebook.  
(Kramer, as cited in Hill, 2014, para. 4).
The researchers stated that the study “was consistent with Facebook’s Data Use Policy, to which all users 
agree prior to creating an account on Facebook” (Kramer et al., 2014, p. 8789).12 Grimmelmann (2014), 
however, maintained in his blog that, without obtaining participants’ informed consent, the research was 
both illegal and unethical. 
12 It has been claimed that, at the time of the study, Facebook’s Data Policy did not yet include the clause alluding to Facebook’s 
‘right’ to use user data for research purposes, and that, in fact, this clause was inserted four months later (Hill, 2014).
25
2.6.8 Cambridge Analytica (2016)
In 2014, Aleksandr Kogan, a researcher affiliated with Cambridge University, harvested data from 270,000 
users of a personality test app called “thisisyourdigitallife” (Paganini, 2018). However, because Facebook 
allowed app developers to access information from the Facebook friends of app users at the time, the total 
number of users that data was harvested from was estimated at 87 million (Facebook Newsroom, 2018b). 
Kogan went on to share the data with Cambridge Analytica, a data analytics firm, which then, together with 
associated companies, allegedly used it to influence voters in advance of the EU Brexit referendum in 2016 
and the US presidential election in 2016 (Scott, 2018b). The fallout from the data breach, reportedly 
discovered by Facebook in 2015 (Paganini, 2018; Prokop, 2018), prompted the company to further restrict 
the amount of information app developers could access (a process begun in 2014) (Facebook Newsroom, 
2018b; Paganini, 2018). Alyssa Newcomb, writing for NBC news, referred to the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal as “the biggest crisis of [Facebook’s] 14-year existence” (2018, para. 3).
2.7 Privacy concerns on Facebook
In this thesis I divide privacy concerns on Facebook into two types: user-user concerns and user-corporate 
concerns (Figure 1). User-user concerns relate to the ways in which other users may infringe on a Facebook 
user’s privacy, whereas user-corporate concerns relate to the ways in which the Facebook corporation and 
businesses affiliated with it may do so. The survey listed twelve Facebook-related privacy concerns, eight of 
which were user-user concerns, and four of which were user-corporate concerns. The eight user-user 
privacy concerns were: Bullying and harassment; Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me; The
wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos; Stalking; Identity theft; Fraud; and Someone 
impersonating me. The four user-corporate concerns were: Facebook knowing too much about me; 
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me; Spam/unsolicited email from businesses 
linked to Facebook; and Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook.
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Figure 1. Privacy concerns on Facebook
2.7.1 User-user privacy concerns
A major user-user privacy concern on Facebook is cyberbullying. Cyberbullying has been defined as “an 
aggressive, intentional act carried out by a group or individual, using electronic forms of contact, repeatedly 
and over time against a victim who cannot easily defend him or herself” (Smith et al., 2008, p. 376).13 
Willard (as cited in Kwan & Skoric, 2013, p. 17) identified eight types of cyberbullying: flaming (“angry and 
vulgar online exchanges”); harassment (“repeated sending of nasty and insulting messages”); denigration 
(“spreading of rumors and gossiping about a person online to damage his/her reputation or friendship”); 
impersonation (“caus[ing] someone to get into trouble or to damag[ing] someone’s reputation by 
pretending to be that person and sending material on that personʼs behalf”); outing (“sharing secrets or 
humiliating information [about] another person [online]”); trickery (“convinc[ing] someone to share 
humiliating information, then making that information available [online]”); exclusion (“intentionally 
exclud[ing] someone from an online group in order to cause hurt to the person”); and cyberstalking 
(“repeatedly harass[ing] someone such that the person feels threatened or afraid”). Note that all these 
types of cyberbullying have in common the “malicious intent to hurt a weaker party” in an online context 
(Kwan & Skoric, 2013, p. 17). Sometimes similar behaviours to those listed here are enacted on Facebook, 
but without malicious intent. For instance, a user may post or share content about another user without 
realising that this content is perceived as sensitive (i.e., private) by him or her. In such instances malice is 
not a motive, but the hapless userʼs privacy is nonetheless violated (Burkell et al., 2014; Lin & Lin, 2016).
Cyberbullying “has been theorized to peak in early adolescence and then to significantly decrease after high
school” (Kokkinos, Baltzidis, & Xynogala, 2016, p. 841). Accordingly, most of the cyberbullying literature is 
centred on teens (Lowry et al., 2016), but Lowry et al. (2016) found that adults do indeed cyberbully on 
social media, including Facebook, and that “heavy social media use combined with anonymity...fosters 
cyberbullying” (p. 962). Also, a number of studies have shown that university students have experienced or 
perpetrated cyberbullying on Facebook. Rates of victimisation have been claimed to range from 8% to over 
55%, and rates of perpetration have been claimed to range from 14% to over 22% (Kokkinos et al., 2016, p. 
841; Crosslin & Golman, 2014). Dredge, Gleeson, and de la Piedad Garcia (2014) found that “[the n]umber 
of Facebook friends and traditional bullying victimisation were...significant predictors of cyberbullying 
victimisation” (p. 16) among their sample of 15-24 year olds, and Lee (2017) similarly found that “sharing 
personal information with a large number of Facebook friends [was] positively associated with 
victimization” (p. 57) among her sample of African American college students. The author also found that 
13 Although “there is common agreement that bullying includes a repetitive behavior” (Slonje & Smith, 2008, p. 153), a number of
writers have pointed out that a single act of cyberbullying can cause the victim to suffer repeatedly (e.g., the taking and online 
‘sharing’ of a sensitive photo of the victim may cause him or her to suffer every time that photo is viewed and commented on) 
(Slonje & Smith, 2008; Dooley, Pyzalski, & Cross, 2009; Menesini, Nocentini, & Calussi, 2011), that act thus “meeting the 
[criterion] of repetition” (Menesini et al., 2011, p. 269).
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“online disinhibition – a lessening of inhibitions during online interactions that would otherwise be present 
in face-to-face interactions – emerged as the strongest predictor of cyberbullying perpetration” (p. 57). 
Cyberbullying victimisation in adults has been associated with emotional distress, poor concentration, 
anxiety and social anxiety, loneliness, depression, and suicidal thoughts (Crosslin & Golman, 2014; Dredge 
et al., 2014; Varghese & Pistole, 2014), and, in fact, some Facebook users deactivate their account in order 
to avoid cyberbullying (Crosslin & Golman, 2014).
Another user-user privacy concern on Facebook is the risk of other people posting sensitive information, 
photos, or videos about or of them (Debatin, 2009). Behaviours of this type with malicious intent may be 
classified as cyberbullying or harassment. However, users sometimes post sensitive information about their 
Facebook friends without malicious intent: sometimes, despite the best of intentions, wires are crossed and
signals about the confidentiality of the information are misread (Grimmelmann, 2009).
Many Facebook users feel continually uneasy about the wrong person seeing their posts, photos, or videos 
(Cover, 2012). The main cause of the wrong person seeing one’s Facebook content is what boyd (2008) 
referred to as “social convergence”. As Grimmelmann (2009) wrote: “Our social roles are contextual and 
audience-specific, but when multiple audiences are present simultaneously, it may not be possible to keep 
up both performances at once” (p. 1177). This problem is compounded by Facebook’s News Feed: News 
Feed publishes our activities on Facebook, including posts, photos, likes, and comments, on our Facebook 
friends’ pages, so what could be meant as a semi-private post may end up being prominently and 
indiscriminately displayed on all of our Facebook friends’ pages (boyd, 2008). Also, Facebook encourages a 
number of what Grimmelmann called “misperceptions” (2009, pp. 1160-1164), giving users the feeling that 
they are in a private space with their close friends, as opposed to an open forum with all their Facebook 
friends, or all Facebook users, or even the general public if their privacy settings have not been adequately 
tweaked. For instance, university students with unsecured information are likely to forget that potential 
employers may peruse the Facebook profiles of potential job candidates (Pike, Bateman, & Butler, 2018). 
A concern related to “social convergence” (boyd, 2008) is stalking. Facebook does not let users know who 
has viewed their content (unlike some SNS: e.g., LinkedIn [LinkedIn Help, 2019]), making it very tempting 
for users to peruse fellow users’ pages. Take, for example, the musings of a hapless journalist with ‘no life’ 
spending her evenings stalking old classmates on Facebook:
My 10-year high school reunion is less than a month away, and I can’t really see the point in going. 
Don’t get me wrong, as an awkward teenager I had dreamt of coming back to school in 10 years’ time
and wowing everyone with how successful I was. I would see my arch-nemesis amount to nothing, 
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and the boy who used to throw my shoes on the roof of our science block, would fall over himself to 
apologise for being a twerp. But those dreams are long behind me, not because I have grown into a 
better person, sadly, but rather that Facebook has gone and ruined it. Now every Saturday night is a 
school reunion for me; it’s just that my former school mates don’t know they are invited. Thanks to 
Facebook, my insatiable desire to know everyone’s business knows no bounds. I already know my 
arch-nemesis has not developed an exotic facial fungus. I know that she is just as gorgeous as she was
at school and is incredibly successful in her chosen field – in fact I even know that she had Thai for 
dinner last Thursday. This kind of information is usually reserved for a stalker, but thanks to Facebook,
I can enjoy all of the benefits of being a hard-core bush creeper without the risk of prosecution. I also 
know that the boy who picked on me relentlessly, ended up on A Current Affair for abusing a pair of 
teenagers on a train. The chances of him apologising for being a jerk are slim, considering he still is 
one. Then there’s the matter of being a huge success. The most significant thing I have done this year 
was getting drunk enough to buy $250 worth of Tupperware. It was my rent money. I’ll hardly be 
ramming that down anyone’s throat. (Confessions of a ‘Facestalker’, 2013)
Seriously, though, ‘facestalking’ (Young, 2011) (the practice of surreptitiously viewing others’ pages on 
Facebook [p. 26]) is one of the attractions of Facebook (Chaulk & Jones, 2011). Users can use the privacy 
settings to limit most of their profile to friends only, but they cannot hide what Facebook refers to as their 
‘public’ information (Facebook Help Centre, 2019f).  Facestalking can be a benign activity prompted by 
curiosity or even concern (Young, 2011), but it can also be motivated by jealousy (Fleuriet, Cole, & Guerrero,
2014; Muise, Christofides, & Desmarais, 2014), and can even lead to physical stalking, depending upon what
information has been made available on Facebook (Gross & Acquisti, 2005).
Facebook users are also concerned about fraudulent attacks on Facebook, (Al-Shamaileh, 2018) and, 
according to Vishwanath (2014), rightly so. Phishing, “a form of deception in which an attacker attempts to 
fraudulently acquire sensitive information from a victim by impersonating a trustworthy entity” (Jagatic, 
Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer, 2007, p. 94), was traditionally perpetrated via email, but is increasingly 
perpetrated using social media, including Facebook (Vishwanath, 2014). Social media attacks are claimed to 
be much more successful than email attacks, with studies reporting “a 40% success rate”, as opposed to a 
“1% success rate” for email attacks (Vishwnatha, 2014, p. 84). A phishing attack on Facebook is a two stage 
process (Vishwanath, 2014). In “the first stage [of the attack]” (p. 84), the phisher sends the victim a friend 
request. Once the request has been accepted, the phisher has access to the victim’s non-public information,
as well as information about the victim’s friends and friends of friends. In “the second stage of the attack” 
(p. 84), the phisher requests critical information from the victim by directly engaging with him or her on 
Facebook, and then uses this information to defraud him or her: information gleaned from the victim’s 
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News Feed, profile, and posts makes the phisher sound genuine and personable during this process of 
engagement (Vishwanath, 2014). Vishwanath (2014) noted that “social media attacks have the potential for 
contagion effects, where the first few victims result in many more victims who see their friends appear as 
connections to the phisher and [therefore] believe in the legitimacy of the phisher” (p. 84). Fake or 
duplicate Facebook profiles are also used to defraud Facebook users: Vishwanath (2014) gave the example 
of a case in which “con artists used photographs and names of real U.S. army soldiers to create Facebook 
profiles, friend women using these profiles, and scam them” (p. 84). The author found that the key risk 
factor for being a victim of a phishing attack on Facebook was “habitual Facebook use” (p. 94) which 
involved routinely accepting friend requests from unknown others, leading to the indiscriminant 
accumulation of a large number of Facebook friends.
Even the Facebook corporation acknowledges the threat to user data on Facebook through fraud, malware, 
and viruses:
Our industry is prone to cyber-attacks, with third parties seeking unauthorized access to our data or 
users’ data....In addition, computer malware, viruses, social engineering (predominantly spear 
phishing attacks), and general hacking have become more prevalent in our industry, have occurred on
our systems in the past, and may occur on our systems in the future....Our efforts to protect our 
company data or the information we receive may also be unsuccessful due to software bugs or other 
technical malfunctions, employee, contractor, or vendor error or malfeasance, government 
surveillance, or other threats that evolve. In addition, third parties may attempt to fraudulently 
induce employees or users to disclose information in order to gain access to our data or our users’ 
data. Cyber-attacks continue to evolve in sophistication and volume, and inherently may be difficult 
to detect for long periods of time. (Facebook, Inc., 2018, p. 14)
2.7.2 User-corporate privacy concerns
Some users may feel uneasy about the extent of Facebook’s knowledge about them (Stern, 2018), and with 
good reason, because Facebook has a number of ways of obtaining information about its users. Firstly, it 
obtains information about users from their Facebook profiles, their updates, and from their interactions 
with other users on the site.
Secondly, Facebook users are tracked outside of Facebook via Facebook’s ubiquitous ‘Like’ button and its 
other social plugins, which are displayed on third-party websites. These social plugins track the viewer 
regardless of whether or not he or she clicks on them or is logged into Facebook. In fact, Facebook tracks all 
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visitors to websites displaying its social plugins, including those visitors who do not have a Facebook 
account (Facebook Newsroom, 2018c; ACLU of Northern California et al., 2010; Simonite, 2015, Hanson, 
2015). For this reason, and because the ‘Like’ button is found on so many websites, including government 
and health websites (Gibbs, 2015b), it has raised the ire of privacy advocates the world over (ACLU of 
Northern California et al., 2010; Shah, 2019): indeed, in 2011 the German state of Schleswig-Holstein 
outlawed the ‘Like’ button on websites generated by businesses within its borders, on the basis that the 
button violated Germany’s data protection laws (Daw, 2011), and more recently, in 2016, a Dusseldorf court 
prosecuted a German website for incorporating Facebook’s ‘Like’ button (Bowan & Govender, 2016). The 
‘Like’ button has come under further threat in the EU, under its new General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) (White, 2019).
Also embedded on third-party games, applications, and websites is Facebook’s Single Sign-On function 
(SSO),14 labelled ‘Facebook Login’ (Dolcourt, 2010; Facebook for Developers, 2019a). Facebook Login 
enables Facebook users to open an account with or log into third-party websites using their Facebook 
credentials. The advantage to the user is that he or she does not need to repeat the account creation 
process for every app or website he or she uses, nor remember multiple passwords and usernames, but the 
disadvantage is that Facebook is privy to users’ activities on these sites (Thurston, 2015; Smolaks, 2019; 
Facebook Newsroom, 2018c). 
However, Facebook now has another way of tracking users across the web. From 2015, website owners 
have been able to use the ‘Facebook pixel’, a snippet of JavaScript code, to track the actions of visitors to 
their website (Campbell, 2018; Facebook for Developers, 2019b, para. 1).15 The pixel sends tracking data to 
Facebook, allowing Facebook to identify visitors, via their “browser, machine, and IP address” (Cukier, 2016, 
para. 4), if they are Facebook users. In fact, “if the same user uses several devices and several browsers, and
don’t we all, all of these combinations can be associated to one, single user” (Cukier, 2016, para. 4).
In addition, advertisers supply Facebook with data pertaining to their offline and online customers or 
contacts (contacts are people who have provided personally identifying information in the process of, for 
example, signing up for the vendor’s newsletter). The data that advertisers upload to Facebook include 
names, email addresses, and phone numbers, together with customers’ online or offline purchase 
behaviours. Facebook then matches the personally identifiable details to its database, thereby tying these 
details to customers’ Facebook ID, in one fell swoop both increasing its data on those customers and 
14 In 2010, Facebook’s SSO replaced ‘Facebook Connect’, which had been operating since 2008, and which had provided 
approximately the same functionality (Rouse, 2010; Dolcourt, 2010).
15 Prior to 2015, Facebook had two pixels: the ‘conversion tracking pixel’ and the ‘custom audience pixel’. After introducing the 
new ‘Facebook pixel’ in 2015, it phased the other two pixels out (Campbell, 2018, para. 4 & para. 6; Facebook Ads Help Centre, 
2019a).
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enabling them to be better targeted for advertisements (AdEspresso, 2019, Types of custom audiences; 
Finn, 2017, #7; Facebook Ads Help Centre, 2019b; Facebook Ads Help Centre, 2019c; Facebook Help Centre, 
2019g;).16 
Moreover, from mid-2013 to mid-2018, Facebook purchased data about its users from external data brokers
(Reitman, 2013; Hatmaker, 2018; Facebook Help Centre, 2019c) (data brokers build profiles of subjects over 
a number of years, “gathering data from government and public records, consumer contests, warranties and
surveys, and private commercial sources – like loyalty card purchase histories or magazine subscription lists”
[Dewey, 2016, para. 9]). These data included sensitive information such as income, number of credit cards, 
and shopping habits (Angwin, Mattu, & Parris, 2016). Facebook used these data to slot users into micro-
categories, for ad targeting purposes, “such as ‘total liquid investible assets $1-$24,999ʼ, ‘People in 
households that have an estimated household income of between $100K and $125Kʼ, or even ‘Individuals 
that are frequent transactors at lower cost department or dollar stores’” (Angwin et al., 2016, para. 19). 
However, even though Facebook stopped purchasing information about users from third-party brokers in 
2018, Cyphers (2019) claimed that:
...over a year later, advertisers are still using data broker-provided information to target users on 
Facebook, and both Facebook and data brokers are still raking in profit. That’s because Facebook 
allows data brokers to upload “custom audience data files” – lists of contact information, drawn from 
the brokers’ vast tranches of personal data – where they can charge advertisers to access those lists. 
As a result, though the interface has changed, data broker-powered targeting on Facebook is alive 
and well. (Cyphers, 2019, Stop data broker-powered ad targeting)
But that isn’t all: Facebook’s ‘family of companies’, which includes WhatsApp (a messaging app) and 
Instagram (a photo-sharing app), ‘share’ user account information with Facebook (Facebook Help Centre, 
2019a). WhatsApp, acquired by Facebook in 2014 (Facebook Newsroom, 2014; Covert, 2014), started 
sharing user data with Facebook in 2016,17 and Instagram, acquired by Facebook in 2012 (Rusli, 2012), 
changed its privacy policy, effective early 2013, to state that:    
We may share User Content and your information (including but not limited to, information from 
16 Note that in so doing, advertisers will be inadvertently supplying Facebook with the information of customers who are NOT 
Facebook users. 
17 Due to legal action in Europe and the UK, WhatsApp has stopped sharing user data with Facebook “to improve your Facebook 
product experiences or provide you more relevant Facebook ad experiences on Facebook” (WhatsApp FAQ, 2019, para. 4) in 
these regions, but it still shares European and UK user data with Facebook for other purposes  (WhatsApp FAQ, 2019). Outside 
of Europe and the UK, “Facebook and the other companies in the Facebook family...may use information from [WhatsApp] to 
improve your experiences within these services such as making product suggestions (for example, of friends or connections, or 
of interesting content) and showing relevant offers and ads” (WhatsApp, 2016: author’s brackets).
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cookies, log files, device identifiers, location data, and usage data) with businesses that are legally 
part of the same group of companies that Instagram is part of, or that become part of that group 
(“Affiliates”). (Instagram, as cited in Schroeder, 2012)
In Instagram’s latest privacy policy, the wording has changed, but the meaning is the same:
We connect information about your activities on different Facebook Products and devices to provide 
a more tailored and consistent experience on all Facebook Products you use, wherever you use them.
For example, we can suggest that you join a group on Facebook that includes people you follow on 
Instagram or communicate with using Messenger. (Instagram, 2018, Information across Facebook 
Products and devices)
Facebook, therefore, has a number of ways of obtaining information about its users, enabling it to build 
comprehensive profiles of them. Its motive for so doing is to target advertisements to users in a precise 
fashion within Facebook itself and across the internet. 
2.8 Suggested approaches to privacy issues on Facebook
Most writers agree that there is no ‘magic bullet’ that will eliminate causes for concern regarding privacy 
issues on SNS. However, various suggestions have been put forward about how to better safeguard users’ 
privacy on Facebook. Suggested approaches are: to implement more user-friendly privacy settings, to make 
transparent “the flows of information” (Hull et al., 2011, p. 289) in a user-user context, legal measures, user 
responsibility, and open-source SNS.
Regarding the necessity for more user-friendly privacy settings, Hull et al. (2011) and Hull (2015) maintained
that Facebook’s privacy settings are hard to understand and awkward and time-consuming to use. Stern and
Kumar (2014) suggested a wheel interface which is, by contrast, intuitive, quick, and easy to use. Other 
suggestions for more user-friendly privacy settings include opt-in as opposed to opt-out settings (Noain-
Sanchez, 2016) and ‘privacy nudges’ (Wang et al., 2013). Some writers, however, have implied that 
Facebook’s interface deliberately downplays users’ privacy options, as Facebook is economically invested in 
coaxing users to divulge as much information as it can, and as publicly as possible (Light & McGrath, 2010; 
Debatin et al., 2009; Waldman, 2016; Watson et al., 2015; Heyman, de Wolf, & Pierson, 2014; Jones, 2010). 
It has also been pointed out that Facebook users are likely to be too eager to socialise on Facebook to take 
time out to adjust their privacy settings (Light & McGrath, 2010), and besides, the privacy settings are of 
limited use, because “mutual friends can share information about a user, even if she has barred one of them
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from seeing the information directly on her Facebook page” (Grimmelmann, 2009, 1186). In addition, there 
is no privacy setting that allows users to shield their information from Facebook itself (Chaudhry, Saleem, 
Iqbal, & Yasir, 2015).
Regarding the necessity for more transparent “flows of information”, Hull et al. (2011) maintained that 
“insofar as the cognitive model users bring to Facebook is offline friendship, they will need extra reminders 
that the ways they handle information and privacy offline do not port directly to Facebook” (p. 300): in 
other words, “Facebook needs to do a better job of making the flows of information on the site transparent 
to users” (p. 300). 
...when changes in context generate changes in flows of information, maintaining privacy requires 
drawing people’s attention to the changes in question....The software could [for example] 
prominently provide a ‘‘delete old updates’’ button, which would remind users that their updates are 
permanently on record, unless they take explicit counter-measures. The software could also default 
to deleting updates, requiring users to ‘‘save old updates.’’ Alternatively, the interface could be 
changed from the point of view of the reader: attached to each update could be a ‘‘view all of Mary’s 
updates’’ option, which would subtly remind users that the same option applies to their own 
updates. It could even be designed to send a notice to users: ‘‘Mary has just looked at all of your 
updates.’’ This is not to endorse any one of these design options; the point is to underscore that each 
of these design features embeds normative preferences about the distribution of information and 
how they develop. Automatic deletion of old updates, for example, would move Facebook’s 
community closer to an offline small town, where gossip travels quickly but is imperfectly 
remembered. Retention of updates, combined with reminders to that effect, would further 
encourage users to view their identities online as constructed and performative...This encouragement
would be magnified even more by a ‘‘Mary has just looked at all of your updates’’ option; users would
increasingly view their Facebook identities as subject to constant surveillance, and modify them 
accordingly. (Hull et al., 2011, p. 299-300) 
Other writers, however, have suggested that as users have gotten used to Facebook, new norms of 
information flow have been established. boyd (2008), for instance, argued that although News Feed was 
met with an outcry when it was first introduced, Facebook users have come to embrace it, and now write 
their posts with News Feed in mind. Burkell et al. (2014), too, maintained that Facebook is seen 
predominantly as a public, not private, space: “Our results reveal that online social spaces are indeed loci of 
public display rather than private revelation: online profiles are structured with the view that ‘everyone’ can
see them, even if the explicitly intended audience is more limited” (p. 974).
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Some writers have argued that SNS users need to be protected by legal measures. In relation to user-
corporate privacy concerns, Nissenbaum (2011) maintained that governments should “articulate a backdrop
of context-specific substantive norms that constrain what information websites can collect, with whom they
can share it, and under what conditions it can be shared” (p. 32). Although Nissenbaum’s comment was not 
directed at SNS specifically, it has great relevance to SNS providers. In relation to user-user privacy concerns,
Grimmelmann (2010) made an argument for applying product safety legislation to Facebook: “A site that 
violates [users’] privacy causes harms, and when those harms are preventable with better design choices or 
more careful programming, it makes sense to ask whether the site operator should be held accountable for 
them” (p. 816). He explained that legally, a) “sellers can be held liable even when the consumer is at fault in 
the accident [because] certain kinds of misuse are foreseeable at the time of sale” (p. 817-818) (e.g., 
“guards on a punch press keep the operator from sticking his or her hand in at the wrong time” [p. 820]) 
and b) “disclaimers are not a substitute for a safe product” (p. 818). Grimmelmann gave an example of a 
good design choice made by Facebook: the fact that private messages have a ‘reply’ button but no ‘forward’
button (p. 820). Another good design choice is the fact that “Facebook [allows] users to view their profile 
from the perspective of other users to see what information is visible about them” (Houghton & Joinson 
2010, 90). 
In contrast to the above argument, Debatin et al. (2009) placed responsibility for privacy protection on SNS 
with users: “Safer use of social networking sites would...require a dramatic change in user attitudes: a 
responsible and informed user with a high level of computer literacy – not just in the technical but in the 
sociocultural and ethical sense as well” (p. 102). Also in support of user responsibility, Croom, Gross, Rosen, 
and Rosen (2016) found that participants in their study could only name 72% of their Facebook friends. The 
authors therefore suggested that: “If [Facebook] users friending each other means allowing the person to 
take their private content into the public sphere, users should establish some basic criteria for ‘friends’ and 
realize that ‘friends’ they cannot name may provide a good place to start” (p. 140). Similarly (and as noted 
in Section 2.7.1), Vishwanath (2014) found that the major risk factor for being a victim of a phishing attack 
on Facebook was routinely accepting friend requests from unknown others.  
Hull (2015), however, presented a counter-argument to sole user responsibility for privacy protection SNS, 
stating that, despite their best intentions, “Facebook users do not successfully effectuate their privacy 
preferences, and...they often do not even know this” (p. 93). Hull (2015) cited two studies to illustrate this 
point. The first study was carried out by Liu et al. (2011), the authors concluding that their findings “strongly
[suggest] that [Facebook] users are having trouble correctly configuring their privacy settings” (p. 65), and 
the second study was carried out by Madejski et al. (2011), the authors similarly finding that participants’ 
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privacy intentions did not match their privacy settings on Facebook, with “93.8% of participants reveal[ing] 
some information that they did not want disclosed” (p. 11). Thus, according to these researchers, Facebook 
is at least partially at fault for users’ mismanagement of the privacy settings.
Finally, Fuchs (2012) suggested that we “establish and support noncommercial, nonprofit internet 
platforms”, including “open-source alternative[s] to Facebook” (p. 153). Diaspora 
(https://diasporafoundation.org/), launched in 2010, and Ello (https://ello.co/), launched in 2014, are two 
such alternatives. However, a major problem with these platforms, according to commentator Will Oremus 
(2014), is that most people use Facebook: Jim Dwyer, the author of a book about Diaspora (More awesome 
than money, 2014), commented that Diaspora “felt like a ‘ghost town’ compared with Facebook” (Dwyer, as 
cited in Oremus, 2014, para. 12). Oremus (2014), however, observed that rivals to Facebook, even if they do 
not succeed in wresting away the bulk of Facebook users, may serve an important purpose by “calling 
attention to [Facebook’s] shortcomings and forcing it to respond and adapt” (para. 20). Thus, perhaps a 
combination of legal pressure, user awareness, and Facebook’s response to potential threats in the form of 
competition will help to ameliorate privacy issues for Facebook users.
In this chapter I have discussed definitions of privacy and privacy taxonomies, the privacy paradox and 
privacy calculus, contextual integrity, and the non-neutrality of web technology. I have also reviewed 
Facebook’s history of privacy controversies, outlined user-user and user-corporate privacy issues on 
Facebook, and summarised suggestions regarding various approaches to dealing with privacy issues on 
Facebook. In Chapter 3 I look at what makes Facebook so compelling in spite of users’ privacy concerns: 
social needs.
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3. BACKGROUND – SOCIAL NEEDS
In the last chapter I detailed users’ privacy concerns on Facebook, and in this chapter I look at the socially 
motivated reasons why people use Facebook in spite of these concerns. I argue that people seek to satisfy 
two key social needs on Facebook: the need for self-portrayal and the need for belonging. I further suggest 
that, for the purposes of this thesis, there are two facets of self-portrayal – strategic self-presentation and 
expression of the true self, and two facets of belonging – intimacy and affiliation (Figure 2).
The term self-portrayal is inspired by Friedlander’s (2011) article comparing presentation of oneself on 
Facebook to traditional portraiture (i.e., “likenesses” [Friedlander, 2011, p. 3] created by visual artists). 
Friedlander noted that: “Portraiture sits uneasily on the boundaries between the objective world and the 
recesses of our interiority. So too, the subject in an SNS must balance his or her desire for an acceptable 
public representation with a need to express himself or herself in some authentic and private way” (p. 4). In 
a similar vein, I propose that Facebook is used to satisfy users’ needs for strategic self-presentation (Utz et 
al., 2012) and expression of the true self (McKenna, Green, & Gleason, 2002). 
Strategic self-presentation, sometimes called “impression management” (e.g., Goffman, 1959) or just “self-
presentation” (e.g., Nadkarni & Hoffman, 2012), has been described as “an actor’s shaping of his or her 
responses to create in specific others an impression that is for one reason or another desired by the actor” 
(Jones & Pittman, 1982, p. 233). According to Jones and Pittman (1982), strategic self-presentational 
behaviours are not necessarily “false”, but rather, “typically involve selective disclosures and omissions, 
matters of emphasis and toning rather than of deceit and simulation” (p. 233).
The true self (Rogers, 1951), on the other hand, has been variously referred to as one’s “inner self” 
(McKenna et al., 2002) or “inner identity” (Tosun & Lajunen, 2009), the “real me” (McKenna et al., 2002; 
Bargh, McKenna, & Fitzsimons, 2002), and the “authentic self” (Leary, 2003). Current conceptions of the 
true self are based upon psychologist Carl Rogers’ (1951) writings on the subject, and Rogers, in turn, “was 
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Figure 2. Social needs on Facebook
informed by Jung’s (1953) distinction between the unconscious self and its public mask, the persona” 
(Bargh et al., 2002, p. 34). Rogers, like Jung, practised psychotherapy, and for Rogers, “an important feature 
of the process of therapy was the work towards discovery of the true self, so that the person could express 
it more freely in his or her interactions with others” (Bargh et al., 2002, p. 34). 
Seidman (2014) defined the need to belong as “the fundamental motive to connect with and be accepted by
others” (p. 368). I propose that Facebook is used to satisfy users’ need for belonging in the contexts of both 
significant (which I call intimate) and non-significant (which I call affiliative) relationships. For the purposes 
of this thesis, intimate relationships are characterised by a deep emotional bond, whereas affiliative 
relationships are characterised by ‘common ground’ such as mutual interests (e.g., a sporting club), beliefs 
(e.g., a religious community), experiences (e.g., individuals met while travelling), or circumstances (e.g., 
workmates). Both intimate and affiliative relationships may be (but are not necessarily) grounded in a group
context18 (e.g., a common interest or family group). Finally, there is a continuum between affiliative and 
intimate relationships (Altman & Taylor, 1973; Claridge, 2018), and an affiliative relationship may, over time,
become intimate (Altman & Taylor, 1973).  
Intimacy is used, in this thesis, to denote emotional – as opposed to physical – intimacy. Emotional intimacy 
has been defined as “the sharing of one’s innermost self with another” (McAdams, 1989, pp. 199-200), and 
has been linked to mutual deep self-disclosure (Altman & Taylor, 1973), emotional support (Jacobson, 
1986), and strong ties (Choi, Kim, Sung, & Sohn, 2011; Rostila, 2011).
Henry Murray’s (1938) “affiliative attitude” is an umbrella term covering the desire for the whole gamut of 
positive interpersonal relationships: “To form friendships and associations. To greet, join, and live with 
others. To co-operate and converse sociably with others. To love. To join groups” (p. 80). However, in this 
thesis, I focus on affiliation in the context of non-intimate – which I call affiliative – relationships. Affiliative 
relationships are said to be characterised by breadth, as opposed to depth, of self-disclosures (Choi et al., 
2011), cognitive support in the form of specialised services and information (Jacobson, 1986; Rostila, 2011), 
and weak ties (Choi et al., 2011; Rostila, 2011).
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, I will explore concepts related to self-portrayal and belonging. However, because 
humanism, inclusive of motivation and needs theory, underpins a number of these concepts, I will firstly 
overview of the origins and fundamental precepts of the humanistic movement. 
18 A group has been defined as “a collection of people who interact with one another, share similar characteristics and collectively
have a sense of unity” (Matsiki, Dimou, & Daras, 2014, p. 68).
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3.1 Humanism, motivation, and needs
Humanism “flourished in academic psychology roughly from the 1940s to the 1970s” (O’Hara & Taylor, 
2000, p. 186) and is still “alive and well” (Kirschenbaum & Jourdan, 2005, p. 48) today in the forms of 
psychotherapy and counselling (e.g., Psychology Today, 2019). Humanistic psychology has been defined as 
“the study of man based on the assumption that, as a human being, he is free and hence responsible for his 
actions and their consequences to his well-being and growth [sic]” (Jourard, 1974, p. v). It is characterised 
by its compassionate, self-empowering approach to personality, and has been referred to as “the ‘third 
force’ of psychology, following on the heels of the [behaviorist] and psychoanalytic schools of thought” 
(Dye, 2008, p. 12). 
According to O’Hara and Taylor (2000), “as a psychology and as a pyschotherapy, humanistic psychology 
rests on four core assumptions”: 
1. From infancy to old age, human beings strive to actualize their highest potentials as unique selves at
the same time that they establish and maintain close mutual connections with others.
2. When this drive is frustrated by adverse environmental circumstances, people will attempt to 
realize self and relational potentials through processes of adaptation that result in psychological 
distress and eventually to suboptimal personality patterns.
3. People, including those with serious psychological problems, possess enormous inner resources for 
self-regulation and self-healing that can be accessed in the service of recovery, growth, and self-
transcendence.
4. Healing, self-actualization, and individual and collective emancipation is facilitated by participation 
in relationships characterized by a few key interpersonal conditions, namely mutual respect, 
warmth, acceptance, genuineness, and empathy. (O’Hara & Taylor, 2000, p. 186: authors’ numbered
list)
The two psychologists who perhaps best embody the humanistic approach are Carl Rogers and Abraham 
Maslow. Rogers is famed for developing a “person-centred approach” to psychological therapy, which is 
based on an empathetic relationship between the client and the therapist, allowing the client to achieve 
emotional growth via collaboration (Kirschenbaum & Jourdan, 2005). Similarly, Maslow “introduced the 
idea of the self-actualizing personality”, maintaining that “our definition of normality should be based on 
the best examples of humanity, not on a comparison with psychopathology” (O’Hara & Taylor, 2000, p. 186).
Maslow’s (1943) “hierarchy of needs” maps the steps toward self-actualisation, and is based upon Henry 
Murray’s (1938) “psychogenic needs theory”, the earliest of the humanistic psychological needs theories. 
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Several years later, McClelland (1961) presented his “trichotomy of needs”, also based on Murray’s work, 
and together with Murray’s and Maslow’s, his is one of the most influential needs theories of that era. 
Consistent with humanistic psychology’s positive spin, Maslow, McClelland, Murray, and Rogers are said to 
have “emphasized the positive growth potential in human character” (Leary, 1996, p. 301).
In his book Explorations in personality (1938), Murray, together with 27 junior researchers and co-authors, 
and based on the study of 51 young men, detailed a comprehensive typology of psychogenic needs, 
“presumably dependent upon and derived from the primary needs” (p. 80), such as air, water, and food. 
Murray identified a total of 35 psychogenic needs, as well as four “inner states”, and 12 “general traits” (pp. 
144-149). He referred to all this as his – “admittedly vague and incomplete” (p. 38) – “theory of personality”
(p. 36). Murray’s was the “first systematic attempt to document and describe the range of human [needs]” 
(Xu, Mellor, Xu, & Duan, 2014, p. 46).
Maslow (1943), however, apparently referring to Murray’s work, claimed that: “Lists of drives will get us 
nowhere” because “no need or drive can be treated as if it were isolated or discrete; every drive is related 
to the state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of other drives” (p. 370: author’s italics). Instead, he postulated 
that we have five needs, which we seek to satisfy in order of priority from lowest to highest (although in 
reality, Maslow [1943] claimed, any given need only needs to be “relatively” [p. 376] or “fairly well” [p. 395] 
satisfied before we seek to satisfy the next in the hierarchy). The needs, in order from lowest to highest, are:
physiological needs, safety needs, love needs (“love and affection and belongingness needs” [p. 380]), 
esteem needs (which are of two types: firstly, “the desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for 
confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom” [p. 381], and secondly, “the desire 
for reputation or prestige…, recognition, attention, importance or appreciation” [p. 382]), and finally, the 
need for self-actualisation, which is “the desire to become more and more what one is, to become 
everything that one is capable of becoming”: “A musician must make music, an artist must paint, a poet 
must write, if he is to be ultimately happy” (p. 382).
McClelland, in his book The achieving society (1961), explored the relationship between three of Murray’s 
needs – n Achievement, n Power and n Affiliation (in the needs literature, “the need for” is typically 
expressed as “n”) – and economic growth. Whereas Murray’s psychogenic needs theory is not well known 
outside the psychological arena – where it has exerted considerable influence (Xu et al, 2014) – both 
Maslow’s and McClelland’s theories went on to be employed in managerial training, and are still used in 
that context today (Rybnicek, Bergner, & Gutschelhofer, 2019, Dye, Mills, & Weatherbee, 2005; Commerce 
Mates, 2019). 
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Key terms in the early humanistic literature, therefore, were “need” and “drive”, but the term “motive” (or 
“motivation”) was later employed in similar contexts. In Explorations in personality (1938), Murray variously
defined a need as “an organic potentiality or readiness to respond in a certain way under given conditions” 
(p. 61), “an electro-chemical process of some sort which is inwardly felt as the force of desire” (p. 64), and 
“a disequilibrium which stresses toward equilibrium” (p. 67). He toyed with the idea of using the term 
“drive” instead of “need” but decided against it (p. 75), and did not use the term “motive” at all.  Maslow, in 
his 1943 treatise, however, seems to have used the terms “need” and “drive” synonymously, and he also 
used the term “motivation”, which he did not define, though he did state that: “Any motivated 
behavior...must be understood to be a channel through which many basic needs may be simultaneously 
expressed or satisfied. Typically an act has more than one motivation” (p. 370: author’s italics). Rosenfeld, 
Culbertson, and Magnusson (1992) later maintained that: “Drives follow from needs....A need becomes a 
drive when an individual’s energy has been triggered to satisfy it” (p. 2) and: “Psychologists have 
traditionally considered motivation as closely related to and following from drives” (p. 2). Also, Weiner 
(2000) stated there is no consensus as to the definition of motivation, “but most agree that an analysis of 
motivation involves the creation of principles to explain why people...initiate, choose, or persist in specific 
actions in specific circumstances. Motivational formulations thus include statements about the needs and 
goals of the person as well as the incentives in the environment” (p. 314). McClelland et al. (e.g., 1989), 
along with later writers (e.g., Vignoles, 2009; Xu et al., 2014), however, have used the terms “need” and 
“motive” synonymously.
McClelland and his colleagues were the first to explicitly differentiate between implicit and explicit motives 
in the needs literature (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Langens & McClelland, 1997): implicit 
motives “are largely non-conscious” (Langens & McClelland, 1997, p. 1) and “emotion-driven” (Michalak, 
Puschel, Joormann, & Schulte, 2006, p. 81), as opposed to explicit motives, which comprise “conscious goals
and duties” (Langens & McClelland, 1997, p. 1) and are “cognition-based” (Michalak et al., 2006, p.81).19 
Any motive can be assessed for its implicit and explicit dimensions,20 but it has been found that the two 
measures do not always correlate (McClelland et al., 1989; Neumann & Schultheiss, 2015). Not surprisingly, 
however, a strong correlation between implicit and explicit motives has been found, in certain instances, to 
be associated with increased well-being (Langens & McClelland, 1997) and motivation at work (Thielgen, 
Krumm, & Hertel, 2014). Most of the research in the area of implicit motives has focussed on the power, 
19 For research and assessment purposes, explicit motives are “derived from self-reports” (and are therefore sometimes called 
“self-attributed motives”) (McClelland et al., 1989, p. 690), but, because of the non-conscious nature of implicit motives, these 
motives are gauged “by means of a content analysis of the Thematic Apperception Test...[which] involves the writing of brief 
imaginative stories in response to certain pictures” (Shipley & Veroff, 1952, p. 349). The TAT was developed by Murray and his 
colleagues (principally Christiana Morgan) while researching the material for Explorations in personality (1938) (Smith, 1990).
20 These are referred to as, for example, ‘the implicit affiliation motive’ and ‘the explicit affiliation motive’ (Quirin, Dusing, & Kuhl, 
2013).
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achievement, and affiliation motives (Neumann & Schultheisss, 2015; Xu et al, 2014), largely due to the 
influence of McClelland’s work, though later research has explored the needs for belonging, self-
presentation, popularity, and affiliation, among others, on SNS (e.g., Nadkarni & Hofmann, 2012; Utz et al., 
2012; Park, Jin, & Jin, 2011).
The approach and avoidance dichotomy is intrinsic to motivation theory: “Approach motivation is the 
energization of behavior by, or the direction of behavior toward, positive stimuli..., whereas avoidance 
motivation is the energization of behavior by, or the direction of behavior away from, negative stimuli” 
(Elliot, 2006, p. 111). The need for affiliation (discussed in Section 3.3.3), for instance, is said to have “two 
aspects...(a) seeking affiliation because of the pleasant stimulus reward value of the affiliative relationship 
(approach behavior); and (b) seeking affiliation because of the painful stimulus value of rejection” (Shipley 
& Veroff, 1952, p. 354: authors’ brackets). 
Few studies have dealt directly with implicit and explicit motives or approach and avoidance motives in 
relation to Facebook use. Dufner, Arslan, and Denissen (2018), however, explored the relationship between 
Facebook content and implicit motives in the achievement, affiliation, and power domains. The authors 
found that “how people create and maintain their [Facebook] profile might...partly depend on their implicit 
motives” (p. 85), and therefore, “even though people may perceive a high degree of control over the picture
they present of themselves” (p. 85) on Facebook, they may unintentionally “reveal aspects of their 
personality” (p. 85) that they are unaware of.21
Regarding approach and avoidance motives, Carpenter, Green, and LaFlam (2011) found that Facebook 
users’ “motivations to either approach or avoid the perspectives of others” (p. 538) influenced their 
behaviours on Facebook. The authors explained that: “Some individuals are fascinated by the mystery of 
others’ thoughts and feelings and get real pleasure when puzzling out other people’s perspectives. Other 
individuals, however, seem to put energy into outright avoiding exposure to others’ mental states” (p. 538). 
Using Facebook “to find or court new romantic or sexual partners” (p. 539) or to cultivate “Facebook-only 
relationships” (p. 539) was associated with avoidance motivation in relation to seeking others’ perspectives.
However, using Facebook to “interact with people [one knows] in-person” (p. 539) or to “schedule or find 
out about activities” (p. 539) was associated with approach motivation in relation to seeking others’ 
perspectives.
21 Dufner et al. (2018) pointed out that the revealing of implicit motives on Facebook may have user-corporate privacy 
repercussions: “Even privacy-conscious users may inadvertently broadcast information about themselves that they are not 
consciously aware of. It might therefore be possible that some online advertisements are highly manipulative or violate feelings
of privacy, because they speak directly to users’ implicit motives” (p. 8).
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3.2 Concepts related to self-portrayal
Below I overview the theoretical background in support of the need for self-portrayal. There exists a rich 
body of work exploring the concepts of strategic self-presentation and expression of the true self. Influential 
writers, upon which the work of later writers is based, are Erving Goffman (1959) and Carl Rogers (1951).
3.2.1 True self
The concept of the true self was first espoused by the one of the trailblazers of the humanistic psychological
movement, Carl Rogers, who called it the “real self” (1951) and, in one instance, the “real me” (1961, p. 
205). The true self/real me is equivalent to Higgins’ “actual self” (1987) (discussed in Section 3.2.2), and is 
sometimes also called the “authentic self” (Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014), especially in popular culture 
(for instance, “Dr Phil” describes the “authentic self” as opposed to the “fictional self” on his website 
[https://www.drphil.com/advice/defining-your-authentic-self/]). Although Rogers did not explicitly define 
the true/real self, he did write that the therapist’s goal is to help the individual “become what he is” (1961, 
p. 167). Describing this process, Rogers (1961) wrote that he helped the client listen to “the deepest 
recesses of his physiological and emotional being” with the result that the client “finds himself increasingly 
willing to be, with greater accuracy and depth, the self which he most truly is” (p. 251). The true self has 
also been referred to as one’s “inner self” (McKenna et al., 2002, p. 9) or “inner identity” (Tosun & Lajunen, 
2009, p. 401), and Seidman (2014) stated that the true self “consists of qualities an individual...possesses 
but does not normally express to others” (p. 367). However, according to Rogers, (1951, 1961), the true self 
exists whether or not it is publicly expressed, and, in fact, whether or not the individual is aware of or 
accepting of this self.
McKenna et al. (2002) found that those who have difficulty expressing their true self in face-to-face 
interactions are more able to do so online, thus enabling them to form “real, deep, and meaningful 
relationships...on the Internet, and...these relationships [are] stable over time” (p. 28). Regarding SNS, 
Seidman (2014) reported that “those who feel able to express their ‘true self’ online are more active on 
Facebook, have more self-oriented motivations for posting, and post more personally revealing and 
emotional content” (p. 367), and Tosun (2012) found that Facebook users “with [a] high tendency to express
their true self on the Internet...use Facebook for establishing new friendships and for initiating/terminating 
romantic relationships more than...individuals with low and medium levels of the same tendency” (p. 1510).
Also, more recently, Wang et al. (2018) found an association between the need to belong and “authentic 
self-presentation” (“users authentically shar[ing] their feelings, thoughts, and life events” [p. 134]) on SNS. 
In this thesis, I use the term expression of the true self (McKenna et al., 2002) synonymously with the terms 
true self expression (Seidman, 2014) and authentic self-presentation (Wang et al., 2018).
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3.2.2 Ideal, ought, and actual selves
E. Tory Higgins’ self-discrepancy theory (1987) postulates the existence of ideal, ought, and actual selves. 
According to Higgins (1987), “there are three basic domains of the self” (p. 120): first, “the actual self, which
is your representation of the attributes that someone (yourself or another) believes you actually possess”; 
second, “the ideal self, which is your representation of the attributes that someone (yourself or another) 
would like you, ideally, to possess (i.e., a representation of someone’s hopes, aspirations, or wishes for 
you)”; and third, “the ought self, which is your representation of the attributes that someone (yourself or 
another) believes you should or ought to possess (i.e., a representation of someone’s sense of your duty, 
obligations, or responsibilities)” (pp. 320-321: author’s italics & author's brackets). According to Higgins, 
therefore, there are “six basic types of self-state representations: actual/own, actual/other, ideal/own, 
ideal/other, ought/own, and ought/other” (p. 321), and “discrepancies between self-state representations” 
will lead to emotional “discomfort” (p. 319).
Equivalent to Higgins’ (1987) representation of the ‘ideal/own’ self is Baumeister’s (1982) “self-
construction”, which is an attempt to “construct (create, maintain, and modify) one’s public self congruent 
to one’s ideal” (p. 3: author’s brackets). Baumeister (1982) differentiated self-construction from “impression
management”, which is geared toward Higgins’ (1987) ‘other’, and which I address in Section 3.2.4. 
According to Baumeister (1982), both self-construction and impression management are motivations for 
“the use of behavior to communicate...information about oneself to others” (p. 3).
Swann’s (2008) self-enhancement theory and self-verification theory also have elements in common with 
Higgins’ (1987) self-discrepancy theory. Self-enhancement theory proposes that “people desire...self-
enhancing or positive evaluations” (p. 430) whereas self-verification theory proposes that “people want 
others to see them as they see themselves” (p. 430). According to Bareket-Bojmel et al. (2016), the “key 
difference” (p. 789) between self-enhancers and self-verifiers on SNS is that self-enhancers only disclose 
positive information about themselves, whereas self-verifiers disclose both positive and negative 
information about themselves. Interestingly, Bareket-Bojmel et al. (2016) found that not only were self-
enhancing posts “positively related to the number of audience ‘likes’ and comments” (p. 793) on Facebook, 
but so were self-deprecating posts: Facebook users “who were ‘courageous’ enough to engage in self-
derogation were rewarded with social network support” (p. 793). 
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3.2.3 Self-concept and multiple selves
McConnell (2011) claimed that “most view self-concept as the content of what people believe to be true 
about themselves” (p. 3), and, more specifically, Graeff (1996) defined self-concept as “a person’s 
perception of his own abilities, limitations, appearance, and characteristics, including his own personality” 
(p. 481). Horowitz (2000), p. 208), however, stated that “each person can have multiple self-concepts, even 
contradictory ones”, but that “with maturation” these self-concepts may be integrated into a bigger, 
harmonious whole. McConnell’s (2011) multiple self-aspect framework, which “conceives of the self-
concept as a collection of multiple, context-dependent selves” (p. 3), supports this proposition. In a similar 
vein, Turkle (1995) proposed a multiple, fluid, flexible self: “The flexible self is not unitary, nor are its parts 
stable entities. A person cycles through its aspects, and these are themselves ever-changing and in constant 
communication with each other” (p. 261). To Turkle, communication between the different aspects of the 
self is of crucial importance, because it allows one to “have a sense of self without being one self” (p. 258). 
Reminiscent of Turkle’s fluid, flexible self, Rogers (1961) saw “oneself as a stream of becoming, not a 
finished product....a fluid process, not a fixed and static entity; a flowing river of change, not a block of solid 
material; a continually changing constellation of potentialities, not a fixed quantity of traits” (p. 179).
Turkle (1995) claimed, in regard to constructed personas on MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons – online games, 
usually text-based, and involving multiple players), that “[there are] places where persona and self merge – 
places where the multiple personae join to comprise what the individual thinks of as his or her authentic 
self” (p. 185-186). While Turkle wrote this prior to the advent of Web 2.0, and in relation to unabashedly 
fictitious personae, there is a common thread to the later practice of presenting different selves on SNS. 
Brivio and Cilento-Ibarra (2009), exploring this practice on blogs and SNS, concluded that “behind the 
multiple presentations there is something, the Self that allows users to feel a sense of coherence and 
uniqueness, multiple Self Presentations notwithstanding” (p. 115). 
3.2.4 Strategic self-presentation 
Erving Goffman’s acclaimed work The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, first published in 1959, 
introduced the concept of “impression management” (p. 203): this concept is akin to what later writers 
have referred to as “strategic self-presentation” (e.g., Jones & Pittman, 1982; Utz et al., 2012; Bareket-
Bojmel et al., 2016), or “self-presentation” (e.g., Schlenker, 1975; Paulhus & Trapnell, 2008; Nadkarni & 
Hofmann, 2012). These three terms are therefore used synonymously in this thesis. Baumeister (1982) 
described impression management as “the attempt to please a particular audience”, and listed “[the wish 
for] a particular benefit”, “a desire to be liked”, and “the desire for self-esteem” (p. 3) as motives for so 
doing. Grimmelmann (2009) noted that SNS “offer a gloriously direct tool for...‘impression management’: 
45
the profile page” (p. 1152):
Many users choose to display the most flattering photographs of themselves that they can. Each 
additional datum is a strategic revelation, one more daub of paint in your self-portrait. Facebook’s 
profile fields aren’t a list of things most important to its users; they’re a list of things its users most 
want to say about themselves. (Grimmelmann, 2009, p. 1152)
Less positively, however, Gil-Or, Levi-Belz, and Turel (2015) asserted that “some [Facebook] users decide, 
consciously or unconsciously, to present an identity or a self that deviates from their true-self” (p. 1): the 
authors called this the “false Facebook-self” (p. 1). Finally, Rui and Stefanone (2013) noted that on 
Facebook, users’ efforts at strategic self-presentation may be hampered by “other-provided information in 
the form of text posts and digital images on their profile pages” (p. 110: authors’ italics).
3.2.5 Narcissism and the need for popularity 
Narcissism and the need for popularity are both said to motivate strategic self-presentation on SNS (Buffardi
& Campbell, 2008; Ong et al. 2011; Utz et al., 2012; Nadkarni & Hofmann, 2012). Ong et al. (2011) described
the features of narcissism as follows:
Narcissism is characterized by a highly inflated, positive but unrealistic self-concept, a lack of interest 
in forming strong interpersonal relationships, and an engagement in self-regulatory strategies to 
affirm…positive self-views….Narcissists are exhibitionistic, attention-seeking, and are acutely 
concerned about their physical appearance….Narcissists are also often skilled with dealing with new 
social settings and with starting new relationships, though they mostly seek relationships which can 
enhance their status and positive self-views. (Ong et al., 2011, p. 181)
Ong et al. (2011) and Buffardi and Campbell (2008), studying the effects of narcissism on Facebook use in 
adolescents and college students respectively, found that the more narcissistic respondents were, the more 
content they posted on Facebook. Buffardi and Campbell (2008) thus suggested that “participating in social 
networking online is arguably attractive to narcissists in that it allows for controlled self-presentation, 
satiates the craving for attention, and promotes shallow relationships, all of which are associated with 
narcissism” (p. 1312). Later studies add weight to these findings. Ryan and Xenos (2011) studied 1324 
Australian internet users aged 18-44, some of whom used Facebook and some of whom did not, and found 
that the Facebook users tended to be more narcissistic than the non-users. Also, Smith, Mendez, and White 
(2014) found that narcissists were more likely than the general Facebook population to post on Facebook 
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but were less likely to use the privacy settings, and Winter et al. (2014) found that narcissism was associated
with “deeper self-disclosure and more self-promotional content” (p. 194) in status updates on Facebook.
Utz et al. (2012) found that the need for popularity (NfP), defined as “the motivation to do certain things in 
order to appear popular” (p. 38), predicted the following behaviours on SNS: “grooming (“cultivat[ing] 
bonds with others” [p. 38]), “strategic self-presentation, profile enhancement, disclosure of feelings, routine
use of SNS, and number of friends” (p. 37). Utz et al. (2012) took care to clarify the differences between NfP
and narcissism: according to the authors, narcissists “actually believe they are superior [to others, 
whereas]...individuals with a high NfP merely want to be perceived as popular” (p. 38). The authors 
suggested that SNS “are ideal venues” for those with a high need for popularity because they “facilitate 
selective self-presentation and provide users with a large audience” (p. 41). 
3.3 Concepts related to belonging
In Section 3.2, I overviewed the concepts of the true self, ideal, ought, and actual selves, multiple selves, 
and strategic self-presentation, together with SNS-related research concerning narcissism and the need for 
popularity. These concepts and studies form the basis of the self-portrayal component of this thesis. In the 
following sub-sections I overview the concepts of social support, social capital, affiliation, intimacy, and 
self-disclosure, which form the basis of the belonging component of this thesis.
3.3.1 Social support
In her review of social support definitions, Hupcey (1998) found that these definitions fall into five 
categories: “the type of support provided”, “recipients’ perceptions” of the quality of support provided, 
support providers’ “intentions or behaviours”, reciprocity (“an exchange of resources”), and the “social 
networks” through which support is accessed (p. 1232). Hupcey (1998) therefore concluded that the 
concept of social support “remains extremely complex and illusive” (p. 1239). However, for the purposes of 
this thesis, I will adopt Lin, Ensel, Simeone, and Kuoʼs (1979) network-based definition of social support as 
“support accessible to an individual through social ties to other individuals, groups, and the larger 
community” (p. 109).
Writers who have reviewed the empirical social support research advocate anywhere from two to six types 
of social support. Pattison, Llamas, and Hurd (1979), for instance, listed two types of social support – 
affective and instrumental – while Jacobson (1986) claimed that the literature reflects three types of social 
support:
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Emotional support refers to behavior that fosters feelings of comfort and leads an individual to 
believe that he or she is admired, respected, and loved, and that others are available to provide 
caring and security. Cognitive support refers to information, knowledge, and/or advice that helps the 
individual to understand his or her world and to adjust to changes within it. Materials support refers 
to goods and services that help to solve practical problems. (Jacobson, p. 252: author’s italics) 
Cohen and Wills (1985), however, proposed four types of social support:
Esteem support is information that a person is esteemed and accepted. Self-esteem is enhanced by 
communicating to persons that they are valued for their own worth and experiences and are 
accepted despite any difficulties or personal faults....Informational support is help in defining, 
understanding, and coping with problematic events....Social companionship is spending time with 
others in leisure and recreational activities. This may reduce stress by fulfilling a need for affiliation 
and contact with others, by helping to distract persons from worrying about problems, or by 
facilitating positive affective moods....Finally, instrumental support is the provision of financial aid, 
material resources, and needed services. Instrumental aid may help reduce stress by direct resolution
of instrumental problems or by providing the recipient with increased time for activities such as 
relaxation or entertainment. (Cohen & Wills, 1985, p. 313: my italics)
Cutrona and Suhr (1992, p. 155) suggested, based on their review of the literature, five types of social 
support: “informational, tangible, esteem, emotional, and social network support”. Informational support 
refers to “advice”, “factual input”, and “feedback on actions”; tangible support refers to “offers to provide 
needed goods...and services”; esteem support refers to “expressions of regard for one’s skills, abilities...and 
intrinsic value”; emotional support refers to “expressions of caring”, “concern”, “empathy”, and “sympathy”; 
and social network support “entails a sense of belonging among people with similar interests and concerns”.
Finally, Barrera and Ainlay (1983) documented six types of social support: 
Material Aid: providing tangible materials in the form of money and other physical objects; 
Behavioral Assistance: sharing of tasks through physical labor; Intimate Interaction: traditional 
nondirective counseling behaviors such as listening; and expressing esteem, caring, and 
understanding; Guidance: offering advice, information, or instruction; Feedback: providing individuals
with feedback about their behavior, thoughts, or feelings; [and] Positive Social Interaction: engaging 
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in social interactions for fun and relaxation. (Barrera & Ainlay, 1983, p. 135-136: reformatted from dot
points, my italics)
Regarding social support given in the context of SNS, Manago, Taylor, and Geenfield (2012) found that the 
greater the number of Facebook friends, the higher the level of perceived social support on Facebook. 
However, Lonnqvist and Deters (2016) conversely found that the number of Facebook friends was not 
related to perceived social support on the site. Chiang and Huang (2016) found that Facebook users 
communicated social support via likes and comments, and Niland et al. (2015) described Facebook as a 
place where friends give and receive social support in the forms of “emotional and instrumental assistance” 
(p. 11). However, there is a downside: “Facebook...‘reaches out’ through its affordances with ‘always on’ 
friend activities, calling for responses 24/7, and a ‘real’ friend is always there to respond” (p. 13).
Regarding the association between wellbeing and social support in relation to SNS, Shensa, Sidani, Lin, 
Bowman, and Primack (2016) found that those who perceived themselves as lacking in offline social support
spent more time on SNS than those who perceived themselves as having adequate offline social support. 
The authors did not determine causality, so it may have been either that the perceived lack of offline social 
support caused respondents to turn to SNS “to fill this void” (p. 4), or that spending “substantial” (p. 4) time 
on SNS led to the perceived lack of offline social support. Perhaps similarly, Tang, Chen, Yang, Chung, and 
Lee (2016) found that social support (in the forms information, affection, and companionship) received on 
Facebook was positively correlated with Facebook addiction. Also, Indian and Grieve (2014) found that 
social support given to socially anxious individuals on Facebook significantly improved their wellbeing, but 
Park et al., (2016), studying the relationship between depression and social support given on Facebook, 
found that “although depressed individuals consistently received more social support when they disclosed 
negative information [on Facebook], they paradoxically perceived themselves as receiving less social 
support than their non-depressed counterparts” (p. 43: authors’ italics). 
  
3.3.2 Social capital
The concept of social capital is said to have its origins in the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Emile 
Durkheim, Max Weber, Ferdinand Tonnies, and Georg Simmel (Koniordos, 2008; Rostila, 2011), but the term
“social capital” is said to have been first used in 1916 by Lyda Hanifan, a district school inspector, who wrote
that: “[Social capital...refers not] to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in 
life which tends to make those tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of people, namely 
goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse” (p. 130). 
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Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, and Robert Putnam are said to be the major influences in the 
development of the concept of social capital as it is used today (Bjornskov & Sonderskov, 2012; Rostila, 
2011). The late Bourdieu (1930-2002) is perhaps best understood in the context of an advocate for social 
equality. In his tribute to Bourdieu, Desan (2013) wrote that: “Bourdieu was a sort of patron saint for the 
French social movements of the past 15 years.....In a post-Marxist age, Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ offered 
a new framework for understanding social domination” (p. 135). Bourdieu (1986) postulated that there are 
three “fundamental” types of capital: economic, cultural, and social (p. 242). To Bourdieu (1986), social 
capital is “made up of social obligations (‘connections’)” and “is convertible, in certain conditions, into 
economic capital” (p. 242: author’s brackets): examples of social capital in action, according to Bourdieu, are
“‘a helping hand’, ‘string-pulling’, [and] the ‘old boy network’” (p. 258).
Coleman (1926-1995) was a “social theorist and empirical researcher” (Cooper & Valentine, 2003, p. 324) 
whose main area of empirical research was secondary school education in the United States. Coleman 
defined social capital, in relation to school students, as “the set of resources that inhere in family relations 
and in community social organization and that are useful for the cognitive or social development of a child 
or young person” (as cited by Cooper & Valentine, 2003, p. 325). Coleman also penned a more general 
definition, however, as follows:
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with 
two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate 
certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure. (Coleman, 
1988, p. S98)
According to Coleman (1988) there are three forms of social capital: “obligations, expectations, and 
trustworthiness of [social] structures” (p. S102), “information channels” (p. S104), and “norms and effective 
sanctions” (p. S104). 
Putnam is a political scientist best known for the publication of two books: Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy (1993) in which he postulated that some regions of Italy are more economically 
and governmentally successful than others because they have higher levels of social capital, and Bowling 
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000) in which he lamented the decline of social 
capital in America. Putnam (1993) defined social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’’ (p. 167).
Each of these three theorists has his own angle on social capital: Bordieu’s is neo-Marxist (or anti-
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neoliberalist), Coleman’s is the conversion of social capital to human capital in the form of education, and 
Putnam’s is civic society (“the ways in which an active community – one characterized by a high level of 
social capital – contributes to the welfare of society and the effectiveness of government” [Rochon, 2008, p.
641]).
The concept of social capital has been criticised for being “vague and somewhat obscure” (Rostila, 2011, p. 
312). According to Portes (2000), this confusion has arisen because Putnam (1993; 2000) focussed on the 
benefits of social capital at the civic level whereas Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988) before him focussed
on its benefits at the individual and familial levels. Portes (2000) asserted that Putnam’s “conceptual 
stretch” – his shifting of focus from the micro to the macro level – “was never explicitly theorized, giving rise
to the present state of confusion about the meaning of the term” (p. 3), and “causes and effects of social 
capital as a collective trait were never disentangled, giving rise to much circular reasoning” (p. 4).
Similarly, Fukuyama (2001) maintained that “many” definitions of social capital “refer to manifestations of 
social capital rather than to social capital itself”, hence the confusion about the definition of this term. 
According to Fukuyama, “trust, networks, civil society, and the like...are all epiphenominal, arising as a 
result of social capital but not constituting social capital itself” (p. 7). He himself defined social capital as “an
instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals” (p. 7). Fukuyama 
further stated that, according to his definition, any co-operative norm: e.g., “honesty, the keeping of 
commitments, reliable performance of duties, reciprocity, and the like” can constitute social capital (p. 8).
But how does one qualify social capital? Putnam (2000) introduced the terms “bonding” and “bridging” in 
relation to social capital. It has been suggested that bonding social capital is based on “ascribed trust” 
whereas bridging social capital is based on “earned trust” (Claridge, 2018, p. 1). Bonding capital is likely to 
supply us with, in Jacobson’s lexicon (1986) (referred to in Section 3.3.1), emotional and material support, 
and bridging capital is likely to provide us with cognitive support in the form of “novel information” (Choi et 
al., 2011, pp. 109). Putnam’s bridging and bonding social capital roughly equate with Granovetter’s (1973) 
“strong” and “weak” ties: strong ties are equivalent to bonding capital, and weak ties to bridging capital 
(Choi et al., 2011, p. 109-110). Granovetter (1973) proposed that “the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) 
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the 
reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (p. 1361: author’s brackets). Rostila (2011) noted that 
Granovetterʼs strong ties “seem to refer to intimate ties with immediate family and close friends and tend to
be multi-stranded and regularly maintained”, whereas his weak ties “are non-intimate ones, such as social 
contacts with acquaintances. Such ties tend to be single-stranded and infrequently maintained” (p. 313).
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De Meo et al. (2014) proposed a definition of strong and weak ties on Facebook based on “the topology of 
the social network” (p. 78): “Weak ties are connections between individuals belonging to distant areas of 
the social graph, or the ones that happen to have most of their relationships in different national, linguistic, 
age, or common-experience groups” (p. 79) whereas “strong ties are ties between trusted/known persons 
(such as family ties and close friendships)” (p. 79: author’s brackets). The authors found that weak ties far 
outnumbered strong ties on Facebook. Thompson (2008), writing for The New York Times, supported this 
finding: 
Many [SNS users] maintained that their circle of true intimates, their very close friends and family, 
had not become bigger. Constant online contact had made those ties immeasurably richer, but it 
hadn’t actually increased the number of them....But where their sociality had truly exploded was in 
their ‘weak ties’ – loose acquaintances, people they knew less well. It might be someone they met at 
a conference, or someone from high school who recently ‘friended’ them on Facebook, or somebody 
from last year’s holiday party. (Thompson, 2008, p. 6)
The author went on to note that he had 254 Facebook friends, “yet only 20 are family or people Iʼd consider
close friends. The rest are weak ties – maintained via technology” (p. 6).
De Meo et al. (2014) noted that weak ties are beneficial in that they “optimize the coverage of information 
spread” on Facebook (p. 78). Thompson (2008) referred to this too: 
Sociologists have long found that ‘weak ties’ greatly expand your ability to solve problems. For 
example, if you’re looking for a job and ask your friends, they won’t be much help; they’re too similar 
to you, and thus probably won’t have any leads you don’t already have yourself. Remote 
acquaintances will be much more useful, because they’re further afield, yet still socially intimate 
enough to want to help you out. (Thompson, 2008, p. 6)
Luarn, Kuo, Chiu, and Chang (2015) found that those with strong ties on Facebook were more likely to give 
social support by “clicking ‘like’, writing comments, and sending private messages” (p. 44) than those with 
weak ties, the implication being that these exchanges of social support occurred more between strong than 
weak ties. Between them, then, De Meo (2014) and Luarn et al. (2015) support the view that, in terms of 
social support, strong ties provide emotional support on Facebook and weak ties provide informational 
support.
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3.3.3 Affiliation
Henry Murray (1938) defined his “affiliative attitude” (the need for affiliation/affiliation motive) as: “To form
friendships and associations. To greet, join, and live with others. To co-operate and converse sociably with 
others. To love. To join groups” (p. 80). Later definitions of n affiliation, based on Murray’s work, include “a 
desire to establish and/or maintain warm and friendly interpersonal relations” (French & Chadwick, 1956, p.
296), and “motivation for social acceptance” (Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff, 1954, p. 405). In this thesis, I frame 
affiliation in the context of non-intimate relationships based on ‘common ground’. Atkinson et al.’s (1954) 
definition of affiliation supports this framing, as do parts of Murray’s (1938) “affiliative attitude” (“To form 
friendships and associations...To co-operate and converse sociably with others” [p. 80]). 
Affiliative relationships provide a sense of belonging on SNS, partly because they enable a sense of 
connection to a wider network (Thompson, 2008), partly because they provide emotional support (though 
not to the extent of intimate relationships) (Vitak & Ellison, 2012, p. 250), and partly because they help 
provide a sense of identity, particularly if such relationships are set in a group context (Robards & Bennett, 
2011).
Regarding this latter point, Robards and Bennett (2011) found that affiliative relationships in both offline 
and SNS (including Facebook) contexts facilitated the process of identity formation. The authors interviewed
32 young adults, “uncovering how their identities are constructed and subsequently situated within, across 
or in-between systems of belonging” (p. 309):
...individuals seek each other out...in a reflexive process of self-selection based around perceived 
commonality in terms of taste, aesthetics, outlook, and other cultural attributes....Due to the cultural 
fragmentation associated with late modernity, the everyday terrains that individuals must traverse in 
their search for like-minded others are increasingly vast and multi-layered. Thus, temporary 
engagement with a variety of collectivities becomes an increasingly necessary step in seeking out 
those individuals and collective spaces (virtual and physical) with whom and within which one feels 
‘at home’. (Robards & Bennett, 2011, p. 314: authors’ brackets)
Also, in this thesis, I associate affiliation with bridging social capital and weak ties. Vitak and Ellison (2012) 
and De Meo et al. (2014) respectively found that bridging social capital and weak ties were associated with 
informational support on Facebook. The provision of informational support on Facebook has been found to 
be valuable not only in a practical sense, but also in the sense of engendering in recipients a sense of 
belonging (Erfani, Abedin, & Blount, 2016).
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3.3.4 Intimacy
There is a lack of consensus among theorists as to the definition of intimacy, and according to Register and 
Henley (1992), “at least twenty significantly different definitions of intimacy can be found” (p. 468). 
Although intimacy has been identified as a component of romantic love (Rubin, 1973; Sternberg, 1986), the 
experience of intimacy is not confined to romantic relationships. Prager (1955) defined intimacy as a 
“positively cathected psychological relation between two or more people in which partners share that 
which is private and personal with one another” (as cited in Archer, 2000, p. 360), and for McAdams (1989), 
intimacy “refers to the sharing of one’s innermost self with another” (pp. 199-200). Similarly, Reis (1990) 
described intimacy as a “process” which “begins when one person expresses, through verbal or nonverbal 
means, personally revealing feelings or information to another person. It continues when the listener 
responds supportively or empathetically. For an interaction to become intimate, the discloser must feel 
understood, validated, and cared for by the listener” (p. 16). Also, Laurenceau and Kleinman (2006) stated 
that “intimacy is best conceptualized as a personal, subjective (and often momentary) sense of 
connectedness that is the outcome of an interpersonal, transactional process consisting of self-disclosure 
and partner responsiveness” (p. 638: authors’ brackets). Intimacy has been said to exist in a range of 
contexts, including those of same- and opposite-sex friendships (Helgeson, Shaver, & Dyer, 1987; Aukett, 
Ritchie, & Mill, 1988) and marriage (Waring & Chelune, 1983; Dandeneau & Johnson, 2007). 
A number of studies have sought to determine lay meanings of intimacy (e.g., Helgeson et al., 1987; 
Monsour, 1992; Waring, Tillman, Frelick, Russell, & Weisz, 1980; Register & Henley, 1992). For instance, 
Monsour (1992), in his study of intimacy between cross- and same-sex friends, found that “five of the seven
most frequently mentioned definitions of intimacy were specified by both cross-and same-sex friends: self-
disclosures, emotional expressiveness, unconditional support, physical contact and trust” (p. 277), and 
Waring et al. (1980) identified self-disclosure as “a fundamental aspect of intimacy in interpersonal 
relationships and marriage. Expression of affection, compatibility, cohesion, identity [“knowing oneself, 
knowing one’s needs, and a sense of self-esteem” (p. 473)], and the ability to resolve conflict were also 
considered important aspects of intimacy” (p. 471). However, Helgeson et al. (1987), in their study of same-
sex friendships and opposite-sex couples, concluded that intimacy, “which has sometimes been treated in 
the scientific literature as a synonym for self-disclosure, is more accurately described as appreciation, 
affection or warmth” (p. 223). Perhaps the last word on this topic should go to McAdams (1989), who stated
that: “A person who is high in intimacy motivation [the need for intimacy]...is consistently ready for the 
experience of intimacy. Such a person is on the lookout for opportunities to share the inner self and to 
experience the wholeness of the other” (p. 49).
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Ljepava, Orr, Locke, and Ross (2013) found that “frequent Facebook users...reported having more intimate 
friendships both online and offline” (p. 1606) than non-Facebook users, and speculated that “close 
friendships might now be a part of online social networks and may contribute to the feeling of closeness 
and intimacy between friends, thus deepening the connections that previously existed” (p. 1606). Also, Park
et al. (2011), exploring “the association between self-disclosure and intimacy in the context of Facebook” 
(p. 1981), found that frequent positive status updates (measured by questions such as “I frequently talk 
about myself in Facebook” and “I usually disclose positive things about myself in Facebook” [p. 1977]) 
contributed to a feeling of intimacy between users. The authors speculated that “linear self-disclosure 
[progressively deepening self-disclosure as per Altman and Taylor (1973), discussed below] may not be 
essential in maintaining relationships on Facebook as one knows one’s close friends already and he or she 
may be able to communicate with his/her close friends through other channels as well, including [face-to-
face] communication or phones, not purely via Facebook” (p. 1981).22 Similarly, Utz (2015) found that, on 
Facebook, not only were intimate self-disclosures related to a feeling of connection, but so were 
entertaining and humorous self-disclosures. Finally, Barazova (2012) found that Facebook users felt that it 
was inappropriate to share intimate self-disclosures publicly (via status updates) on Facebook. However, 
intimate self-disclosures shared privately (via messages) enhanced the feeling of “relational intimacy” (p. 
815) between discloser and confidant.
3.3.5 Self-disclosure
According to Laurenceau and Kleinman (2006), “self-disclosure has traditionally been considered an 
important component and index of intimacy” (p. 641). The use of the term self-disclosure dates from the 
1950s (Bevan-Dye & Akpojivi, 2016), when Jourard and Lasakow published findings based on the JSDQ 
(Jourard-Lasakow Self-Disclosure Questionnaire) (Chen & Nakazawa, 2009, p. 82), which measured levels of 
self-disclosure to key others (“mother, father, opposite-sex best friend, and same-sex best friend” [Cozby, 
1973, p. 73]). Jourard argued that self-disclosure was important because “the ability to allow one’s real self 
to be known to at least one ‘significant’ other is a prerequisite for a healthy personality” (Cozby, p. 77).
It is widely acknowledged that self-disclosures can be both non-verbal and unintentional (Reis, 2000; 
Greene, Derlaga, & Mathew, 2006), but definitions of self-disclosure are generally limited to verbal and 
intentional disclosures only. For instance, Cozby (1973) defined self-disclosure as “any information about 
himself which Person A communicates verbally to a Person B [sic]” (p. 73), and, thirty years later, Greene et 
al. (2006) defined self-disclosure as “an interaction between at least two individuals where one intends to 
22 In support of this point, Yang, Brown, and Braun (2013) found “a sequence of media use tied to stages of relationship 
development – from Facebook in early stages to instant messaging and then cell phones as the relationship progressed” (p. 5). 
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deliberately divulge something personal to another’’ (p. 411).
Altman and Taylor (1973) explored the relationship between self-disclosure and relationship development, 
coining the term social penetration theory. Key to Altman and Taylor’s (1973) social penetration theory are 
the hypotheses that “interpersonal exchange gradually progresses from superficial, nonintimate areas to 
more intimate, deeper layers of the selves of the social actors” (p. 6), and that “people assess [the] 
interpersonal rewards and costs...gained from interaction with others” (p. 6). One of the rewards may be 
intimacy, and one of the costs, vulnerability. Eldridge Cleaver (1968) eloquently described this cost in 
reference to a deepening romantic relationship:
The reason two people are reluctant to really strip themselves down in front of each other is because 
in doing so they make themselves vulnerable and give enormous power over themselves one to the 
other….The prospect is terrifying. The stakes are high. (Cleaver, as cited in Altman & Taylor, 1973, p. 
41) 
According to Altman and Taylor, (1973), we tend to proceed cautiously in interpersonal relationships, 
sharing first the public, and then progressively more private aspects of ourselves to minimise the risks of 
sharing too much with an unknown other. As well as increased vulnerability, these risks may include 
“negative reactions” such as criticism and rejection (Ignatius & Kokkonen, 2007, p. 380). 
Altman and Taylor (1973), however, explained that not all relationships become close: “Some are much 
more segmental and fragmentary, examples being associations between members of the PTA, a working 
committee, a school or work associate. In such relationships, people learn about one another in areas 
necessary to function in the group and often only interact within the framework of the group’s goals” (p. 
12). (“Of course”, Altman and Taylor (1973) added, “such groups can serve as a springboard for more 
intimate relationships” [pp. 12-13]). In this regard, Altman and Taylor’s social penetration theory parallels 
social capital theory (discussed in Section 3.3.2), which postulates bonding and bridging capital/strong and 
weak ties. 
Self-disclosures are usually measured in terms of breadth and depth: “Depth refers to the intimacy level of 
the disclosure, whereas breadth refers to the amount of information exchanged” (Collins & Miller, 1994, p. 
458). The most intimate self-disclosures are considered to be those describing “personal emotions and self-
perceptions (e.g., feelings, fears, wishes, and needs)” (Reis, 2000, p. 211: author’s brackets). Self-disclosure 
has been studied from four perspectives (Reis, 2000, p. 211): the relationship stage approach, epitomised 
by Altman and Taylor (1973) (discussed above); the social skills approach, which postulates that there are 
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“fairly strict social rules governing what information is appropriate to reveal and in what contexts” (Collins &
Miller, 1994, p. 459); the goal-oriented approach, which postulates that “self-disclosure may be enacted for 
any of several purposes: for example, to elicit a supportive response: to foster a deepening relationship: to 
unburden the self: or to manipulate the other into complementary self-revelations” (Reis, 2000, p, 211); 
and the individual differences approach, which focusses on who is more likely to self-disclose, and under 
what conditions. 
Cultural background and gender are among the factors that researchers have considered as influencing the 
level of self-disclosure. Regarding the influence of culture on self-disclosure, Brinthaupt (2008) stated that 
“cultures with a greater emphasis on nuclear and extended families...are more self-disclosing than cultures 
with less closely knit social or family structures” and that “members of Eastern cultures...tend to report less 
frequent self-disclosures than members of Western cultures” (p. 408). Regarding the influence of gender, 
Ignatius and Kokkonen (2007), after reviewing the literature, claimed that “the current body of evidence 
does not lend itself to secure conclusions” (p. 382) about its role in self-disclosure, whereas Brinthaupt 
(2008), in contrast, claimed that “researchers have consistently found that females tend to show more self-
disclosure than males”, but added that this is “a relatively small effect” (p. 408). Shaffer, Pegalis, and Cornell 
(1992), however, found that “sex role identity” or “masculinity and femininity” predicted self-disclosure 
more accurately than actual gender: femininity was correlated with higher self-disclosure than masculinity, 
but “androgynous” people (those expressing high levels of both masculinity and femininity) self-disclosed 
most of all (p. 307).
Three other observations related to self-disclosure, and perhaps relevant to this thesis, are as follows. 
Firstly, strongly felt emotions, such as those stirred by traumatic life events (Rimé, Philippot, Boca, & 
Mesquita, 1992) and anxiety (Stiles, Shuster, & Harrigan, 1992) are said to prompt self-disclosure, but 
loneliness is said to have the opposite effect (Schwab, Scalise, Ginter, & Whipple, 1998). Secondly, 
reciprocity is said to be key to self-disclosure in that a disclosure will often evoke another, similar disclosure 
from its recipient (Cozby, 1972). Thirdly, an individual’s predisposition to volunteer unsolicited disclosures – 
his or her “baseline of disclosure” – must be taken into account when considering his or her self-disclosing 
behaviours (McAllister & Bregman, 1985, p. 775). This “baseline of disclosure”, is most likely synonymous 
with the need to disclose, defined as “the need to reveal information about the self” (Chen, 2012, p. 171). 
Cheung, Lee, and Chan (2015) found that “[the] convenience of maintaining existing relationships, new 
relationship building, self-presentation, and enjoyment” (p. 292) motivated self-disclosure on Facebook.23 
23 Incidentally, the authors also found that “perceived privacy risk does not have any significant impact on self-disclosure” on 
Facebook (Cheung et al., 2015, p. 279).
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Also, Trepte and Reinecke (2013) found that a “psychological disposition for self-disclosure” was associated 
with “a higher tendency to use SNS” (including Facebook), and “frequent SNS use increases the wish to self-
disclose online because self-disclosing behaviors are reinforced through social capital [including advice, 
offers of material aid, and “someone to talk to” (p. 1106)] within the SNS environment” (p. 1102). Similarly, 
Zhang (2017) found that Facebook users who self-disclosed on Facebook “in times of stress” (p. 257) 
received social support, which in turn “reduced depression” (p. 257). Forest and Wood (2012), however, 
found that those with low self-esteem tended to post more negative status updates (expressing “sadness, 
anger, frustration, anxiety, fear, and irritability” [p. 297]) on Facebook than did those with high self-esteem, 
but that other Facebook users responded negatively to these updates. The apparent discrepancy between 
Zhang’s (2017) and Forest and Wood’s (2012) findings may be explained by both Zhang’s and Forest and 
Wood’s suggestion that those who post with an awareness of self-presentational issues in times of stress 
may receive a more positive response than those who are too “honest” (Zhang, p. 535). Additionally, in 
support of Forest and Wood’s (2012) findings, Ardi and Maison (2014) found that those with higher self-
esteem tended to post more positive content on Facebook than those with lower self-esteem. Finally, self-
disclosure has been explicitly linked with expression of the true self online (McKenna et al., 2002) and on 
SNS in particular (Seidman, 2014 [“true self expression”]; Wang et al., 2018 [“authentic self-presentation”]).
In summary, I propose, based on the literature, that Facebook users seek to portray themselves on 
Facebook both strategically and authentically, and also that they seek to belong in the contexts of both 
intimate and affiliative relationships. I equate intimate relationships with bonding social capital and strong 
ties, and affiliative relationships with bridging social capital and weak ties. In terms of social support, and 
using Jacobson’s three categories of social support (1986), intimate relationships are more likely to provide 
emotional, and possibly material, support on Facebook, and affiliative relationships are more likely to 
provide cognitive support on the site (Luarn et al., 2015; Trepte & Reinecke, 2013; De Meo, 2014). In terms 
of self-disclosure, deep mutual self-disclosure on Facebook is not necessary to promote a feeling of 
intimacy: instead, frequent, positive, entertaining, and humourous updates have been found to promote 
intimacy (Park et al., 2011; Utz, 2015). 
In Chapter 4 I provide an overview of the research design for this study.
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN
This study is based on the results of a survey containing both open- and closed-ended questions, as well as 
open-ended questions posed to a focus group. The survey was available online for six weeks in August, 
September, and October 2014. It was preceded by an online pilot survey, held in late 2013. The focus group 
was held in November 2014. Prospective participants for the main and pilot surveys and the focus group 
included staff and students at ECU, as well as members of the general public. Participants had to be aged 18 
and over and included Facebook users, people who had used Facebook but had deleted or deactivated their
account, and people who had never used Facebook but had thought about it. A sample of twenty 
respondents (10% of the projected sample for the main survey) completed the pilot survey and there were 
404 completed and valid responses for the main survey. Of this latter group, four respondents had never 
had a Facebook account, five had deleted their account, four had deactivated their account, and 391 had an
active Facebook account. Focus group participants were recruited from the main survey (as explained in 
Section 4.5.2).
Most of the study data are quantitative because the survey was comprised largely of closed-ended 
questions, but these findings are enriched by qualitative data from the open-ended questions in the survey, 
and from the focus group discussion. The quantitative data situate the findings in a broad demographic 
context, while the qualitative data add richness and depth to the data and provide illustrative quotes.
4.1 Quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods research
Because this study is based on quantitative data, and enriched by qualitative data, it is situated in the 
paradigmatic context of a mixed methods study with a predominantly quantitative focus. Qualitative and 
quantitative research methods are said to be grounded in different paradigms (a paradigm has been defined
as a “worldview, complete with the assumptions that are associated with that view” [Merton, as cited in 
Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009, p. 20]): “Quantitative methods are, in general, supported by the positivistic or 
scientific paradigm, which leads us to regard the world as made up of observable, measurable facts” 
whereas “qualitative methods are generally supported by the interpretivist paradigm, which portrays a 
world in which reality is socially constructed, complex, and ever changing” (Glesne & Peshkin, as cited in 
Thomas, 2003, p. 6).
In practice, quantitative research is typically based upon research hypotheses, and data are numeric and 
subject to statistical analysis, while qualitative research is usually exploratory, and based on narrative data 
which are subject to thematic analysis (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Kumar (1996) described the differing 
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purposes of the two approaches thus: “A study is classed as qualitative if [its] purpose...is primarily to 
describe a...phenomenon...and if analysis is done to establish the variation in the...phenomenon...without 
quantifying it”, but “if you want to quantify the variation in a phenomenon...and if the analysis is geared to 
ascertain the magnitude of the variation, the study is classified as a quantitative study” (p. 10: author’s 
italics). The qualitative approach has been criticised for “researcher bias”, lack of “reproductibility”, and lack
of “generalisability” (Mays & Pope, as cited in Crossan, 2003, pp. 53-54), but proponents of this approach 
argue that it allows a depth of insight that quantitative research strategies cannot obtain.
Historically, the quantitative and qualitative research approaches have been considered to be incompatible, 
but it is now widely acknowledged that the two approaches can complement each other (Thomas, 2003), 
and it has, in fact, been suggested that they can be described as the opposing poles of a continuum with 
mixed methods research at the midpoint (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner 
(2007) defined mixed methods research as “an intellectual and practical synthesis based on qualitative and 
quantitative research....It recognizes the importance of traditional quantitative and qualitative research but 
also offers a powerful third paradigm choice that often will provide the most informative, complete, 
balanced, and useful research results” (p. 129). Note that Johnson et al.’s (2007) definition highlights a 
melding of both the practical and paradigmatic aspects of the qualitative and quantitative approaches, and 
indicates that mixed methods researchers are adaptable in that they use whatever combination of methods 
and approaches they believe will best answer the research question.
One way of combining quantitative and qualitative research is to use surveys in conjunction with focus 
groups. Morgan (1996) noted that: “While studies that bring together focus groups and surveys are one of 
the leading ways of combining qualitative and quantitative methods, such designs also raise a complex set 
of issues, since the two methods produce such different kinds of data” (p. 134). In an attempt to clarify 
these issues, he identified four ways of combining surveys and focus groups: firstly, “surveys are the primary
method and focus groups serve in a preliminary capacity”; secondly, “focus groups are the primary method 
while surveys provide preliminary inputs”; thirdly, “surveys [are] the primary method, [while] focus 
groups...act as a follow-up that assists in interpreting the survey results” and “can be quoted in conjunction 
with quantitative findings”; and finally, “focus groups [are] the primary method and surveys [act] as a 
source of follow-up data” (pp. 134-135). In this study, I have adopted the third strategy: the focus group – 
along with the open-ended questions in the survey – added depth to the broad but ‘thin’ survey data.
4.2 The hypotheses
The hypotheses, expressed in brief, are as follows: The demographic factors of age, gender, education, and 
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cultural background help shape both the Facebook-related privacy concerns and social needs of Facebook 
users. These concerns and needs, in turn, shape users’ privacy- and social needs-related behaviours on 
Facebook. Users’ privacy concerns are also partly dependent on their perceptions both of what the 
Facebook corporation ‘knows’ about them and with whom it shares their data (Figure 3).
The hypotheses listed, together with supporting evidence, are as follows:
 Hypothesis #1: Demographic factors influence the nature and degree of privacy concerns on Facebook.  
In this study I hypothesise that the demographic factors of age, gender, formal education, and cultural 
background influence the nature and degree of privacy concerns on Facebook. 
Age and gender have been found by some researchers to influence the nature and degree of privacy 
concerns on SNS. Younger users expressed a greater degree of user-user privacy concern on Facebook than 
did older users (Malik, Hiekkanen, & Nieminen, 2016), and were more likely to use privacy management 
61
Figure 3. Model of hypotheses
strategies on Facebook (Malik, Hiekkanen, & Nieminen, 2016; Kezer, Sevi, Cemalcilar, & Baruh, 2016; Van 
den Broeck, Poels, & Walrave, 2015; Litt, 2013; Lang & Barton, 2015; BUT O’Brien & Torres, 2012, p. 85, 
found that, for privacy reasons, older users “are more cautious about what they say and do” on Facebook 
than younger users), possibly because they tended to share more information on the site than did older 
users (Malik, Hiekkanen, & Nieminen, 2016; Ozimek & Bierhoff, 2016; Kezer et al., 2016; McAndrew & 
Jeong, 2012; BUT Taddicken, 2014, p. 265, found that “age has hardly any effect on self-disclosure” on SNS). 
However, older users expressed a greater degree of user-corporate privacy concern on Facebook than did 
younger users (O’Brien & Torres, 2012; Jeong & Coyle, 2014). 
Regarding gender, females were less inclined than males to provide contact information on SNS (Special & 
Li-Barber, 2012; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009), possibly due to fears of stalking and harassment (Malik et al., 
2016; Litt, 2013; Grubbs-Hoy & Milne, 2010; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009). Females were also less likely than 
males to disclose other types of personal information, such as interests and current location, on SNS (Saeri, 
Ogilvie, La Macchia, Smith, & Louis, 2014), and were more likely than males to use the privacy settings (Litt, 
2013), screen friend requests, and untag photos of themselves (De Wolf, Willaert, & Pierson, 2014; Grubbs-
Hoy & Milne, 2010; BUT Lang & Barton, 2015, p. 147, found that: “Contrary to previous studies, [our] 
findings suggested that women were not more likely to untag [photos of themselves on Facebook] than 
men”, and Malik et al., 2016, similarly found that although females were more concerned about the privacy 
of their photos on SNS than males were, they did not engage in more photo-related privacy-protective 
behaviours). Finally, females had greater user-corporate privacy concerns on Facebook than did males 
(Grubbs-Hoy & Milne, 2010).
I have only found one study dealing with the effect of formal education on privacy concerns on SNS: Blank 
et al. (2014) found a positive association between SNS users’ level of formal education and their use of the 
privacy settings, reflecting user-user privacy concerns. Similarly, in an e-commerce context, some 
researchers have found that consumers with a higher level of formal education place more importance on 
user-corporate privacy than those with a lower level of formal education (e.g., Riquelme & Roman, 2014; 
Yang, Lin, Chandlrees, & Chao, 2009; Cho, Rivera-Sanchez, & Lim, 2009).
Several researchers measuring the effect of culture on online privacy concerns have used Hofstede’s cultural
taxonomy (e.g., Cho et al., 2009; Reay, Beatty, & Miller, 2013; Li, Kobsa, Knijnenburg, & Nguyen, 2017; 
Hallikainen & Laukkanen, 2018). Hofstede (n.d.) defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind 
distinguishing the members of one group or category of people from others” (https://www.hofstede-
insights.com/models/national-culture/). In 1980, Hofstede published his foundational work Culture’s 
consequences: International differences in work-related values in which he postulated, based on “his 
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analysis of some 116,000 survey questionnaires administered to employees of the IBM corporation in 72 
countries” (Minkov & Hofstede, 2011, p. 11), that there are “four major dimensions of national culture” 
(Minkov & Hofstede, 2011, p. 11) as follows: power distance – “social inequality, including the relationship 
with authority”; individualism/collectivism – “the relationship between the individual and the group”; 
masculinity/femininity – “the social implications of having been born as a boy or a girl”; and uncertainty 
avoidance – “ways of dealing with uncertainty, relating to the control of aggression and the expression of 
emotions” (Minkov & Hofstede, 2011, p. 12). In 1991, in his book Cultures and Organizations: Software of 
the Mind, Hofstede added a fifth dimension: long-term versus short-term orientation – “the focus of 
people’s efforts: on the future or the present and the past” (Minkov & Hofstede, 2011, pp. 13-14), and in 
2007 Minkov added two new dimensions, based on his analysis of World Values Survey data 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp): indulgence versus restraint – “a tendency to allow relatively 
free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun [versus]…a 
conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms” (Hofstede, 
Hofstede & Minkov, 2010, p. 281), and monumentalism versus flexumity which “contrasts societies in which 
the human self is like a proud and stable monolithic monument versus societies whose cultures promote 
humility, flexibility, and adaptability to changing circumstances” (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010, p. 
252).24 25
Hofstede’s dimensions of national culture have been criticised on two major counts. First, some researchers 
have asserted that Hofstede’s correlation of cultural dimensions with nations can be misleading because 
some cultures cross national boundaries and/or multiple cultures co-exist in certain nations (McSweeney, 
2002; Peterson & Sondergaard, 2011). A second criticism of Hofstede’s cultural model is the fact that it is 
based on quantitative research, and thus lacks the depth that qualitative approaches provide (Jahoda, 
2012). In this sense, Hofstede’s cultural taxonomy stands in stark contrast to the in situ ethnographic work 
of Kluckholn, Wedgwood, Mead, and other social anthropologists that preceded it.
As mentioned above, there exist a number of studies exploring the relationship between Hofstede’s 
dimensions of national culture and online privacy concerns. Some of these studies focus specifically on 
privacy concerns in an SNS context. For instance, Krasnova, Veltri, and Gunther (2012), who studied German
24 Minkov also found a third dimension, exclusionism versus universalism, but this dimension “correlated with” the pre-existing 
individualism versus collectivism (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010, p. 252).
25 Hofstede’s work has been extended by Project GLOBE (The Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
Project), which proposed, based on data collected from managers in 61 nations, nine cultural dimensions: future orientation, 
performance orientation, humane orientation, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, in-group collectivism, institutional 
collectivism, gender egalitarianism, and assertiveness. Six of these dimensions were derived from Hofstede’s work: “The 
dimensions of power distance and uncertainty avoidance are identical in the two taxonomies. Hofstede’s individualism-
collectivism dimension has been separated into two GLOBE components: in-group collectivism and institutional collectivism. 
Similarly, Hofstede’s masculinity-femininity dimension has been divided into two components: gender egalitarianism and 
assertiveness” (Lustig & Koestler, 2010, pp. 124-125: my italics).
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and US Facebook users, found that a high level of individualism was associated with a high level of user-
corporate and user-user trust and, therefore, a high level of self-disclosure on Facebook, while a low level of
uncertainty-avoidance “leads users to ignore their privacy concerns” (p. 134) on Facebook in favour of self-
disclosure. Also, studies by Park, Jun, and Lee (2015) (centred on South Korea and the US), James, Wallace, 
Warkentin, Kim, and Collignon (2017) (also centred on South Korea and the US), and Cho, Knijnenburg, 
Kobsa, and Li (2018) (centred on Singapore, South Korea, and the US) all found that a high level of 
collectivism was associated with a low level of concern about user-user privacy issues in an SNS context. 
Finally, Bauer and Schiffinger (2016), in their meta-analysis of 38 studies, measured the effect of Hofstede’s 
national cultural dimensions (individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, long-term 
orientation, masculinity, and indulgence) of “online self-disclosure (OSD) in person-to-crowd settings” (p. 1: 
authors’ brackets) including SNS. The authors found that the effect of privacy concerns and “trust beliefs” 
(“confidence that personal information submitted to Internet websites will be handled competently, 
reliably, and safely” [p. 8]) on OSD were not moderated by cultural context, but the effect of anticipated 
benefits and “risk beliefs” (perceived risk of privacy violation) on OSD were. Uncertainty avoidance and 
indulgence were found to reduce the effect of anticipated benefits on OSD, and masculinity and power 
distance were found to increase it. Also, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation were found to 
reduce the effect of risk beliefs on OSD, and indulgence was found to increase it.26 The authors suggested, in
view of their findings, that future research concerning OSD and Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions 
should encompass not just individualism/collectivism and uncertainty avoidance, the two most commonly 
researched dimensions (particularly since they did not find individualism/collectivism statistically 
significant27), but at least some of the other dimensions.
While Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions are a relatively popular choice for the cultural component of 
research concerning privacy concerns on SNS, some researchers have used different theoretical foundations
for this type of research. Thomson, Yuki, and Ito (2015), who studied Japanese and US SNS users, for 
example, based the cultural component of their research on the concept of relational mobility. The authors 
defined relational mobility as “the degree to which individuals have opportunities and the freedom to 
voluntarily form new relationships and terminate old ones in a given social environment, according to one’s 
preference” (p. 287), and claimed that cultures with a high degree of relational mobility (such as the US, as 
opposed to Japan) foster “general trust”, which is “a psychological state to accept vulnerability based solely 
on [a person’s] expectations that most people are reliable, honest, good and kind, acting fairly, and not 
harming [others] intentionally” (Gheorghiu, Vignoles, & Smith, as cited in Thomson et al., 2017, p. 286). A 
26 The authors conceded that certain of these findings appear to be “counter-intuitive” and “puzzling” (p. 12), but suggested 
possible rationalisations for them.
27 This is in marked contrast to Park et al. (2015), James et al. (2017), and Cho et al. (2018), cited above, all of whom did find 
individualism/collectivism statistically significant.
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high level of general trust, in turn, was found to mitigate privacy concerns on SNS.
Gunsoy, Cross, Saribay, Okten, and Kurutas (2015), who studied Turkish and US Facebook users, on the other
hand, based the cultural component of their research on the concept of honour versus dignity cultures. The 
authors explained that: 
In honour cultures (Turkey), esteem depends [both] on one’s own perception of self-worth and on 
other people’s opinions. In those cultures, honor is easily lost and difficult to regain. In dignity 
cultures (northern America), esteem mainly depends on the individual and cannot be taken away by 
others. (Gunsoy et al., 2015, p. 323: authors’ brackets)
The authors explored Turkish and US Facebook users’ attitudes to posting “potentially improper” (p. 323) 
photos (“e.g., at a party; with one’s boyfriend/girlfriend” [p. 323]) on Facebook and found that Turkish 
participants (especially women) were more reluctant to post such photos on Facebook than US participants.
Chen (2018), however, did not use a cultural construct (e.g., Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions, 
relational mobility, honour versus dignity cultures) of any kind for his research concerning the privacy 
paradox in Hong Kong and US SNS users. I have similarly not based the cultural component of this research 
on a cultural construct.
 Hypothesis #2: Demographic factors influence the nature and degree of social needs on Facebook.  
In this study I hypothesise that the demographic factors of age, gender, formal education, and cultural 
background influence the nature and degree of the social needs that users seek to fulfil on Facebook. 
Younger Facebook users were more active on Facebook than older users (Ozimek & Bierhoff, 2016; Malik et 
al., 2016; Przepiorka, Blachnio, & Diaz-Morales, 2016; Kezer et al., 2016; McAndrew & Jeong, 2012) and had 
more Facebook friends than did older users (Kezer et al., 2016). However, Grieve and Kemp (2015) found 
that older users derived more “social connectedness” (p. 241) from Facebook interaction than did younger 
users. This “might reflect”, the authors suggested, “an age-based shift from bridging social capital towards 
bonding social capital in later years” (p. 241). In addition, younger users tended to use Facebook more “as a 
pastime activity” (Papacharissi, as cited in Malik et al., 2016, p. 465), and for the purposes of social 
comparison (Ozimek & Bierhoff, 2016) and “voyeurism” (Van den Broeck et al., 2015, p. 6) than did older 
users, and it could be argued that such activities are not conducive to a sense of social connectedness.
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Regarding gender, males tended to use SNS more to find new friends and romantic partners than did 
females, whereas females tended to use Facebook more to communicate with family and existing friends 
than did males (Muscanell & Guadagno, 2012; McAndrew & Jeong, 2012). Also, males’ profile photos on 
Facebook “accentuated status (using objects or formal clothing) and risk taking (outdoor settings), while 
females’ photos accentuated familial relations (family photos) and emotional expression (eye contact, smile 
intensity and lack of sunglasses)” (Tifferet & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2014, p. 388: authors’ brackets; BUT Hum et al., 
2011, p. 1828, found that “the content...of Facebook profile photographs...did not significantly vary by 
gender”). Males were also less likely than females to show emotional support via public replies to status 
updates on Facebook, although they were equally as likely as females to show emotional support in private 
messages (Joiner et al., 2014). Regarding motives for Facebook use, Krasnova, Veltri, Eling, and Buxmann 
(2017) found that females “focus on maintaining strong relationships with close ties”, whereas males “are 
mainly driven by the ability to gain general information” (p. 273) (general information includes information 
on topics “such as current affairs, politics, money, business, and other topics of broad interest” [Krasnova et 
al., 2017, p. 274]). However, according to Krasnova et al. (2017), both genders were equally motivated to 
use Facebook for the purpose of self-presentation (“self-enhancement” [p. 275]).
I have found only one study regarding formal educational status on Facebook use: Syn and Oh (2015) found 
that Facebook users with a higher level of formal education “tend to be motivated more by enjoyment, 
learning and reputation” than those with a lower level of formal education (p. 565). The authors speculated 
that “Facebook users who have certain levels of education may think that sharing information will help 
them learn new information and grow their reputation among community members, and may enjoy sharing
and searching for information for others” (p. 565).28 
I have not found many studies dealing directly with the relationship between cultural background and the 
use of SNS to fulfil social needs, but there are some studies using Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions. 
Krasnova et al. (2012), in their study comparing the levels of individualism and uncertainty avoidance of US 
and German Facebook users, observed that users from both cultures equally enjoyed sharing information 
on Facebook, and neither the degree of uncertainty avoidance nor individualism appeared to impact upon 
the level of enjoyment. Also, as mentioned above, Bauer and Schiffinger’s (2016) meta-analysis of 38 
studies in regard to “online self-disclosure (OSD) in person-to-crowd settings” (p. 1: authors’ brackets) 
including SNS, found that Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and indulgence 
reduced the effect of anticipated benefits on OSD, whereas masculinity and power distance increased it. 
The authors were not surprised to find that uncertainty avoidance reduced the effect of anticipated benefits
28 Informational support (e.g., novel viewpoints, job leads, and technical advice) is one of the types of social support provided by 
Facebook users to their Facebook friends (Vitak & Ellison, 2012).
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on OSD, but they were unsure as to why indulgence should do so. In another study, centred on Indonesia (a 
collectivistic nation) and Poland (an individualistic nation), Ardi and Maison (2014) found that Indonesian 
Facebook users disclosed more on Facebook and had a greater number of Facebook friends than Polish 
users. The authors speculated that Indonesians’ propensity to disclose more on Facebook may be because: 
In [face-to-face] encounters, collectivists are more likely to have many rules, especially those relating 
to various social norms and respecting people with authority. However, Facebook is a platform that 
provides freedom of expression due to visual anonymity....This may enable users in collectivist 
cultures, like Indonesian, to express themselves more freely in an online setting than they would do 
publicly or in front of a figure of authority. People do not need to be worried about their gestures, 
facial expression or voice when they disclose themselves on SNS, even if everyone knows about their 
identity. (Ardi & Maison, 2014, p. 208)
Finally, Kohl and Gotzenbrucker (2014) explored the relationship between culture and the use of SNS to 
fulfil social needs without using a cultural construct (such as Hofstede’s national cultural dimensions), and 
found that although both Austrian and Thai users used SNS for “lifelogging and mood management” (p. 
521), “Austrian respondents prefer using SNS to communicate, [whereas] Thai respondents were more likely
to use them as playful tools for overcoming emotional barriers and expressing vernacular creativity” (p. 
521). 
In summary, three points need to be made regarding studies related to Hypothesis #1 and Hypothesis #2. 
First, although a number of studies have addressed the impact of age and gender on privacy concerns and 
the expression of social needs on SNS, there are some inconsistencies in their findings. Second, few studies 
have addressed the impact of formal education on privacy concerns and the expression of social needs on 
SNS. Third, although several studies have addressed the impact of cultural background on privacy concerns 
and the expression of social needs on SNS, I am not aware of any such studies centred on Australian culture 
in a cross-cultural context. Therefore, clarification of the roles of gender, age, formal education, and 
Australian cultural background on privacy concerns and the expression of social needs on SNS is needed.
 Hypothesis #3: Privacy perceptions influence the nature and degree of privacy concerns on Facebook. 
In this study I hypothesise that Facebook users’ privacy perceptions in three key areas (who users can hide 
their information from, what Facebook knows about them, and who Facebook shares their information 
with) influence the nature and degree of their privacy concerns on Facebook. The term “privacy 
perceptions” refers to users’ beliefs regarding these three areas, which encompass both user-corporate and 
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user-user privacy issues.
I have found few studies that measure Facebook users’ privacy perceptions in the three key areas stated 
above. In 2012, O’Brien and Torres found that “there is a high level of awareness of activities concerning 
information privacy (what information is protected, how information is shared and who has access) among 
Facebook users” (p. 89: authors’ brackets), although almost 35% of users appeared to be uncertain about 
what information is made available to “third parties” (p. 84), and almost 25% were uncertain about “the risk
to information from using applications and games” on Facebook (p. 84). More recently, Golbeck and 
Mauriello (2016) found that Facebook users were “generally under-informed about what data apps could 
access from their profile”, and “even after receiving explicit information on the topic, many subjects still did 
not fully understand the extent to which apps could access their data” (p. 1).
Regarding the effect of privacy perceptions on privacy concerns, Zlatolas, Welzer, Hericko, and Holbl (2015) 
found that the less users believed that they could control who saw their information on Facebook and how 
Facebook used their information, the greater their Facebook-related privacy concerns, and the greater 
users’ Facebook-related privacy concerns, the less information they shared on the site. However, given the 
lack of studies on the influence of users’ Facebook-related privacy perceptions on their privacy concerns, 
more research is needed on this topic.
 Hypothesis #4: The nature and degree of privacy concerns and social needs on Facebook combine to 
influence behaviours on Facebook.
In this study I hypothesise that the nature and degree of social needs and the nature and degree of privacy 
concerns on Facebook influence behaviours on Facebook: these behaviours may be social or privacy-
related, or some combination of the two. 
The online privacy paradox and privacy calculus theories are relevant to this hypothesis. Barth and de Jong 
(2017) defined the online privacy paradox as “a dichotomy between privacy attitudes and actual behaviour”
(p. 1039), and further explained that: “While users claim to be very concerned about their privacy, they 
nevertheless undertake very little to protect their personal data” (p. 1038). Privacy calculus theory, 
however, “states that people will self-disclose personal information when perceived benefits exceed 
perceived negative consequences” (Dienlin & Metzger, 2016, p. 2).
A number of studies have examined the privacy paradox and privacy calculus in relation to SNS. Min and 
Kim (2015) found support for the privacy calculus in that, although privacy concerns “severely inhibit[ed]” 
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(p. 851) self-disclosure on Facebook, the combined effect of the motives for “relationship management” 
and “self-presentation” (p. 851) enticed users to self-disclose on the site. Similarly, Lee, Park, and Kim 
(2013) found that the intention to self-disclose on SNS (including Facebook) “is influenced by expected 
benefit and expected risk simultaneously” but “the effect of expected benefit is larger than that of expected
risk (p. 873), and Dienlin and Metzger (2016) found that, when deciding whether or not to disclose on 
Facebook, “the net effect of benefits exceeded that of privacy concerns” (p. 277) for users. Hallam and 
Zanella (2017), however, found support for both the privacy paradox and privacy calculus on SNS in that, 
although users do weigh up the costs and benefits of self-disclosure, “a privacy breach, not yet experienced 
and psychologically distant, has less weight in everyday choices than more concrete and psychologically-
near social networking activities” (p. 217). Also, Barth and de Jong (2017) conducted a systematic review of 
35 studies concerning the online privacy paradox, including studies centred on SNS, and concluded that the 
paradox may be largely explained by “the non-rational processes of decision-making” (p. 1045). Finally, 
Baruh, Secinti, and Cemalcilar (2017) carried out a meta-analysis of 166 studies involving 34 countries, 
examining the privacy paradox in relation to “online services” (such as e-commerce, e-government and 
online banking) and SNS. Interestingly, the authors found that the privacy paradox did not apply to online 
service use but it did apply to SNS use: i.e., people curbed their use of online services due to privacy 
concerns, but they continued to use SNS despite their privacy concerns. Baruh et al. (2017) speculated that 
this may be the case because, in contrast to online service use, SNS use generates a myriad of social 
benefits, thus prompting users to override their privacy concerns.29
Other researchers, however, have claimed that privacy concerns do not directly influence self-disclosure on 
SNS. Instead, other variables are said to mediate the relationship between privacy concerns and self-
disclosure. For example, Taddei and Contena (2013), following the lead of Krasnova, Spiekermann, Koroleva,
and Hildebrand (2010) and Joinson, Reips, Buchanan, and Paine-Schofield (2010), concluded that both 
perceived control over one’s information on Facebook, and trust (“defined as the belief that legal structure, 
providers’ characteristics and [SNS] members’ characteristics inhibit opportunistic and dangerous 
behaviours because of their competence, benevolence and integrity” [p. 822]) interacted with privacy 
concerns to influence self-disclosure on SNS. Gupta and Dhami (2015) similarly found that the level of 
perceived privacy and security risks of Facebook use influenced the level of trust on Facebook, and the level 
of trust, in turn, influenced the degree of self-disclosure on Facebook. Also, Dienlin and Trepte (2015) found 
that privacy intentions (the extent to which Facebook users “wanted to” [p. 290: authors’ italics] enact 
specific privacy management strategies of Facebook), and privacy attitudes (the extent to which Facebook 
users thought specific behaviours on Facebook were “useful”, “advantageous”, “worrying”, “dangerous”, 
29 Baruh et al. (2017) noted that: “The findings can be generalized across gender, cultural orientation, and national legal systems” 
(p. 26).
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“careless” or “bad” [p. 289]) mediated the relationship between privacy concerns and privacy-related 
behaviours on Facebook. Saeri et al. (2014) found that privacy concerns on Facebook were associated with 
“intentions to protect...privacy” (p. 363) but the authors did not find an association between privacy 
concerns and “actual privacy protection behaviour” (p. 363). Finally, Kokolakis (2017) reviewed 51 studies 
related to the privacy paradox in both e-commerce and SNS contexts, and concluded that “the diverse 
research results [some in support of the privacy paradox and some not] are explained by the diversity in 
research methods, the different contexts and the different conceptualisations of the privacy paradox” (p. 
122). To rephrase Kokolakis’s point: ultimately, the results of each study may express a portion of the truth. 
Privacy paradox and privacy calculus research portrays SNS users as constantly juggling their need to 
connect with their need for both user-user and user-corporate privacy. Facebook requires authenticity in 
order to reap social capital (Kohl & Gotzenbrucker, 2014). However, the key issue regarding user-user 
privacy concerns on Facebook is “context collapse” whereby users’ information may be viewed by 
unintended audiences (Marwick & boyd, 2011; Vitak et al., 2015). Researchers have found that three 
approaches to user-user privacy management are employed on Facebook: use of the privacy settings, 
network management, and content management (Lankton, McKnight, & Tripp, 2017; Vitak et al., 2015).
The privacy settings allow users to limit their audience by using the Friends only setting and/or setting up 
friend lists (Vitak et al., 2015). Network management strategies include “defriending” (Vitak et al., 2015, p. 
1495) or blocking certain Facebook friends, and rejecting or ignoring friend requests from unknown or 
inappropriate people (such as previous romantic partners or one’s employer, teacher, or students) (Vitak et 
al., 2015). Content management strategies include “hid[ing] information in plain sight” (Georgalou, 2016, p. 
47) by way of using ambiguous phrasing (Georgalou, 2016, p. 47), intentional vagueness (Georgalou, 2016, 
p. 47) (Child & Starcher, 2016, refer to this as “vaguebooking”), and “in-group language” (Georgalou, 2016, 
p. 48) when composing status updates, so that only the poster’s “private sphere of friends” (Georgalou, 
2016, p. 48) knows what the post is referring to. Posters may even use song lyrics or the title of a song to 
convey their message to the in-group (Georgalou, 2016, p. 49). Other content management strategies 
include deleting one’s own posts so as to delete revealing comments to the posts (Georgalou, 2016, p.52), 
or just deleting the comments (Georgalou, 2016, p. 55), and untagging oneself in embarrassing or 
compromising photos, or asking the person who posted such a photo to remove it (Georgalou, 2016, p. 54). 
Another content management strategy is to leave other users’ questions unanswered because “they require
personal information to be given publicly” (Georgalou, 2016, p. 57) (but the question may be answered via a
private message, chat or phone [Vitak et al, 2015]). Also, sometimes users take the “lowest common 
denominator approach” (Vitak et al., 2015, p. 1489) when uploading content to Facebook, whereby only 
content deemed inoffensive to all of their Facebook friends is posted. The ultimate content management 
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strategy, however, is to modify one’s behaviour in the offline world: by so doing, no photos showing one in 
embarrassing or compromising situations can be taken and posted on Facebook (Marder et al., 2016).
The most effective option available to those with user-corporate privacy concerns on Facebook is to refrain 
from using the site. However, as mentioned previously, this strategy raises a user-user privacy-related issue: 
non-users are not able to monitor their presence on Facebook as actualised by Facebook users (Trottier, 
2012). Furthermore, as also mentioned previously, users may feel that they need the site to maintain their 
offline relationships: if all their face-to-face friends are using Facebook, their decision not to use the site 
may lead to their exclusion from the group. In other words, users may feel that, due to a desire to be 
socially included, they no real choice but to keep using the site (Trottier, 2012; Quan-Haase & Young, 2010; 
Blank et al., 2014). Some users, may, however, minimise their use of the site (Zheng, Shi, Zu, & Zhang, 2012).
In summary, there have been some illuminating qualitative studies exploring users’ behaviours in relation to
privacy concerns on Facebook (e.g., Trottier, 2012; Vitak et al., 2015; Georgalou, 2016), but findings 
concerning the privacy paradox and privacy calculus in relation to Facebook are inconsistent, and 
clarification of the role of privacy concerns and social needs in relation to behavioural outcomes on 
Facebook would therefore be beneficial. 
4.3 Survey design
The survey opened with an INFORMATION AND CONSENT section, which provided information about the 
research and the survey, and asked prospective respondents to agree and continue or exit, and if 
continuing, whether they were aged 18 or over. The survey questions were then organised into blocks. Block
1, MY BACKGROUND, asked respondents for their demographic details (gender, age group, level of formal 
education, and cultural background). Block 2, THE STATUS OF MY FACEBOOK ACCOUNT, asked respondents 
whether they had an active, deactivated, or deleted Facebook account, or whether they had never had an 
account. Block 3, MY PRIVACY CONCERNS ABOUT FACEBOOK, asked respondents about the nature and 
degree of their privacy concerns on Facebook. Block 4, FACEBOOK PRIVACY – MY PERCEPTIONS, had three 
sub-sections asking respondents about their privacy perceptions on Facebook: WHO CAN I HIDE MY 
INFORMATION FROM? WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME? and WHO DOES FACEBOOK SHARE MY 
INFORMATION WITH? Block 5, READING & UNDERSTANDING FACEBOOK’S PRIVACY POLICY, asked 
respondents whether they had read none, some or all of Facebook’s privacy policy, and how well they had 
understood what they had read. Block 6, UNDERSTANDING FACEBOOK’S PRIVACY SETTINGS, asked to what 
extent respondents got confused when adjusting their privacy settings on Facebook. Block 7, HOW I USE 
FACEBOOK, asked respondents about their behaviours on Facebook. There were seven subsections in this 
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block: TIME SPENT ON FACEBOOK, REGISTRATION, PROFILE, POSTS, OUTSIDE FACEBOOK, CHANGES IN 
DEGREE, and INTERACTION. Finally, Block 8, WHY I USE FACEBOOK, asked respondents about their 
motivations for using Facebook.
4.3.1 Likert scale items
Many of the survey questions used a Likert scale format. Likert scales are named after their originator, 
Rensis Likert, who published an article describing them in 1932, and use graded points to measure attitudes
or behaviours (Jamieson, 2008). A typical attitudinal scale might have points ranging from Strongly agree to 
Strongly disagree, and a typical behavioural scale might have points ranging from Always to Never (Viljoen, 
2012). Some researchers maintain that the points on any given Likert scale cannot be assumed, for the 
purposes of analysis, to be equally spaced (Jamieson, 2008). However, Chang (1997) found that if the points 
are numbered (as well as verbally labelled if desired), respondents automatically assume them to be 
equidistant, and the researcher can consequently assume the same.30 Therefore, following Chang’s advice, I 
gave every Likert scale point a number (as well as a verbal label).
 
Researchers also debate both the optimum number of points to be used in Likert scales, and whether there 
should be an odd or even number of points (Barnette, 2010). Likert scales were originally devised with an 
odd number of points, but some researchers prefer to have an even number of points, thus avoiding what is
termed central tendency bias (i.e., a documented tendency for respondents to pick the middle or neutral 
response) (Barnette, 2010). Another advantage of even-numbered scales, according to some researchers, is 
that they are more reliable than odd-numbered scales because of the difficulty in naming the midpoint in 
the latter in a manner that will not skew the data (Chang, 1997). I decided to use a 4 point Likert scale as 
opposed to the usual 5 or 7 point scale for three reasons. Firstly, I wanted the survey to be as user friendly 
as possible, and I felt that a 4 point scale would be less complex and the individual points more meaningful 
for respondents than a scale with more points. Secondly, I did not want a neutral midpoint to the scale 
because I wanted to avoid central tendency bias. Thirdly (and this is related to my first and second reasons), 
I felt that a midpoint would not contribute in a meaningful way to the scale.
As well as central tendency bias, researchers have noted two other types of bias appearing in Likert scale 
data: acquiescence bias and social desirability bias. Acquiescence bias refers to a tendency for respondents 
to agree with positively worded items, and researchers often seek to remedy this tendency by including 
some negatively worded items (referred to as “reversed items”) in their scales (Barnette, 2010). Some 
researchers, however, claim that negatively worded items reduce data reliability (Barnette, 2010). I decided 
30 Evenly spaced Likert scale points are particularly desirable if the researcher wishes to use parametric tests, which supposedly 
require interval, as opposed to ordinal, data (Lantz, 2013; BUT Norman, 2010, disagreed). 
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not to include negatively worded items in my scales because their benefits are unproven and I did not want 
the reliability of my data compromised. Social desirability bias is the tendency for respondents to provide 
what they perceive to be socially acceptable answers to questions as opposed to expressing what they 
really think or feel. Barnette (2010) noted that: “Likert surveys on rather personal attitudes or opinions 
related to behaviors considered by society to be illegal, immoral, unacceptable, or personally embarrassing 
are more prone to this problem. This problem is exacerbated if respondents have any feeling that their 
responses can be directly or even indirectly attributed to them personally” (p. 717). I expected social 
desirability bias on some items, so I minimised its effect by mixing these items in with other items and 
assuring respondents of the anonymity of their survey responses. 
4.3.2 The pilot survey’s role in shaping the main survey
Hassan, Schattner, and Mazza (2006) explained that the purpose of a pilot study is to “identify problem 
areas and deficiencies in the research instruments and protocol prior to implementation during the full 
study” (p. 70). Before launching the main survey, I ran a pilot survey to fulfil these functions. I wanted to 
ascertain whether: a) the mechanics of the survey were working correctly; b) the survey was user-friendly in
terms of phrasing and layout; c) there were any other items I should include in the survey, or items I should 
drop; or d) there were any other problems. The survey included a text box asking for feedback. The 
feedback I received was very supportive and constructive, and I made several modifications to the survey 
because of it, ranging from minor spelling errors to the rewording of several questions to more accurately 
reflect their objectives.
4.4 Focus group design
Focus groups are often used in qualitative and mixed methods research (Morgan, 1996). Folch-Lyon and 
Trost (1981) defined a focus group session as “a discussion in which a small number...of respondents, under 
the guidance of a moderator, talk about topics that are believed to be of special importance to the 
investigation” (p. 444). A key characteristic of focus groups, and their major advantage over individual 
interviews, is the participant interaction they enable: “The fact that the participants both query each other 
and explain themselves to each other....offers valuable data on the extent of consensus and diversity among
[them]”, thus offering the researcher more insight than “aggregating individual data in order to speculate 
about whether or why the interviewees differ” (Morgan, 1996, p. 139).
Focus group guidelines, including recommendations for the number of participants and sessions, session 
length, the framing of questions, and management of participants, can be found in the social sciences 
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literature. Focus groups usually consist of between 6-12 participants (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981), although, 
according to Hollis, Openshaw, and Goble (2002): “The more complex or sensitive the issue, the smaller the 
group should be. If there are fewer than five people the range of experience will be less, but this might be a 
compromise for depth of experience” (pp. 2-3). An upper limit of 12 is recommended because “with more 
than 12, not all participants have a chance to present their point of view, and the discussion becomes 
difficult for the moderator to control” (Folch-Lyon & Trost, 1981, p. 446). 
Regarding the number and length of sessions, Hollis et al. (2002) maintained that data saturation (the point 
after which no new information emerges) may occur after two focus group sessions, but “in reality, the 
number of groups is influenced, if not determined, by the budget for the study or the time available” (p. 3). 
Session length is usually one to two hours (Gibbs, 1994), because “if a focus group extends beyond 2 hours, 
fatigue or disinterest may set in” (Packer-Muti, 2010, p. 1025). Regarding the framing of questions, open-
ended questions are preferable to closed-ended questions, and questions should be unambiguous, 
unidimensional, and easily understood by participants (Hollis et al., 2002). Finally, the facilitator has an 
important role in ensuring the success of the group. An effective facilitator encourages open discussion, is a 
good listener, and balances the contributions of dominant and shy participants (Hollis et al., 2002; Tynan & 
Drayton, 1988).
Although not considered ideal, I was limited to one focus group because of time constraints. However, the 
group dynamic was excellent: participants related well to another, chatted easily, and were respectful of one
another’s opinions (Section 4.5.4 explains about the group).
4.5 Data collection
In this section I give more information about the pilot survey, main survey, and focus group, and outline the 
steps that were taken to ensure ethical data collection.
4.5.1 Main survey
There were several key considerations in implementing the main survey. These included publicising the 
survey, ensuring data quality, and ensuring anonymity whilst allowing respondents to enter the prize draw, 
express interest in participating in a focus group, and request a report of the survey findings.
Regarding the promotion of the survey, a survey link was posted on various Facebook profiles, groups and 
pages. Within ECU, the link was posted on the current students’ intranet news page, and this link was 
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shared on the Faculty’s Facebook page. A link to the survey was also briefly posted on the Student Guild’s 
Facebook page, and I sent two emails containing the link to the Graduate Research School’s Google group.  I 
also asked people I knew, within and outside of ECU, if they would like to complete the survey, and if they 
could ask other people if they would like to (‘snowballing’).
When doing the survey, respondents could not proceed from one page to the next until they had answered 
all questions on the current page except for those using text boxes, which they could leave blank. In this 
way, I avoided the difficulty of having to deal with missing data while respondents were afforded some 
flexibility in what they chose to answer. The text box responses were not included in the quantitative 
analysis but provided a great deal of insight into users’ privacy perceptions concerning, and motivations for 
using Facebook. A required response format is also advantageous in that it ensures that respondents do not 
accidentally miss questions or parts of questions. A disadvantage of this format, however, is that 
respondents may not wish to answer all questions and so quit the survey before they finish. My policy (as 
stated in the information letter) was to delete incomplete survey responses, so these responses did not 
contribute to the data set. 
On average, the survey took about 15 minutes to complete (for those with active and deactivated accounts: 
those who had never had an account or who had deleted their account had much briefer surveys), but 
some respondents completed it in less than seven minutes, while others took over an hour to complete it, 
or came back to it the next day.
Once respondents clicked the finish button to complete the survey, they were transferred to another 
website where they had the opportunity to enter a prize draw for one of five $100 Coles-Myer gift vouchers,
express an interest in participating in a focus group or interview, and/or request a copy of a report of the 
survey findings. Transferring respondents to another website where they had the option of providing their 
contact details ensured that these details were kept separate from their survey responses, thus ensuring 
anonymity of said responses. I also blocked Qualtrics from recording respondents’ IP addresses, thus 
providing respondents with further anonymity. Finally, I allocated a number to everyone who was interested
in participating in the prize draw and/or focus group, and used a free online random number generator 
(http://appincredible.com/online/random-number-generator/) to select 20 focus group invitees and five 
prize draw winners.
4.5.2 Pilot survey
Twenty respondents, representing 10% of the projected sample for the main survey (Hertzog, 2008), 
75
completed the pilot survey. Respondents came from within and outside of ECU, and were recruited by word 
of mouth and snowballing. The pilot survey was similar to the main survey in that most of the questions 
were the same (although there were some changes in the main survey due to pilot survey feedback), and in 
that a required response format was used for all questions except for those using text boxes. As was the 
case in the main survey, I ensured the anonymity of survey responses firstly by transferring respondents to 
another website to register their contact details for the $80 prize draw, and secondly by blocking Qualtrics 
from recording IP addresses. 
4.5.3 Focus group
I held one focus group, with four participants, to explore areas about which I was still unsure. Twenty 
randomly selected invitees were emailed an information and consent form, and those agreeing to 
participate in the focus group brought the completed consent form with them on the day. Before the 
session started, participants filled out a form with demographic details (the same details as were requested 
in the survey – participants were not asked to provide personally identifying details). Of the twenty invitees,
the four who accepted and could make it on the day were women in the 18-24 and 25-34 age groups. 
Participants received an $80 Coles-Myer gift voucher as a token of appreciation for their time. The session 
was recorded and later transcribed.
4.5.4 Ethical considerations
Ethical considerations in undertaking this study included identifying risk factors, providing information and 
consent, and ensuring anonymity. The study (Application # 9745) received approval from the ECU ethics 
committee before implementation. The only risk identified was that participants “may be reminded of 
unpleasant online experiences they have had” and the strategy to counter this risk was to provide the 
contact details of the ECU counselling service on the survey and focus group information letters.
As indicated in Section 4.3, an information and consent form was incorporated into the online survey: 
prospective respondents could either select “Agree and continue” or “Exit”. Respondents who continued 
were then asked whether they were aged 18 or over, as ethics approval was only requested for respondents
aged 18+. Survey and focus group participants were informed of the objectives of the research, and main 
survey respondents had the option of receiving a report with the results of the study when it was 
completed. Participants’ privacy was respected by keeping their data secure and confidential, and 
anonymity was assured: participants’ data were anonymously collected and were not used in any way that 
could identify them.
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4.6 Analysis of survey results – Test assumptions, validity, and reliability
When undertaking statistical analysis, key considerations include the validity and reliability of data, and 
whether to use parametric or non-parametric tests.
4.6.1 Validity
Validity has been defined as “the degree to which the researcher has measured what he [sic] has set out to 
measure” (Smith, as cited in Kumar, 1996, p. 137). However, validity can be difficult to establish when 
measuring intangible concepts such as “effectiveness, attitude, or satisfaction” (Kumar, 1996, p. 138). 
Furthermore, issues that could compromise validity are: social desirability, Likert scale bias, 
misinterpretation of questions, random responses, and intentionally misleading responses (Black, 1999, pp. 
223-224).
There are four commonly mentioned types of (ways of assessing) validity: face validity, content validity, 
criterion validity, and construct validity. Face validity is similar to content validity in that both types of 
validity are judgement-based, but whereas face validity is an informal assessment of validity (Does the 
survey look like it is measuring what it is supposed to measure?), content validity is more exacting, and is 
assessed by experts in the field (Kumar, 1996). However, the problem with these types of assessment is 
that: “Different people may have different opinions about the face and content validity of an instrument” 
(Kumar, 1996, p. 139).
There are two main types of criterion validity: concurrent validity and predictive validity. Concurrent validity 
assesses how well a new scale measures a construct by comparing the results to those obtained from an 
established scale measuring the same construct (Laerd dissertation, 2012). Black (1999) noted that this 
strategy “may be of limited value, since [it] is passing the responsibility for ensuring validity to another 
researcher”, and therefore “it should not be the only justification for validity” (p. 229). Predictive validity, on
the other hand, assesses how well a scale “can forecast an outcome” (Kumar, 1996, p. 139) (e.g., Does a 
high score in an IQ test taken prior to university entry predict a high GPA at university level? [Laerd 
dissertation, 2012]). One problem with this type of validity is that it can only be determined retrospectively 
(Kumar, 1996).
Construct validity has been defined as “the correlation between two underlying constructs or factors” and 
“is an attempt to deal with the problem of not having a valid criterion that can be used as a standard against
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which to compare some measure” (Maxim, 1999, p. 265). Construct validity involves the use of statistical 
procedures to ascertain “the contribution of each construct to the total variance observed in a 
phenomenon” (Kumar, 1996, p. 139). According to Bollen (as cited in Maxim 1999, p. 209), “No one 
empirical [statistical] test determines construct validity. Establishing construct validity is a long process, with
each test providing information and suggesting revisions that can aid the next empirical test”. Construct 
validity is usually measured using the convergent/discriminant approach:
Campbell and Fiske (1959) introduced a technique for deciding validity that they termed the 
multitrait, multimethod technique. Here, a correlation or covariance matrix comprising at least two 
different constructs measured by at least two different techniques is estimated....The basic premise 
behind this model is that two different measures of the same concept ought to be highly 
intercorrelated. This Campbell and Fiske termed convergent validity. Further, the correlation between 
the two methods designed to measure the same trait ought to be higher than the correlations among
the traits. This Campbell and Fiske called divergent validity. In other words, unless constructs are 
more dissimilar than the techniques used to measure them, they can no longer be considered 
separate entities. (Maxim, 1999, pp. 210). 
There are two problems with this approach. Firstly: “The multitrait, multimethod approach assumes that 
the measurement methods used to gather the data are equally good”, and secondly, “Campbell and Fiske 
did not initially specify the type of statistical criterion that should be used to evaluate the model. Many 
authors have put forth suggestions: the soundest may be the use of SEM or confirmatory factor analysis” 
(Maxim, 1999, pp. 210-211). Stapleton (1997) similarly maintained that exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is 
the best way to measure construct validity.
The survey items for this thesis were grounded in the relevant literature, and were, in some cases, adopted 
or modified from existing surveys.31 They were also approved by pilot survey respondents. All this suggests 
content validity. In addition, EFA has yielded encouraging results, as detailed in Chapters 5 and 6, suggesting
construct validity (given the robust nature of factor analysis [Allen & Bennett, p. 202], the non-normality of 
much of the survey data was not considered problematic).
31 Five of this study’s Privacy perceptions statements (1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5 & 3C [Table 50]) were closely modelled on O’Brien and 
Torres (2012) corresponding Privacy awareness statements (p. 85). Also, some of this study’s more general survey questions 
were similar to those used by Ross et al. (2009, pp. 583-585) (Do you currently have a Facebook account? If not, why not? How 
many minutes per day do you spend on Facebook? Who can see your Facebook profile? Do you provide your mailing address on 
your Facebook profile? Do you provide a phone number on your Facebook profile? Approximately how many friends are on your
Facebook Friends List? How many Networks do you belong to? How many Facebook Groups do you belong to? Approximately 
how long have you had you Facebook profile?) and O’Brien and Torres (2012, pp. 79-82) (reasons for joining Facebook, details 
disclosed on Facebook, activities on Facebook, Have you read Facebook’s privacy policy? If not, why not?).
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4.6.2 Reliability
According to Wisker (2001), “research....is considered reliable if another researcher carrying out the same 
research activities with the same kind of group would be likely to replicate [the] findings” (p. 253). Factors 
affecting reliability are: ambiguity in the wording of questions, the respondent’s mood, and “the regression 
effect of an instrument – when a research instrument is used to measure attitudes towards an issue, some 
respondents, after having expressed their opinion, may feel that they have been either too negative or too 
positive towards the issue. The second time they may express their opinion differently, affecting reliability” 
(Kumar, 1996, p. 141). There are three ways of assessing the reliability of an instrument: test/retest, parallel
forms of the same test, and the split-half technique. The first two ways are classified as “external 
consistency procedures” whereas the third way is classified as an “internal consistency procedure” (Kumar, 
1996, p. 143). 
The test/retest method involves giving the same test to the same respondents under similar conditions at 
two different times. The greater the difference between the test scores, the less reliable the test is. 
According to Kumar (1996), “The main advantage of the test/retest procedure is that it permits the 
instrument to be compared with itself, thus avoiding the sorts of problems that could arise with the use of 
another instrument”, and “the main disadvantage is that a respondent may recall the responses that he or 
she gave in the first round, which in turn may affect the reliability of the instrument” (p. 141).
When conducting parallel forms of the same test, “the researcher constructs two instruments that are 
intended to measure the same phenomenon” and “the two instruments are then administered to two 
similar populations”. The test results are compared, and “if they are similar, it is assumed that the 
instruments are reliable” (Kumar, 1996, p. 142). According to Kumar (1996): “The main advantage of this 
procedure that it does not suffer from the problem of recall found in the test/re-test procedure”. However, 
“it is extremely difficult to construct two instruments that are comparable in their measurement of a 
phenomenon” (Kumar, 1996, p. 142).
The split half technique “is designed to correlate half of the items with the other half and is appropriate for 
instruments that are designed to measure attitudes towards an issue or phenomenon. The questions or 
statements are divided in half in such a way that any two questions or statements intended to measure the 
same aspect fall into different halves” (Kumar, 1996, p. 142). The resulting scores are correlated, and the 
greater the correlation, the more reliable the instrument is assumed to be. One of the most common 
statistical methods of evaluating the reliability (internal consistency) of a survey instrument is Cronbach’s 
alpha (Allen & Bennett, 2012, p. 210). I have used Cronbach’s alpha to determine the reliability of survey 
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sub-scales: reliability was found to be high for most items (as detailed in Chapters 5 and 6).
4.6.3 Parametric versus non-parametric tests
Parametric tests are based on one or more of the following assumptions: normality, homoscedasticity, 
additivity, linearity, and/or independence of variables. If any of these assumptions are violated, or if the 
data contains outliers, parametric test results could be biased (Field, 2013, pp. 164-176). If one cannot use 
parametric tests because of a violation of one or more of these assumptions, or because the data contains 
outliers, there are five alternatives: to transform the data (which “involves applying a mathematical function
to scores” [Field, 2013, p. 196]), to trim the data (which involves “deleting...scores from the extremes” 
[Field, 2013, p. 196]), to winsorise the data (which “involves replacing outliers with the next highest score 
that is not an outlier” [Field, 2013, p.198]), to use robust methods (i.e., bootstrapping together with 
trimmed means [Field, 2013, pp. 198-200]), or to use non-parametric tests. The drawbacks of non-
parametric tests are that they are commonly held to be less powerful than their parametric equivalents 
(Field, 2013, p. 214), and that there is only a limited range of such tests, which may or may not meet the 
researcher’s needs (Field, 2013, p. 199), but their advantage is that the data can be used as is. Because 
much of the survey data for this thesis does not meet the requirements for parametric tests, I have opted to
use non-parametric tests.
In this chapter I have reviewed the literature directly relating to Hypotheses #1, #2, #3, and #4, and 
addressed considerations and methods regarding survey design, focus group design, data collection, and 
data analysis. In Chapter 5 I analyse the data relating to Hypotheses #1 and #2, in Chapter 6 I analyse the 
data relating to Hypotheses #3 and #4, and in Chapter 7 I discuss the results in relation to the pre-existing 
literature.
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5. RESULTS – DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS, PRIVACY CONCERNS, AND REASONS FOR USING FACEBOOK
Those who had an active Facebook account, who had deactivated or deleted their account, or who had 
never had a Facebook account but who had thought about Facebook, were all invited to complete the 
survey. The survey was completed by 414 people, with 404 valid responses.32 Of these 404 respondents, by 
far the greatest number (n = 391/approx. 97%) had an active Facebook account at the time of the survey. 
However, five respondents (approx. 1%) used to have a Facebook account but had deleted it, four 
respondents (approx. 1%) had a Facebook account but had deactivated it, and another four respondents 
(approx. 1%) had never had a Facebook account (Table 1). I analyse the privacy concerns of these 13 
respondents in Appendix A. 
Table 1. Account status (all valid responses)
Account status Frequency Percent
I have an active Facebook account. 391 96.78
I used to have a Facebook account but I have deleted it. 5 1.24
I have a Facebook account but I have deactivated it. 4 .99
I have never had a Facebook account. 4 .99
Total 404 100.00
5.1 Demographic profile of respondents
All the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 refers to respondents with an active Facebook account. (Analysis for 
respondents without an active Facebook account is in Appendix A.) 
5.1.1 Gender and age
Of the 391 respondents with an active Facebook account, 312 (approx. 80%) were female, 77 (approx. 20%) 
were male, and 2 selected Another identity. Five age groups were represented in a step-wise progression, 
with the most respondents in the lowest age group and the least respondents in the highest age group: 163 
respondents (approx. 42%) were aged 18-24, 125 (approx. 32%) were aged 25-34, 47 (approx. 12%) were 
aged 35-44, 44 people (approx. 11%) were aged 45-54, and 12 people (approx. 3%) were aged 55-64 (Table 
2). 
32 Some respondents who completed the survey had ticked the same response for every item in one or more of the longer 
multiple item Likert scale questions. There were 10 completed surveys in which this had been done for two or more of the 
longer questions, and I did not include these surveys in the analysis (thus reducing the number of survey responses analysed 
from 414 to 404). However, I still included 46 completed surveys in which respondents had ticked the same response for every 
item in only one of the longer questions.
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Table 2. Gender and age
Gender Frequency Percent
Female 312 79.80
Male 77 19.69
Another identity 2 .51
Total 391 100.00
Age Frequency Percent
18-24 years old 163 41.69
25-34 years old 125 31.97
35-44 years old 47 12.02
45-54 years old 44 11.25
55-64 years old 12 3.07
65 years old or older - -
Total 391 100.00
As only two respondents with an active Facebook account selected Another identity for gender (Table 2), I 
cannot include these respondents in gender-based analyses, but they are included in non-gender based 
analyses (analyses based on age, cultural, and educational background, and on non-demographic criteria).
5.1.2 Cultural background
By far the greatest number of respondents with an active account (n = 244/approx. 62%) were born in 
Australia, while 46 respondents (approx. 12%) with an active account were born in the UK.33 Respondents 
born in Australia and the UK therefore comprised almost 75% of the total number of respondents with an 
active account. The next most represented countries/regions of birth were New Zealand (n = 12/approx. 
3%), India (n = 11/approx. 3%), South Africa (n = 9/approx. 2%), the Philippines (n = 8/approx. 2%), and 
China (n = 7/approx. 2%).34 A total of 34 countries/regions of birth were represented by respondents’ 
countries/regions of birth (if the four countries of the UK are grouped together, and China and Hong Kong 
are grouped together) (Table 3).
Table 3. Respondents’ country of birth
Respondents’ COB FrequencyCOB
Frequency
(respondents)
Percent
(respondents)
Cum Percent
(respondents)
Australia 1 244 62.40 62.40
UK a 1 46 11.76 74.16
NZ 1 12 3.07 77.23
India 1 11 2.81 80.04
33 Some respondents listed the UK as their and/or one or both of their parents’ country of birth, whereas others listed England, 
Scotland, Wales or Ireland. The UK is composed of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland (Briney, 2018), so I have 
grouped England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland responses together with UK responses for the purposes of analysis, calling this 
group ‘UKʼ. 
34 Some respondents listed China as their and/or one or both of their parents’ country of birth, whereas others listed Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong is officially a part of China (although in practice Hong Kong is, in some ways, distinct from China) (Boland, 2019), so I
have grouped Hong Kong responses together with China responses for the purposes of analysis, calling this group ‘China’.
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Respondents’ COB FrequencyCOB
Frequency
(respondents)
Percent
(respondents)
Cum Percent
(respondents)
South Africa 1 9 2.30 82.34
Philippines 1 8 2.05 84.39
China b 1 7 1.79 86.18
Malaysia 1 6 1.53 87.71
Zimbabwe 1 6 1.53 89.24
COB – 5 or less respondents c 25 42 10.76 100.00
Total 34 391 100.00
a. ‘UK’ is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
b. ‘China’ is comprised of mainland China and Hong Kong
c. 25 COBs were represented by 5 or less respondents
Approximately 36% of respondents’ parents (n = 140) were both born in Australia, approximately 15% (n = 
59) of respondents’ parents were both born in the UK, and approximately 10% (n = 38) of respondents had 
one parent born in Australia and the other parent born in the UK (Table 4). Therefore, Australia, followed by 
the UK, was by far the most predominant countries of respondents’ parents’ birth.
Table 4. Parents’ countries of birth
Parents’ COB (same)
Frequency
COB
combination
Frequency
(respondents)
Percent
(respondents)
Valid Percent
(respondents)
Cum Percent
(respondents)
Australia 1 140 35.81 48.11 48.11
UK a 1 59 15.09 20.27 68.38
India 1 12 3.07 4.12 72.51
China b 1 8 2.05 2.75 80.76
NZ 1 8 2.05 2.75 75.26
South Africa 1 8 2.05 2.75 78.01
Philippines 1 7 1.79 2.41 83.16
Malaysia 1 6 1.53 2.06 85.22
Parents’ COB (same)  – 5 or less 
respondents c
26 43 10.98 14.78 100.00
100 25.58 Missing
Total 34 391 100.00
Parents’ COB (different) FrequencyCOB
Frequency
(respondents)
Percent
(respondents)
Valid Percent
(respondents)
Cum Percent
(respondents)
Australia & UK 1 38 9.72 38.00 38.00
Parents’ COB (different)  – 5 or less 
respondents d
41 62 15.86 62.00 62.00
291 74.42 Missing 100.00
Total 42 391 100.00
a. ‘UK is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
b. China is comprised of mainland China and Hong Kong
c. 26 parents’ COB, where both parents were born in the same country, were represented by 5 or less respondents
d. 41 combinations of parents’ COB, where both parents were born in different countries, were represented by 5 or less respondents
However, respondents’ cultural backgrounds, in terms of countries/regions of birth, were diverse, with a 
total of 56 countries/regions of birth being represented by their and their parents’ countries/regions of 
birth (Table 5).
83
Table 5. Respondents’ and parents’ countries of birth in alphabetical order
Country Count Country Count Country Count
Afghanistan 1 Greece 20 Pakistan 39
Angola 2 Hungary 21 Philippines 40
Argentina 3 India 22 PNG 41
Australia 4 Indonesia 23 Poland 42
Austria 5 Iran 24 Russia 43
Bangladesh 6 Iraq 25 Saudi Arabia 44
Brunei 7 Italy 26 Singapore 45
Cambodia 8 Kazakhstan 27 Spain 46
Canada 9 Kenya 28 Swaziland 47
Canary Islands 10 Lebanon 29 Sweden 48
Central African Republic 11 Macedonia 30 Switzerland 49
Chile 12 Malaysia 31 Thailand 50
China 13 Maldives 32 Tunisia 51
Colombia 14 Malta 33 UK 52
Croatia 15 Morocco 34 Ukraine 53
Czechoslovakia 16 Mauritius 35 USA 54
Egypt 17 Myanmar 36 Zambia 55
Finland 18 Netherlands 37 Zimbabwe 56
Germany 19 NZ 38
Most respondents (n = 283/approx. 72%) had lived in Australia for more than 15 years, approximately 14% 
(n = 54) respondents had lived in Australia for 6-15 years, approximately 9% (n = 37) of respondents had 
lived in Australia for 1-5 years, and approximately 4% (n = 17) of respondents had lived in Australia for less 
than a year (Table 6).
Table 6. Length of time lived in Australia
Lived in Australia Frequency Percent
More than 15 years 283 72.38
6-15 years 54 13.81
1-5 years 37 9.46
Less than a year 17 4.35
Total 391 100.0
The combined cultural background (the country of birth of the respondent and both parents, together with 
the length of time the respondent had lived in Australia) of 137 respondents (approx. 35%) was 
unambiguously Australian, with the respondent and both parents having been born in Australia and the 
respondent having spent more than 15 years in Australia. This was the biggest single category for combined 
cultural background of the 391 respondents with an active Facebook account. The second biggest category 
(n = 37/approx. 9%) comprised respondents who, together with one parent, had been born in Australia, 
while the other parent had been born in the UK. These respondents had spent more than 15 years in 
Australia. The third biggest category (n = 17/approx. 4%) comprised respondents who had spent more than 
15 years in Australia but who, together with both parents, had been born in the UK. The fourth biggest 
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category (n = 16/approx. 4%) comprised respondents who had spent more than 15 years in Australia, and 
had been born in Australia, whereas both parents had been born in the UK. Cumulatively these four groups 
comprised approximately 53% (n = 207) of the total number of respondents with active Facebook accounts. 
The fifth and sixth largest categories comprised the respondent and both parents having been born in the 
UK, and the respondent having spent 6-15 years and 1-5 years in Australia (n = 12/approx. 3% and n = 
10/approx. 3% respectively). Therefore, almost 60% of respondents with an active Facebook account have 
an exclusively Australian and/or UK combined cultural background (if we assume that respondents in 
categories five and six had spent most of their previous life in the UK). Altogether, there was a total of 104 
different combined cultural backgrounds (Table 7). 
Table 7. Combined cultural background
 COB, P#1 COB, P#2 COB, time lived Aus FrequencyCCB *
Frequency
(respondents)
Percent
(respondents)
Cum Percent
(respondents)
Aus, Aus, Aus, 15+ yrs 1 137 35.04 35.04
Aus, Aus, UK, 15+ yrs a 1 37 9.46 44.50
UK, UK, UK, 15+ yrs 1 17 4.35 48.85
Aus, UK, UK, 15+ yrs 1 16 4.09 52.94
UK, UK, UK, 6-15 yrs 1 12 3.07 56.01
UK, UK, UK, 1-5 yrs 1 10 2.56 58.57
India, India, India, < 1 yr 1 8 2.05 60.62
COB, P#1 COB, P#2 COB, time lived Aus – were 
represented by 5 or less respondents b
117 154 39.38 100.00
Total 124 391 100.00
*      CCB = Combined Cultural Background
a. ‘UK’ is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
b. 117 combinations of COB, P#1 COB, P#2 COB and time lived in Australia were represented by 5 or less respondents
With regard to measures of cultural background for the testing of Hypotheses #1 and #2, I cannot include all
countries of birth because the sample is heavily skewed in favour of Australia as the country of birth, 
followed by the UK, with a large variety of other countries represented in small to minute proportions (Table
3, Table 4, & Table 5). Therefore, I shall use respondents’ and their parents’ countries of birth in relation to 
Australia (Was the respondent born in Australia? Were neither, one or both parents born in Australia?) as 
shown in Table 8, as well as well as the length of time respondents had lived in Australia at the time of the 
survey (Table 6) as measures of cultural influence. These measures, in combination, will be referred to as 
Australian cultural influence.
Table 8. Respondents’ and parents’ countries of birth in relation to Australia
Respondent born in Australia? Frequency Percent
Born in Australia 244 62.40
Not born in Australia 147 37.60
Total 391 100.00
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Respondents’ parents born in Australia? Frequency Percent
Neither parent born in Australia 182 46.55
One parent born in Australia 69 17.65
Both parents born in Australia 140 35.81
Total 391 100.00
5.1.3 Education
Respondents were asked to select any of the following educational qualifications that they had completed: 
A post-secondary (e.g., TAFE) certificate or Diploma, An undergraduate or Honours degree, and A 
postgraduate degree or qualification. I had neglected to include a Secondary school qualification option in 
the list of educational qualifications completed, and for a number of respondents, this was the sole 
educational qualification they had obtained. However, I did include an Other option, in which 36 
respondents listed the following qualifications: Year 12, Secondary education, High school graduate, TEE, 
WACE, HSC, GCE A level, Australian matriculation and WAUFP. For the purposes of this study I will consider 
all these qualifications to be equivalent to a secondary school qualification. Fifty-one respondents left the 
whole question blank – perhaps they thought that high school graduation, not being listed, ‘didn’t count’ for
the purposes of this survey (this was one of the few non-forced questions in the survey) – and I listed 48 of 
these respondents as having completed a secondary school qualification because they were currently 
undertaking undergraduate/Honours or post-secondary (e.g., TAFE) study (44 and 3 respondents 
respectively). I was unsure, however, how to classify 3 current postgraduate students who had not 
responded to the ‘Completed Education’ question, as it seemed unlikely that year 12 was their ‘highest’ 
previous level of formal education. In the end I decided to classify them as having completed an 
undergraduate or Honours degree, as this was respondents’ most frequently selected pathway to current 
postgraduate study.
According to this classification, then, 125 respondents (approx. 32%) with an active Facebook account 
selected A post-secondary (e.g., TAFE) certificate or Diploma as the ‘highest’ level of education completed, 
113 respondents (approx. 29%) selected An undergraduate or Honours degree, 84 respondents (approx. 
21%) selected what I have interpreted as Completion of Year 12 or equivalent (as explained above), and 69 
respondents (approx. 18%) selected A postgraduate degree or qualification (Table 9).
Table 9. Completed education
Completed education Frequency Percent
A post-secondary certificate or Diploma 125 31.97
An undergraduate or Honours degree 113 28.90
Completion of Year 12 or equivalent 84 21.48
A postgraduate degree or qualification 69 17.65
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Completed education Frequency Percent
Total 391 100.00
At the time of the survey, approximately 60% of respondents with an active Facebook account (n = 236) 
were undergraduate or honours students, and approximately 31% (n = 120) were postgraduate students, 
making a combined total of approximately 91% of respondents (n = 356). Twenty-seven respondents 
(approx. 7%) selected I am not a student at this time, and only 8 respondents (approx. 2%) were post-
secondary students (Table 10).
Table 10. Current student status
Current student status Frequency Percent
An undergraduate or Honours student 236 60.36
A postgraduate student 120 30.69
I am not a student at this time 27 6.91
A post-secondary (e.g., TAFE) student 8 2.05
Total 391 100.00
Regarding measures of formal education for the testing of Hypotheses #1 and #2, I cannot use respondents’ 
current educational status in analyses, because a number of respondents were not students at the time of 
the survey, rendering that measure meaningless for those respondents (Table 10). I shall therefore use the 
‘highest’ level of formal education completed (Table 9) as the measure for educational influence.
5.2 Privacy concerns on Facebook 
5.2.1 Means – Privacy concerns
Twelve Facebook-related privacy concerns were listed, and respondents used a 4 point Likert scale with 
levels of concern ranging from 1 – Very much to 4 – Not at all (therefore the lower the mean, the greater 
the level of concern). Eight of the concerns were user-user related and the other four concerns were user-
corporate related, three of them to do with ‘businesses linked to Facebook’, and one referring to the 
Facebook corporation itself.
The greatest Facebook-related privacy concerns for respondents who had an active Facebook account were 
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook (M = 2.18, SD = 1.066), Facebook 
knowing too much about me (M = 2.19, SD = 1.091), Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to 
Facebook (M = 2.26, SD = 1.043) and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me (M = 
2.27, SD = 1.037). These are all user-corporate concerns. Bullying or harassment (M = 2.82, SD = 1.110) was 
of least concern to this group of respondents (Table 11).
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Table 11. Privacy concerns – Means
On Facebook, how much, if at all, do the following possibilities concern you? N Mean* Std Dev
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook 391 2.18 1.066
Facebook knowing too much about me 391 2.19 1.091
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook 391 2.26 1.043
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 391 2.27 1.037
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos 391 2.33 1.087
Other people posting sensitive information about me 391 2.37 1.057
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 391 2.39 1.118
Identity theft 391 2.47 1.150
Fraud 391 2.54 1.140
Someone impersonating me 391 2.65 1.153
Stalking 391 2.67 1.108
Bullying or harassment 391 2.82 1.110
* The lower the mean, the greater the level of concern (1 – Very much; 2 – Moderately; 3 – A little; 4 – Not at all)
5.2.2 Changes in the level of concern
At the time of the survey, over 75% of respondents with an active Facebook account were more concerned 
about privacy issues than they used to be when they first joined Facebook: approximately 42% (n = 166) 
were a lot more concerned, and approximately 34% (n = 133) were a little more concerned. Approximately 
5% of respondents were less concerned – approximately 2% (n = 8) were a lot less concerned and 
approximately 3% (n = 12) were a little less concerned – and approximately 18% of respondents (n = 72) had
about the same level of concern as when they first joined Facebook (Table 12).
Table 12. Changes in the level of privacy concern
Which one of the following statements is true for you? Frequency Percent
I’m a little more concerned about privacy issues than I used to be when I first joined Facebook. 133 34.02
I’m a lot more concerned about privacy issues than I used to be when I first joined Facebook. 166 42.46
I’m a little less concerned about privacy issues than I used to be when I first joined Facebook. 12 3.07
I’m a lot less concerned about privacy issues than I used to be when I first joined Facebook. 8 2.05
My level of concern about privacy issues is about the same as when I first joined Facebook. 72 18.41
Total 391 100.00
5.2.3 Reading and understanding Facebook’s privacy policy
Approximately 6% (n = 25) of the 391 respondents with an active Facebook account had read all of 
Facebook’s privacy policy, approximately 57% (n = 224) had read some of it, and approximately 36% (n = 
142) had read none of it. Of those who had read all of it, 24% (n = 6) had understood it all, while 76% (n = 
19) had understood some of it. Of those who had read some of it, 12.5% (n = 28) had understood all of what
they had read, approximately 81% (n = 182) had understood some of what they had read, and 
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approximately 6% (n = 14) had understood none of what they had read (Table 13).
Table 13. Reading and understanding Facebook’s privacy policy
Have you read Facebook’s privacy policy? Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Yes, all of it. 25 6.39 6.39 6.39
Yes, some of it. 224 57.29 57.29 63.68
No, none of it. 142 36.32 36.32 100.00
Total 391 100.00 100.00
Do you understand Facebook’s privacy policy?
(Those who had read all of it) Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Yes, all of it. 6 1.53 24.00 24.00
Yes, some of it. 19 4.86 76.00 100.00
No, none of it. - - -
366 93.61 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Do you understand what you have read of Facebook’s
privacy policy?
(Those who had read some of it)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Yes, all of it. 28 7.16 12.50 12.50
Yes, some of it. 182 46.55 81.25 93.75
No, none of it. 14 3.58 6.25 100.00
167 42.71 Missing
Total 391 100.00
5.2.4 Understanding Facebook’s privacy settings 
Using a 4 point Likert scale with levels of agreement ranging from 1-Strongly agree to 4-Strongly disagree, 
respondents were asked to rate the statement I get confused when trying to adjust my privacy settings on 
Facebook. Of those respondents with an active Facebook account, approximately 14% (n = 56) strongly 
agreed with this statement, approximately 39% (n = 152) agreed, approximately 38% (n = 149) disagreed, 
and approximately 9% (n = 34) strongly disagreed (Table 14). To put that another way, over half of 
respondents with an active Facebook account (approx. 53%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement  I 
get confused when trying to adjust my privacy settings on Facebook.
Table 14. Confusion over Facebook’s privacy settings
I get confused when trying to adjust my privacy settings on Facebook. Frequency Percent
Strongly agree 56 14.32
Agree 152 38.87
Disagree 149 38.11
Strongly disagree 34 8.70
Total 391 100.00
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5.2.5 Factor analysis and reliability – Privacy concerns
Cronbach’s alpha for the 12 item Privacy concerns on Facebook scale showed high reliability (.928).
A rotated factor matrix (PAF/Promax, KMO = .890) for the 12-item Privacy concerns on Facebook scale 
revealed two factors with eigenvalues exceeding Kaiser’s criterion of 1. These factors accounted for just over
61% of the variance for the 12 concerns (Table 15). 
Table 15. Privacy concerns (2 factor extraction) – Total Variance Explained (PAF – Promax)
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of SquaredLoadings a
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
1 6.752 56.264 56.264 6.382 53.180 53.180 5.914
2 1.397 11.640 67.903 1.001 8.342 61.522 5.057
3 .939 7.823 75.726
4 .679 5.659 81.385
5 .571 4.762 86.147
6 .488 4.068 90.215
7 .324 2.696 92.911
8 .284 2.366 95.278
9 .217 1.808 97.086
10 .156 1.298 98.384
11 .116 .964 99.348
12 .078 .652 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.
The underlying factors identified were: Factor #1 – User-user privacy concerns and Factor #2 – User-
corporate privacy concerns (Table 16). However, there was a third group of variables that loaded 
predominantly onto the first factor and at low levels (below the lower limit of .4, as recommended by 
Stevens [1992]) onto the second factor: Fraud, identity theft, and Someone impersonating me. These 
variables could be described as security concerns, and although fraud, identity theft, and impersonation on 
Facebook are perpetrated by Facebook users, not the Facebook corporation, users may have seen the 
Facebook corporation as partly responsible for their perpetration: this may be why they loaded at low levels
onto the second factor. 
Table 16. Privacy concerns (2 factor extraction) – Pattern Matrix (PAF – Promax)
Privacy concerns Factor 
a
1 2
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me .921 -.155
Other people posting sensitive information about me .903 -.126
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos .737
Stalking .714
Bullying or harassment .679
Someone impersonating me .627 .251
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Privacy concerns Factor 
a
1 2
Identity theft .622 .290
Fraud .604 .324
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me -.100 .883
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook -.124 .837
Facebook knowing too much about me .757
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook .123 .635
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Note. Coefficients below .1 suppressed.
I therefore tried a three factor extraction, the eigenvalues exceeding Joliffe’s criterion of .7, to see whether 
(as the marginal loadings on the two factor model seemed to indicate) a security concerns factor would 
emerge. The three factors accounted for just over 69% of the variance for the 12 concerns (Table 17).  
Table 17. Privacy concerns (3 factor extraction) – Total Variance Explained (PAF – Promax)
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of SquaredLoadings a
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
1 6.752 56.264 56.264 6.473 53.941 53.941 5.543
2 1.397 11.640 67.903 1.070 8.913 62.855 4.981
3 .939 7.823 75.726 .758 6.313 69.168 4.612
4 .679 5.659 81.385
5 .571 4.762 86.147
6 .488 4.068 90.215
7 .324 2.696 92.911
8 .284 2.366 95.278
9 .217 1.808 97.086
10 .156 1.298 98.384
11 .116 .964 99.348
12 .078 .652 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.
The three-factor extraction did indeed reveal a security concerns factor (Factor #1) (the variables loading ≥ .
4 onto this factor were: Fraud; Identity theft; Someone impersonating me; and Stalking), as well as a user-
user privacy concerns factor (Factor #2) (the variables loading ≥ .4 onto this factor were: Other people 
posting sensitive photos or videos of me; Other people posting sensitive information about me; The wrong 
person seeing my posts, photos or videos; and Bullying or harassment) and a user-corporate privacy 
concerns factor (Factor #3) (the variables loading onto this factor ≥ .4 were: Businesses linked to Facebook 
finding out too much about me; Facebook knowing too much about me; Spam/unsolicited email from 
businesses linked to Facebook; and Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook) 
(Table 18). 
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Table 18. Privacy concerns (3 factor extraction) – Pattern Matrix (PAF – Promax)
Privacy concerns Factor 
a
1 2 3
Fraud .944
Identity theft .930
Someone impersonating me .884
Stalking .446 .361
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me .993
Other people posting sensitive information about me .906
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos .121 .615
Bullying or harassment .308 .420
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me .925
Facebook knowing too much about me .767
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook .747
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook .281 .506
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.
Note. Coefficients below .1 suppressed.
A lower limit of .3 (as opposed to .4) for factor loadings has been recommended for sample sizes in excess 
of 350 (Hair, Tathum, Anderson, & Black, 1998). In the three factor extraction (Table 18), two variables – 
Stalking and Bullying or harassment – loaded onto two factors, one loading being above .4, and the other 
loading being between .3 and .4. Although the variable Stalking loaded predominantly onto Factor #1, it 
loaded at .361 onto Factor #2, indicating that stalking was perceived not only as a security concern but also 
as a user-user privacy concern. Similarly, the variable Bullying or harassment loaded predominantly onto 
Factor #2, and at .308 onto Factor #1, indicating that bullying and/or harassment were seen primarily as 
user-user privacy concerns, but also as security concerns. 
It was interesting to note that the variable Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to 
Facebook loaded not far below the lower limit of .3 (.281) onto the security concerns factor.  Although this 
variable could not be included in this factor, its marginal loading made me think carefully about the names 
of the first and third factors, which I thus called User-user security concerns and User-corporate privacy and 
security concerns respectively. The factors extracted using a lower limit of .3, therefore, were: Factor #1 – 
User-user security concerns (Fraud; Identity theft; Someone impersonating me; Stalking; Bullying or 
harassment), Factor #2 – User-user privacy concerns (Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me; 
Other people posting sensitive information about me; The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos; 
Bullying or harassment; Stalking), and Factor #3 – User-corporate privacy and security concerns (Businesses 
linked to Facebook finding out too much about me; Facebook knowing too much about me; 
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook; Viruses, spyware or other malware from 
businesses linked to Facebook).
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Confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs), using robust weighted least squares estimation (WLSM),35 of the two 
and three factor models, with and without factor loadings of between .3 and .4, revealed that the three 
factor model with factor loadings ≥ .3 gave the best fit, and it was, in fact, an excellent fit (CFI = .994, RMSEA
= .051, SRMR = .040)36 (Table 19). (A CFI above .90 is said to indicate an acceptable fit, and above .95, a good
fit [Matsunaga, 2010, p. 108]; a RMSEA below .08 is said to indicate an acceptable fit, and below .06, a good
fit [Matsunaga, 2010, p. 108]; and an SRMR below .08 is said to indicate an acceptable fit, and below .05, a 
good fit [Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008, p.55].37)
Table 19. Privacy concerns (2 and 3 factors with factor loadings ≥ .3 and ≥ .4) – WLSM
2 factors (factor loadings ≥ .4)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
621.800 53 .000 .980 .092 .066
3 factors (factor loadings ≥ .4)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
361.824 51 .000 .990 .066 .050
2 factors (factor loadings ≥ .3)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
624.189 52 .000 .980 .093 .066
3 factors (factor loadings ≥ .3)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
245.883 49 .000 .994 .051 .040
* All values are robust. 
5.3 Demographic factors and privacy concerns (Hypothesis #1)
Hypothesis #1 states that demographic factors influence the nature and degree of privacy concerns on 
Facebook. Because the survey data does not meet parametric test assumptions including normality, I used 
non-parametric tests to analyse relationships between variables to test this and the other three hypotheses.
5.3.1 Gender and privacy concerns
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that there was a statistically significant gender-based difference in levels 
of concern for nine out of the 12 privacy concerns on Facebook, with females being more concerned than 
males in every case. However, the effect sizes, as per the r scores, were small, the concern Viruses, spyware 
or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook showing the biggest difference between genders  
(Mean Rank for Males = 232.12 and for Females = 185.84, U = 9153.50, z = -3.370, p = .001, r = .170). The 
35 The CFAs were computed using the lavaan package in Rstudio (v. 4). All other statistics were computed using SPSS (v. 22 and v. 
25) and PSPP (v. 3).
36 Although Chi-square (ꭕ2) is traditionally reported in CFA, this statistic is sensitive to larger sample sizes (Vandenberg, 2006).
37 The recommended cut-off points for CFIs and RMSEAs are “arbitrary” (Lai & Green, 2016, p. 220). In fact, according to Hooper 
et al. (2008), “recommendations for RMSEA cut-off points have been reduced considerably in the last fifteen years” (p. 54), and 
an upper limit of .1 was considered acceptable in the early 1990s. According to this guideline, the RMSEAs of both the two and 
three factor privacy concern models, with and without factor loadings of between .3 and .4, are acceptable. 
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three concerns that did not show a statistically significant gender-based difference in levels of concern were
Identity theft, Fraud and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me (Table 20 & Table 
21).
Table 20. Gender and privacy concerns – Mann-Whitney Ranks
Privacy concerns Gender N* MW Mean Rank
Sum
of Ranks
Bullying or harassment Male 77 218.63 16834.50
Female 312 189.17 59020.50
Total 389
Other people posting sensitive information about me Male 77 217.07 16714.50
Female 312 189.55 59140.50
Total 389
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me Male 77 223.34 17197.50
Female 312 188.00 58657.50
Total 389
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos Male 77 220.14 16950.50
Female 312 188.80 58904.50
Total 389
Stalking Male 77 221.14 17027.50
Female 312 188.55 58827.50
Total 389
Identity theft Male 77 211.11 16255.50
Female 312 191.02 59599.50
Total 389
Fraud Male 77 215.62 16602.50
Female 312 189.91 59252.50
Total 389
Someone impersonating me Male 77 217.82 16772.00
Female 312 189.37 59083.00
Total 389
Facebook knowing too much about me Male 77 219.57 16907.00
Female 312 188.94 58948.00
Total 389
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me Male 77 212.29 16346.50
Female 312 190.73 59508.50
Total 389
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook Male 77 219.53 16903.50
Female 312 188.95 58951.50
Total 389
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook Male 77 232.12 17873.50
Female 312 185.84 57981.50
Total 389
* Gender ‘Another Identity’ (N = 2) excluded
Table 21. Gender and privacy concerns – Mann-Whitney Test Statistics
Privacy concerns a N* Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W z
Asymp. Sig.
(two-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷⎷n)
Bullying or harassment 389 10192.500 59020.500 -2.145 .032 .108
Other people posting sensitive information about me 389 10312.500 59140.500 -1.995 .046 .101
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 389 9829.500 58657.500 -2.554 .011 .129
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos 389 10076.500 58904.500 -2.268 .023 .114
Stalking 389 9999.500 58827.500 -2.359 .018 .119
Identity theft 389 10771.500 59599.500 -1.451 .147 .073
Fraud 389 10424.500 59252.500 -1.856 .063 .094
Someone impersonating me 389 10255.000 59083.000 -2.060 .039 .104
Facebook knowing too much about me 389 10120.000 58948.000 -2.229 .026 .113
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 389 10680.500 59508.500 -1.565 .117 .079
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook 389 10123.500 58951.500 -2.220 .026 .112
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook 389 9153.500 57981.500 -3.370 .001 .170
a. Grouping Variable: Gender 
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Privacy concerns a N* Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W z
Asymp. Sig.
(two-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷⎷n)
* Gender ‘Another identity’ (N = 2) excluded
5.3.2 Age and privacy concerns
A Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b showed significant age-related trends for two out of the 12 
privacy concerns on Facebook: Stalking (j = 30,748, z = 3.526, p = .000, r = .178, ꚍ = .151), and 
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook (j = 23,297.5, z = -2.815, p = .005, r = .142, ꚍ = 
-.121). The results showed that concern about Stalking decreased slightly with age and concern about Spam
increased slightly with age (Table 22 & Table 23). However, the effect sizes, as per the r scores and ꚍ values, 
were small.
Table 22. Age and privacy concerns – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test
Privacy concerns a * N
Observed J-T
Statistic
Mean J-T
Statistic
Std. Devn. of
J-T Statistic
Std. J-T
Statistic
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
Bullying or harassment 5 391 27602.500 26599.500 1168.921 0.858 .391 .043
Other people posting sensitive information about me 5 391 25775.500 26599.500 1175.124 -0.701 .483 .035
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 5 391 26357.000 26599.500 1178.454 -0.206 .837 .010
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos 5 391 27418.000 26599.500 1176.531 0.696 .487 .035
Stalking 5 391 30748.000 26599.500 1176.686 3.526 .000 .178
Identity theft 5 391 25796.000 26599.500 1179.057 -0.681 .496 .034
Fraud 5 391 25113.000 26599.500 1179.200 -1.261 .207 .063
Someone impersonating me 5 391 26647.000 26599.500 1176.132 0.040 .968 .000
Facebook knowing too much about me 5 391 25281.500 26599.500 1170.247 -1.126 .260 .056
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about 
me
5 391 24713.500 26599.500 1172.846 -1.608 .108 .081
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook 5 391 23297.500 26599.500 1173.123 -2.815 .005 .142
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to
Facebook
5 391 24737.500 26599.500 1169.913 -1.592 .111 .005
a. Grouping Variable: Age group
* Number of Levels in Age group
Table 23. Age and privacy concerns – Kendall’s Tau-b
Privacy concerns Kendall’s Tau-b Age group
Bullying or harassment Correlation Coefficient .037
Sig. (2-tailed) .391
N 391
Other people posting sensitive information about me Correlation Coefficient -.030
Sig. (2-tailed) .483
N 391
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me Correlation Coefficient -.009
Sig. (2-tailed) .837
N 391
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos Correlation Coefficient .030
Sig. (2-tailed) .487
N 391
Stalking Correlation Coefficient .151
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
Identity theft Correlation Coefficient -.029
Sig. (2-tailed) .496
N 391
Fraud Correlation Coefficient -.054
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Privacy concerns Kendall’s Tau-b Age group
Sig. (2-tailed) .207
N 391
Someone impersonating me Correlation Coefficient .002
Sig. (2-tailed) .968
N 391
Facebook knowing too much about me Correlation Coefficient -.048
Sig. (2-tailed) .260
N 391
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me Correlation Coefficient -.069
Sig. (2-tailed) .108
N 391
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook Correlation Coefficient -.121
Sig. (2-tailed) .005
N 391
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook Correlation Coefficient -.068
Sig. (2-tailed) .111
N 391
5.3.3 Australian cultural influence and privacy concerns
Australian cultural influence is measured by the length of time respondents had lived in Australia at the 
time of the survey (Less than a year, 1-5 years, 6-15 years, More than 15 years), and by respondents’ and 
their parents’ countries of birth in relation to Australia (Was the respondent born in Australia? Were 
neither, one or both parents born in Australia?). A Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b showed 
significant trends regarding the length of time respondents had lived in Australia for two out of the 12 
privacy concerns on Facebook: Stalking (j = 20,152.5, z = 3.165, p = .002, r = .160, ꚍ = .141) and Fraud (j = 
19,184, z = 2.171, p = .030, r = .109, ꚍ = .096). The results showed that the longer respondents had lived in 
Australia, the less concerned they tended to be about both Stalking and Fraud. However, the effect sizes, as 
per the r scores and ꚍ values, were small (Table 24 & Table 25).
Table 24. Length of time lived in Australia and privacy concerns – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test
Privacy concerns a * N
Observed J-T
Statistic
Mean J-T
Statistic
Std. Devn. of
J-T Statistic
Std. J-T
Statistic
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
Bullying or harassment 4 391 18759.000 17054.500 972.521 1.753 .080 .088
Other people posting sensitive information about me 4 391 17500.500 17054.500 977.680 0.456 .648 .023
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 4 391 17951.000 17054.500 980.449 0.914 .361 .046
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos 4 391 18459.500 17054.500 978.851 1.435 .151 .072
Stalking 4 391 20152.500 17054.500 978.979 3.165 .002 .160
Identity theft 4 391 18779.500 17054.500 980.951 1.758 .079 .088
Fraud 4 391 19184.000 17054.500 981.070 2.171 .030 .109
Someone impersonating me 4 391 18826.000 17054.500 978.519 1.810 .070 .091
Facebook knowing too much about me 4 391 17550.000 17054.500 973.624 0.509 .611 .025
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 4 391 17315.000 17054.500 975.786 0.267 .789 .013
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook     4 391 16511.500 17054.500 976.016 -0.556 .578 .028
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to 
Facebook
4 391 16965.000 17054.500 973.346 -0.092 .927 .004
a. Grouping Variable: Length of time lived in Australia in total
* Number of Levels in Length of time lived in Australia in total
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Table 25. Length of time lived in Australia and privacy concerns – Kendall’s Tau-b
Privacy concerns Kendall’s Tau-b Time lived in Australia
Bullying or harassment Correlation Coefficient .078
Sig. (2-tailed) .080
N 391
Other people posting sensitive information about me Correlation Coefficient .020
Sig. (2-tailed) .648
N 391
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me Correlation Coefficient .041
Sig. (2-tailed) .361
N 391
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos Correlation Coefficient .064
Sig. (2-tailed) .151
N 391
Stalking Correlation Coefficient .141
Sig. (2-tailed) .002
N 391
Identity theft Correlation Coefficient .078
Sig. (2-tailed) .079
N 391
Fraud Correlation Coefficient .096
Sig. (2-tailed) .030
N 391
Someone impersonating me Correlation Coefficient .081
Sig. (2-tailed) .070
N 391
Facebook knowing too much about me Correlation Coefficient .023
Sig. (2-tailed) .611
N 391
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me Correlation Coefficient .012
Sig. (2-tailed) .789
N 391
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook Correlation Coefficient -.025
Sig. (2-tailed) .578
N 391
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook Correlation Coefficient -.004
Sig. (2-tailed) .927
N 391
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that there was a statistically significant difference in levels of concern for 
three out of the 12 privacy concerns on Facebook, in relation to respondents’ country of birth: Identity theft
(Mean Rank for Australian born = 205.50 and for Another COB = 180.24, U = 15617.00, z = -2.212, p = .027, r
= .111), Fraud (Mean Rank for Australian born = 205.93 and for Another COB = 179.51, U = 15510.50, z = 
-2.313, p = .021, r = .116), and Someone impersonating me (Mean Rank for Australian born = 204.45 and for 
Another COB = 181.97, U = 15872.00, z = -1.974, p = .048, r = .099). In all three cases, respondents who had 
been born in Australia indicated less concern than those with another country of birth. However, the effect 
sizes, as per the r scores, were small (Table 26 & Table 27).
Table 26. Respondents’ country of birth and privacy concerns – Mann-Whitney Ranks
Privacy concerns Respondents’ COB N MW Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Bullying or harassment Australian born 244 198.75 48496.00
Another COB 147 191.43 28140.00
Total 391
Other people posting sensitive information about me Australian born 244 199.96 48790.50
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Privacy concerns Respondents’ COB N MW Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Another COB 147 189.43 27845.50
Total 391
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me Australian born 244 200.88 49015.50
Another COB 147 187.89 27620.50
Total 391
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos Australian born 244 200.91 49022.50
Another COB 147 187.85 27613.50
Total 391
Stalking Australian born 244 202.96 49523.00
Another COB 147 184.44 27113.00
Total 391
Identity theft Australian born 244 205.50 50141.00
Another COB 147 180.24 26495.00
Total 391
Fraud Australian born 244 205.93 50247.50
Another COB 147 179.51 26388.50
Total 391
Someone impersonating me Australia 244 204.45 49886.00
Another COB 147 181.97 26750.00
Total 391
Facebook knowing too much about me Australian born 244 199.88 48771.50
Another COB 147 189.55 27864.50
Total 391
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me Australian born 244 198.69 48481.00
Another COB 147 191.53 28155.00
Total 391
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook Australian born 244 197.48 48186.00
Another COB 147 193.54 28450.00
Total 391
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook Australian born 244 199.44 48663.00
Another COB 147 190.29 27973.00
Total 391
Table 27. Respondents’ country of birth and privacy concerns – Mann-Whitney Test Statistics
Privacy concerns a N Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W z
Asymp. Sig.
(two-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
Bullying or harassment 391 17262.000 28140.000 -0.647 .518 .031
Other people posting sensitive information about me 391 16967.500 27845.500 -0.926 .355 .046
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 391 16742.500 27620.500 -1.138 .255 .057
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos 391 16735.500 27613.500 -1.147 .252 .058
Stalking 391 16235.000 27113.000 -1.625 .104 .082
Identity theft 391 15617.000 26495.000 -2.212 .027 .111
Fraud 391 15510.500 26388.500 -2.313 .021 .116
Someone impersonating me 391 15872.000 26750.000 -1.974 .048 .099
Facebook knowing too much about me 391 16986.500 27864.500 -0.911 .362 .046
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 391 17277.000 28155.000 -0.631 .528 .031
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook 391 17572.000 28450.000 -0.347 .728 .017
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook 391 17095.000 27973.000 -0.807 .420 .040
a. Grouping Variable: Respondents’ COB 
A Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b showed significant trends regarding respondents’ parents’ 
countries of birth in relation to Australia for six out of the 12 privacy concerns on Facebook. The three 
greatest concerns were Fraud (j = 27,788, z = 3.426, p = .001, r = .172, ꚍ = .151), followed by Identity theft (j 
= 27,788, z = 3.174, p = .002, r = .160, ꚍ = .140) and Someone impersonating me (j = 27,019.5, z = 2.765, p = .
006, r = .139, ꚍ = .122). The results show that respondents with neither parent born in Australia tended to 
be the most concerned about all six privacy concerns, and respondents with both parents born in Australia 
tended to be the least concerned. However, the effect sizes, as per the r scores and ꚍ values, were small 
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(Table 28 & Table 29).
Table 28. Parents’ country of birth and privacy concerns – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test 
Privacy concerns a * N
Observed J-T
Statistic
Mean J-T
Statistic
Std. Devn. of
J-T Statistic
Std. J-T
Statistic
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
Bullying or harassment 3 391 24178.000 23849.000 1139.721 0.289 .773 .014
Other people posting sensitive information about me 3 391 25166.500 23849.000 1145.768 1.150 .250 .058
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 3 391 25678.500 23849.000 1149.014 1.592 .111 .080
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos 3 391 26790.500 23849.000 1147.140 2.564 .010 .129
Stalking 3 391 26815.500 23849.000 1147.291 2.586 .010 .130
Identity theft 3 391 27498.000 23849.000 1149.601 3.174 .002 .160
Fraud 3 391 27788.000 23849.000 1149.741 3.426 .001 .172
Someone impersonating me 3 391 27019.500 23849.000 1146.751 2.765 .006 .139
Facebook knowing too much about me 3 391 25613.000 23849.000 1141.014 1.546 .122 .078
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 3 391 25098.500 23849.000 1143.548 1.093 .275 .055
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook 3 391 25343.500 23849.000 1143.818 1.307 .191 .066
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to 
Facebook
3 391 26166.500 23849.000 1140.689 2.032 .042 .102
a. Grouping Variable: Parents’ COB
* Number of Levels in: Parents’ COB
Table 29. Parents’ country of birth and privacy concerns – Kendall’s Tau-b
Privacy concerns Kendall’s Tau-b Parents’ COB
Bullying or harassment Correlation Coefficient .013
Sig. (2-tailed) .773
N 391
Other people posting sensitive information about me Correlation Coefficient .051
Sig. (2-tailed) .250
N 391
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me Correlation Coefficient .070
Sig. (2-tailed) .111
N 391
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos Correlation Coefficient .113
Sig. (2-tailed) .010
N 391
Stalking Correlation Coefficient .114
Sig. (2-tailed) .010
N 391
Identity theft Correlation Coefficient .140
Sig. (2-tailed) .002
N 391
Fraud Correlation Coefficient .151
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 391
Someone impersonating me Correlation Coefficient .122
Sig. (2-tailed) .006
N 391
Facebook knowing too much about me Correlation Coefficient .068
Sig. (2-tailed) .122
N 391
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me Correlation Coefficient .048
Sig. (2-tailed) .275
N 391
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook Correlation Coefficient .058
Sig. (2-tailed) .191
N 391
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook Correlation Coefficient .090
Sig. (2-tailed) .042
N 391
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In summary, and according to the statistically significant associations for the three measures of Australian 
cultural influence, the less time respondents had lived in Australia at the time of the survey, the more likely 
they were to to be concerned about Stalking and Fraud on Facebook. Similarly respondents who were not 
born in Australia also tended to rate these two concerns, as well as Someone impersonating me, higher than
respondents who were born in Australia. Finally,  respondents whose parents were not born in Australia and
who were not born in Australia either were the most likely to be concerned about Stalking, Fraud, Someone
impersonating me, and three other risks: Identity theft, The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos,
and Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook (Table 30).
Table 30. Australian cultural influence and privacy concerns on Facebook – Summary
Reasons for using Facebook r  (r = z ÷ ⎷n)
Time lived Australia Respondents’ COB Parents’ COB
Stalking .160 .130
Fraud .109 .116 .172
Identity theft .111 .160
Someone impersonating me .099 .139
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos .129
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses 
linked to Facebook .102
Note. Where the r scores are not provided, the p value is not statistically significant.
5.3.4 Completed education and privacy concerns
A Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b indicated that there were no statistically significant 
correlations between the ‘highest’ level of formal education respondents had completed at the time of the 
survey (Year 12, Post-secondary, Undergraduate or Honours, Postgraduate) and the 12 privacy concerns on 
Facebook (Table 31 & Table 32).
Table 31. Completed education and privacy concerns – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test
Privacy concerns a * N
Observed J-T
Statistic
Mean J-T
Statistic
Std. Devn. of
J-T Statistic
Std. J-T
Statistic
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
Bullying or harassment 4 391 29139.500 28167.500 1192.354 0.815 .415 .041
Other people posting sensitive information about me 4 391 26349.500 28167.500 1198.682 -1.517 .129 .076
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 4 391 27238.500 28167.500 1202.079 -0.773 .440 .039
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos 4 391 26177.000 28167.500 1200.118 -1.659 .097 .083
Stalking 4 391 28780.500 28167.500 1200.276 0.511 .610 .025
Identity theft 4 391 28288.000 28167.500 1202.694 0.100 .920 .005
Fraud 4 391 28365.000 28167.500 1202.840 0.164 .870 .042
Someone impersonating me 4 391 29691.000 28167.500 1199.711 1.270 .204 .064
Facebook knowing too much about me 4 391 26860.000 28167.500 1193.706 -1.095 .273 .055
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 4 391 27182.500 28167.500 1196.358 -0.823 .410 .041
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook 4 391 26038.500 28167.500 1196.641 -1.779 .075 .089
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to 
Facebook
4 391 27752.500 28167.500 1193.366 -0.348 .728 .036
 a. Grouping Variable: Completed education
* Number of Levels in Completed education
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Table 32. Completed education and privacy concerns – Kendall’s Tau-b
Privacy concerns Kendall’s Tau-b Completed education
Bullying or harassment Correlation Coefficient .035
Sig. (2-tailed) .415
N 391
Other people posting sensitive information about me Correlation Coefficient -.064
Sig. (2-tailed) .129
N 391
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me Correlation Coefficient -.033
Sig. (2-tailed) .440
N 391
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos Correlation Coefficient -.070
Sig. (2-tailed) .097
N 391
Stalking Correlation Coefficient .022
Sig. (2-tailed) .610
N 391
Identity theft Correlation Coefficient .004
Sig. (2-tailed) .920
N 391
Fraud Correlation Coefficient .007
Sig. (2-tailed) .870
N 391
Someone impersonating me Correlation Coefficient .054
Sig. (2-tailed) .204
N 391
Facebook knowing too much about me Correlation Coefficient -.047
Sig. (2-tailed) .273
N 391
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me Correlation Coefficient -.035
Sig. (2-tailed) .410
N 391
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook Correlation Coefficient -.076
Sig. (2-tailed) .075
N 391
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook Correlation Coefficient -.015
Sig. (2-tailed) .728
N 391
5.4 Why respondents use Facebook
5.4.1 Means – Reasons for using Facebook
Respondents were given a list of 24 reasons for using Facebook, and were asked how often, using a 4 point 
Likert scale with levels of frequency ranging from 1 – Very often to 4 – Never, they used Facebook for those 
reasons (the lower the mean, the greater the frequency). For those respondents with an active account, 
Facebook was used most often to keep in touch with friends (M = 1.55, SD = 0.755) and to keep in touch 
with family (M =1.96, SD =1.011). The third most common reason for using Facebook was boredom (M = 
2.25, SD = 1.045), followed by to keep in touch with people from one’s past (M = 2.29, SD = 0.964), and to 
put off doing one’s work (M = 2.48, SD = 1.071). Respondents used Facebook least to meet new romantic or 
sexual partners (M = 3.88, SD = 0.401) (Table 33).
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Table 33. Reasons for using Facebook – Means
Reasons for using Facebook N Mean * Std Dev
To keep in touch with friends 391 1.55 0.755
To keep in touch with family 391 1.96 1.011
Because I’m bored 391 2.25 1.045
To keep in touch with people from my past 391 2.29 0.964
To put off doing my work 391 2.48 1.071
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest) 391 2.54 0.922
To share my news 391 2.60 0.909
To have fun 391 2.62 0.975
To share my thoughts and feelings 391 2.96 0.880
To find out about people I am curious about 391 3.07 0.899
To express who I am 391 3.17 0.883
To ask for advice or help 391 3.29 0.841
To keep an eye on someone 391 3.31 0.869
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 391 3.34 0.837
To feel less lonely 391 3.34 0.871
To find people who share similar interests 391 3.40 0.866
To work with others who have similar goals 391 3.43 0.835
To expand my network 391 3.44 0.805
To find like-minded people 391 3.46 0.812
To project my best self 391 3.46 0.821
To make new friends 391 3.46 0.818
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline 391 3.48 0.819
To enhance my image 391 3.56 0.735
To meet new romantic or sexual partners 391 3.88 0.401
* The lower the mean, the more Facebook is used for that reason (1 – Very often, 2 – Quite often,  3 – Sometimes, 4 – Never)
5.4.2 Factor analysis and reliability – Reasons for using Facebook
Cronbach’s alpha for the 24 item Reasons for using Facebook scale showed high reliability (.919).
A rotated factor matrix (PAF/Promax, KMO = .902) for the 24 item Reasons for using Facebook scale 
revealed five factors with eigenvalues exceeding Kaiser’s criterion of 1. These factors accounted for just over
55% of the variance for the 24 reasons (Table 34).
Table 34. Reasons for using Facebook (5 factor extraction) – Total Variance Explained (PAF – Promax)
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of SquaredLoadings a
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
1 8.731 36.381 36.381 8.310 34.624 34.624 7.048
2 2.056 8.567 44.948 1.651 6.878 41.503 6.355
3 1.730 7.207 52.155 1.338 5.574 47.076 4.994
4 1.485 6.188 58.343 1.091 4.545 51.621 5.126
5 1.273 5.305 63.648 .894 3.726 55.348 1.242
6 .941 3.920 67.568
7 .791 3.294 70.863
8 .678 2.826 73.689
9 .666 2.775 76.463
10 .637 2.654 79.118
11 .561 2.338 81.455
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Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of SquaredLoadings a
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
12 .519 2.164 83.619
13 .499 2.081 85.700
14 .489 2.039 87.739
15 .441 1.836 89.574
16 .430 1.790 91.365
17 .367 1.528 92.893
18 .340 1.415 94.308
19 .320 1.331 95.639
20 .283 1.180 96.819
21 .273 1.138 97.958
22 .223 .928 98.886
23 .141 .585 99.471
24 .127 .529 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.
Using the guideline of factor loadings ≥ .4 as significant (Stevens, 1992), the underlying factors identified 
were: Factor #1 – Relationship seeking (at least partly for the purposes of working with others who have 
similar goals and asking for advice or help); Factor #2 –  Strategic self-presentation and authentic self-
expression; Factor #3 –  Relationship maintenance; Factor #4 – Entertainment, procrastination, and fun; and 
Factor #5 – Facestalking (possibly with a view to forming new relationships with suitable others) (Table 35). 
Three reasons did not load significantly (≥ .4) onto any factor: To feel less lonely, To share my news, and To 
share my thoughts and feelings. 
Table 35. Reasons for using Facebook (5 factor extraction) – Pattern Matrix (PAF – Promax)
Reasons for using Facebook
Factor a
1 2 3 4 5
To find people who share similar interests 1.039 -.188
To find like-minded people .944 -.123
To work with others who have similar goals .896 -.142
To make new friends .692 -.143 .239
To expand my network .579 .137 .189
To ask for advice or help .510 .134
To meet new romantic or sexual partners .440 .124 -.202 .151
To feel less lonely .244 .236 .228 .135
To project my best self -.151 1.030 -.106 .182
To enhance my image 1.019 -.118 .197
To express who I am .111 .644 .100 -.110
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline .284 .522
To share my news .330 .294 .159 -.319
To keep in touch with friends -.141 .875 .120
To keep in touch with family -.118 -.104 .846 -.165
To keep in touch with people from my past .654 -.133 .103
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show 
an interest)
.157 .496 .183
Because I’m bored -.138 1.010 .184
To put off doing my work -.165 .985 .170
To have fun .238 .143 .493
To find out about people I am curious about .274 .211 .135 .541
To keep an eye on someone .137 .148 .285 .531
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Reasons for using Facebook
Factor a
1 2 3 4 5
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners .279 .149 .426
To share my thoughts and feelings .325 .207 .107 .159 -.396
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations
Note. Coefficients below .1 suppressed.
In the above five factor configuration, I wanted to test the strength of the association between the strategic
self-presentation and authentic self-expression facets of Factor #2. Also, Factor #1 (Relationship seeking) 
appeared to contain a diverse set of variables (reasons). To see if either of these factors would split into two,
I extracted another factor for the 24 reasons (making a total of six factors, the eigenvalues exceeding 
Joliffe’s criterion of .7) (Table 36 & Table 37). Factor #2 remained stable, but Factor #1 did split into two: the 
resulting factors were Affiliation and Relationship seeking. The two factors differed in that Affiliation 
emphasised a search for group identity (To find people who share similar interests, To work with others who 
have similar goals, To find like-minded people, To expand my network) whereas Relationship seeking focused
on a search for new relationships, most likely significant (intimate) relationships (To meet new romantic or 
sexual partners, To make new friends, To find out more about potential or new friends or partners), 
motivated at least partly by a need for emotional or practical support (To feel less lonely, To ask for advice or
help).
Table 36. Reasons for using Facebook (6 factor extraction) – Pattern Matrix (PAF – Promax)
Reasons for using Facebook Factor 
a
1 2 3 4 5 6
To find people who share similar interests 1.083 -.152
To find like-minded people .896 .108
To work with others who have similar goals .715 -.120 .148
To expand my network .451 .162 .155
To project my best self 1.000
To enhance my image .967 -.102
To express who I am .513 .387
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline .158 .407 .123 .287
To put off doing my work .964 -.160
Because I’m bored -.102 .937 -.133 .102
To have fun .151 -.144 .436 .124 .273
To keep an eye on someone .247 .332 .175 .105 -.326
To keep in touch with friends .828 -.111 .130
To keep in touch with family -.138 .820 -.218
To keep in touch with people from my past -.128 .614 .119
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or 
show an interest)
.461 .266 .106
To meet new romantic or sexual partners -.250 .722
To find out more about potential or new friends or 
partners
.642 -.171
To make new friends .286 -.166 .593
To ask for advice or help .119 -.127 .523 .221
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Reasons for using Facebook Factor 
a
1 2 3 4 5 6
To feel less lonely .176 .453 .184
To share my thoughts and feelings .176 .652
To share my news .152 .243 .601
To find out about people I am curious about .253 .172 .193 .242 .145 -.354
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 10 iterations.
Note. Coefficients below .1 suppressed.
In this new six factor configuration of the 24 reasons for using Facebook, not only did the Strategic self-
presentation and authentic self-expression factor from Table 35 remain stable, but so did both the 
Entertainment, procrastination, and fun factor and the Relationship maintenance factor. However, a new 
factor was formed, consisting of two variables that did not load significantly (≥ .4) onto any factor in Table 
35 (To share my news, To share my thoughts and feelings), and also, the Facestalking factor in Table 35 
disintegrated, two components of which did not load significantly (≥ .4) onto any factor in Table 36 (To keep 
an eye on someone, To find out about people I am curious about), and the third of which loaded onto the 
new Relationship seeking factor (To find out more about potential or new friends or partners). To 
summarise, therefore, the six factors were: Factor #1 – Affiliation, Factor #2 – Strategic self-presentation 
and authentic self-expression, Factor #3 – Entertainment, procrastination, and fun, Factor #4 – Relationship 
maintenance, Factor #5 – Relationship seeking, and Factor #6 – Sharing of news, thoughts, and feelings. 
These factors accounted for 57.5% of the variance for the 24 reasons (Table 37).
Table 37. Reasons for using Facebook (6 factor extraction) – Total Variance Explained (PAF – Promax)
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of SquaredLoadings a
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
1 8.731 36.381 36.381 8.332 34.717 34.717 6.375
2 2.056 8.567 44.948 1.674 6.975 41.691 5.754
3 1.730 7.207 52.155 1.356 5.651 47.343 4.708
4 1.485 6.188 58.343 1.105 4.605 51.947 4.983
5 1.273 5.305 63.648 .907 3.780 55.727 6.413
6 .941 3.920 67.568 .436 1.817 57.544 3.177
7 .791 3.294 70.863
8 .678 2.826 73.689
9 .666 2.775 76.463
10 .637 2.654 79.118
11 .561 2.338 81.455
12 .519 2.164 83.619
13 .499 2.081 85.700
14 .489 2.039 87.739
15 .441 1.836 89.574
16 .430 1.790 91.365
17 .367 1.528 92.893
18 .340 1.415 94.308
19 .320 1.331 95.639
20 .283 1.180 96.819
21 .273 1.138 97.958
22 .223 .928 98.886
23 .141 .585 99.471
24 .127 .529 100.000
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Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of SquaredLoadings a
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.
In another attempt to test the strength of the association between the strategic self-presentation and 
authentic self-expression facets of Factor #2, and to see if the To keep an eye on someone and To find out 
about people I am curious about variables would coalesce into a factor, I extracted another factor for the 24 
reasons (making a total of seven factors, the eigenvalues exceeding Joliffe’s criterion of .7) (Table 38 & Table 
39).
Table 38. Reasons for using Facebook (7 factor extraction) – Pattern Matrix (PAF – Promax)
Reasons for using Facebook Factor 
a
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To find people who share similar interests 1.039 -.126
To find like-minded people .880
To work with others who have similar goals .713 .146
To expand my network .407 .127 .121 .166
To project my best self .988
To enhance my image .924
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline .144 .351 .317 .108
To keep in touch with friends .808 .105
To keep in touch with family .778 -.180
To keep in touch with people from my past .566
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, 
offer help or show an interest)
.431 .233
Because I’m bored .905
To put off doing my work .904 -.125
To share my thoughts and feelings -.108 .950
To share my news -.135 .107 .827 -.105
To express who I am .420 .482
To have fun .113 -.164 .343 .355
To meet new romantic or sexual partners .157 .715 -.125
To make new friends .300 -.114 -.104 .566
To find out more about potential or new friends 
or partners
-.112 .555 .282
To ask for advice or help .157 .118 .156 .472
To feel less lonely .154 .177 .403
To find out about people I am curious about -.102 1.051
To keep an eye on someone .134 .192 -.142 .535
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
Note. Coefficients below .1 suppressed.
These two variables did, in fact, coalesce into a factor: therefore, the Facestalking factor was back. In this 
new seven factor configuration of the 24 reasons for using Facebook, the Affiliation, Relationship 
maintenance, and Relationship seeking factors from Table 36 remained stable. However, the To express 
myself in ways that I can’t offline variable no longer loaded significantly (≥ .4) onto the Strategic self-
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presentation and authentic self-expression factor from Table 36 (nor onto any other factor), and the To 
express who I am variable loaded significantly (≥ .4) onto not only the Strategic self-presentation and 
authentic self-expression factor, but also the Sharing of news, thoughts, and feelings factor from Table 36. 
This latter factor could thus more appropriately be called Authentic self-expression. Also, the Entertainment,
procrastination, and fun factor from Tables 35 and 36 lost the To have fun variable, which did not load 
significantly (≥ .4) onto any factor.  
As previously mentioned, a lower limit of .3 (as opposed to .4) for factor loadings has been recommended 
for sample sizes in excess of 350 (Hair et al., 1998). There were five loadings of between .3 and .4 in the 
seven factor extraction (Table 38). First, the To express myself in ways that I can’t offline variable loaded at .
351 onto Factor #2 (Strategic self-presentation and authentic self-expression). It was therefore apparent 
that the strategic self-presentation and authentic self-expression facets of Factor #2 were stable, and this 
factor could thus be called Strategic yet authentic self-presentation. Second, this variable loaded at .317 
onto Factor #5 (Authentic self-expression), thus strengthening this factor. Third, the To have fun variable 
loaded at .343 onto Factor #4 (Entertainment and procrastination), which could thus again be called 
Entertainment, procrastination, and fun, and fourth, this variable loaded at .355 onto Factor #5 (Authentic 
self-expression), which seemed to indicate that respondents found authentic self-expression on Facebook 
enjoyable. Finally, the To make new friends variable loaded at .300 onto Factor #1 (Affiliation), which is 
arguably consistent with this factor.
To summarise, therefore, the seven factors were: Factor #1 – Affiliation, Factor #2 – Strategic yet authentic 
self-presentation, Factor #3 – Relationship maintenance, Factor #4 – Entertainment, procrastination, and 
fun, Factor #5 – Authentic self-expression, Factor #6 – Relationship seeking, and Factor #7 – Facestalking. 
These factors accounted for almost 60% of the variance for the 24 reasons (Table 39). 
Table 39. Reasons for using Facebook (7 factor extraction) – Total Variance Explained (PAF – Promax)
Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of SquaredLoadings a
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
1 8.731 36.381 36.381 8.355 34.813 34.813 6.052
2 2.056 8.567 44.948 1.689 7.036 41.849 5.337
3 1.730 7.207 52.155 1.386 5.777 47.626 4.403
4 1.485 6.188 58.343 1.163 4.846 52.472 4.087
5 1.273 5.305 63.648 .938 3.910 56.382 5.890
6 .941 3.920 67.568 .461 1.922 58.304 6.143
7 .791 3.294 70.863 .378 1.573 59.878 4.847
8 .678 2.826 73.689
9 .666 2.775 76.463
10 .637 2.654 79.118
11 .561 2.338 81.455
12 .519 2.164 83.619
13 .499 2.081 85.700
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Factor
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of SquaredLoadings a
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total
14 .489 2.039 87.739
15 .441 1.836 89.574
16 .430 1.790 91.365
17 .367 1.528 92.893
18 .340 1.415 94.308
19 .320 1.331 95.639
20 .283 1.180 96.819
21 .273 1.138 97.958
22 .223 .928 98.886
23 .141 .585 99.471
24 .127 .529 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
a. When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.
Confirmatory factor analyses, using robust weighted least squares estimation (WLSM), of the five, six, and 
seven factor models, with and without factor loadings of between .3 and .4, revealed that the seven factor 
model with factor loadings ≥ .3 gave the best fit, and it was a good, verging on excellent, fit  (CFI = .982, 
RMSEA = .043, SRMR = .052) (Table 40).
Table 40. Reasons for using Facebook (5, 6, and 7 factors with factor loadings ≥ .3 and ≥ .4) – WLSM
5 factors (factor loadings ≥ .4)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
692.809 179 .000 .972 .052 .060
6 factors (factor loadings ≥ .4)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
814.832 194 .000 .971 .054 .061
7 factors (factor loadings ≥ .4)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
660.260 187 .000 .977 .047 .054
5 factors (factor loadings ≥ .3)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
1098.188 220 .000 .959 .062 .070
6 factors (factor loadings ≥ .3)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
908.060 214 .000 .969 .055 .062
7 factors (factor loadings ≥ .3)*
ꭕ2 df p CFI RMSEA SRMR
713.546 227 .000 .982 .043 .052
* All values are robust. 
5.5 Demographic factors and reasons for using Facebook (Hypothesis #2)
Hypothesis #2 states that demographic factors influence the nature and degree of social needs on 
Facebook. I used the Reasons for using Facebook variable to measure social needs on Facebook.
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5.5.1 Gender and reasons for using Facebook
A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that gender influenced respondents’ reasons for using Facebook. There 
was a statistically significant difference between genders for eight of the 24 reasons given. Females used 
Facebook more than males for the following five reasons: To keep in touch with friends (Mean Rank for 
Males = 216.56 and for Females = 189.67, U = 10349.50, z = -2.14, p = .032, r = 0.108), To keep in touch with 
family (Mean Rank for Males = 234.37 and for Females = 185.28, U = 8980.50, z = -3.64, p = .000, r = 0.184), 
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or to show an interest) (Mean Rank for Males = 
234.64 and for Females = 185.22, U = 8960.00, z = -3.64, p = .000, r = 0.184), To share my news (Mean Rank 
for Males = 225.58 and for Females = 187.45, U = 9657.50, z = -2.82, p = .005, r = 0.142), and To put off 
doing my work (Mean Rank for Males = 220.69 and for Females = 188.66, U = 10034.00, z = -2.32, p = .020, r
= 0.117). However, males used Facebook more than females for the following three reasons: To make new 
friends (Mean Rank for Males = 170.63 and for Females = 201.01, U = 10135.50, z = -3.64, p = .014, r = 
0.124), To meet new romantic or sexual partners (Mean Rank for Males = 180.03 and for Females = 198.70, 
U = 10859.00, z = -2.57, p = .010, r = 0.130), and To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 
(Mean Rank for Males = 168.06 and for Females = 201.65, U = 9937.50, z = -2.60, p = .009, r = 0.131). The 
biggest differences were To keep in touch with family and To be there for others (both r = 0.184), both of 
which females used Facebook for more than males.  However, the effect sizes for all eight reasons, as per 
the r scores, were small (Table B1 & Table 41).
Table 41. Gender and reasons for using Facebook – Mann-Whitney Test Statistics
Reasons for using Facebook a N* Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W z
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
To keep in touch with friends 389 10349.500 59177.500 -2.141 .032 .108
To keep in touch with family 389 8980.500 57808.500 -3.638 .000 .184
To keep in touch with people from my past 389 11869.500 60697.500 -0.170 .865 .008
To make new friends 389 10135.500 13138.500 -2.456 .014 .124
To meet new romantic or sexual partners 389 10859.000 13862.000 -2.566 .010 .130
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 389 9937.500 12940.500 -2.596 .009 .131
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
389 8960.000 57788.000 -3.636 .000 .184
To ask for advice or help 389 11674.000 60502.000 -0.418 .676 .021
To feel less lonely 389 11132.000 59960.000 -1.109 .267 .056
To enhance my image 389 10781.000 13784.000 -1.689 .091 .085
To project my best self 389 11907.500 14910.500 -0.138 .890 .006
To express who I am 389 11946.000 14949.000 -0.080 .936 .004
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline 389 11602.500 14605.500 -0.548 .584 .027
To share my news 389 9657.500 58485.500 -2.818 .005 .142
To share my thoughts and feelings 389 10800.500 59628.500 -1.466 .143 .074
To find like-minded people 389 10653.000 13656.000 -1.794 .073 .090
To find people who share similar interests 389 10655.500 13658.500 -1.760 .078 .089
To work with others who have similar goals 389 11746.500 14749.500 -0.348 .728 .017
To find out about people I am curious about 389 11696.000 14699.000 -0.381 .703 .019
To keep an eye on someone 389 11955.500 14958.500 -0.071 .944 .003
To expand my network 389 11203.000 14206.000 -1.053 .292 .053
To have fun 389 11383.000 60211.000 -0.744 .457 .037
To put off doing my work 389 10034.000 58862.000 -2.322 .020 .117
Because I’m bored 389 11364.500 60192.500 -0.761 .446 .038
a. Grouping Variable: Gender
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Reasons for using Facebook a N* Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W z
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
* Gender ‘Another identity’ (N = 2) excluded
5.5.2 Age and reasons for using Facebook
A Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b showed significant age-related trends for 21 out of the 24 
reasons for using Facebook. Six of these reasons had both an r score and a ꚍ value above .2. They are, in 
descending order according to the r-scores: Because I’m bored (j = 37,111, z = 8.965, p = .000, r = .453, ꚍ = .
385), To put off doing my work (j = 34,107, z = 6.392, p = .000, r = .323, ꚍ = .274), To find out more about 
potential or new friends or partners (j = 33,198; z = 5.989; p = .000, r = .302, ꚍ = .266), To keep in touch with 
friends  (j = 32,943.5, z = 5.931, p = .000, r = .299, ꚍ = .266), To keep an eye on someone (j = 32,901.5, z = 
5.711, p = .000, r = .288, ꚍ = .253), and To find out about people I am curious about (j = 32,095.5, z = 4.803, p
= .000, r = .242, ꚍ = .210). The younger the respondent, the more likely he or she was to have used Facebook
for all 21 reasons. This age-related trend, according to the r scores for the 21 reasons, ranges from large to 
small, Because I’m bored having the largest effect. The three reasons that did not show an age-related trend
were: To keep in touch with family, To share my news, and To work with others who have similar goals (Table
42 & Table B2).
Table 42. Age and reasons for using Facebook – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test
Reasons for using Facebook a * N Observed J-TStatistic
Mean J-T
Statistic
Std. Devn. of
J-T Statistic
Std. J-T
Statistic
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
To keep in touch with friends 5 391 32943.500 26599.500 1069.566 5.931 .000 .299
To keep in touch with family 5 391 27881.500 26599.500 1149.049 1.116 .265 .056
To keep in touch with people from my past 5 391 29446.000 26599.500 1158.274 2.458 .014 .124
To make new friends 5 391 30204.500 26599.500 1053.661 3.421 .001 .173
To meet new romantic or sexual partners 5 391 28388.000 26599.500 618.155 2.893 .004 .146
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 5 391 33198.000 26599.500 1101.725 5.989 .000 .302
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
5 391 29165.000 26599.500 1157.397 2.217 .027 .112
To ask for advice or help 5 391 29742.000 26599.500 1115.149 2.818 .005 .142
To feel less lonely 5 391 30084.000 26599.500 1092.678 3.189 .001 .161
To enhance my image 5 391 30593.500 26599.500 1005.564 3.972 .000 .200
To project my best self 5 391 30514.000 26599.500 1045.476 3.744 .000 .189
To express who I am 5 391 31754.000 26599.500 1134.067 4.545 .000 .229
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline 5 391 30376.500 26599.500 1031.670 3.661 .000 .185
To share my news 5 391 28112.500 26599.500 1152.748 1.313 .189 .066
To share my thoughts and feelings 5 391 30110.500 26599.500 1139.959 3.080 .002 .155
To find like-minded people 5 391 29845.000 26599.500 1045.200 3.105 .002 .157
To find people who share similar interests 5 391 29492.500 26599.500 1063.472 2.720 .007 .137
To work with others who have similar goals 5 391 28553.500 26599.500 1053.990 1.854 .064 .093
To find out about people I am curious about 5 391 32095.500 26599.500 1144.288 4.803 .000 .242
To keep an eye on someone 5 391 32901.500 26599.500 1103.539 5.711 .000 .288
To expand my network 5 391 29839.000 26599.500 1059.533 3.057 .002 .154
To have fun 5 391 31758.500 26599.500 1166.338 4.423 .000 .223
To put off doing my work 5 391 34107.000 26599.500 1174.554 6.392 .000 .323
Because I’m bored 5 391 37111.000 26599.500 1172.479 8.965 .000 .453
a. Grouping Variable: Age group
* Number of Levels in Age group
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5.5.3 Australian cultural influence and reasons for using Facebook
Australian cultural influence is measured by the length of time respondents had lived in Australia at the 
time of the survey (Less than a year, 1-5 years, 6-15 years, More than 15 years), and by respondents’ and 
their parents’ countries of birth in relation to Australia (Was the respondent born in Australia? Were 
neither, one or both parents born in Australia?). A Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b showed 
statistically significant trends for the length of time respondents had lived in Australia (Less than a year, 1-5 
year, 6-15 years, More than 15 years) and two of the listed reasons for using Facebook: To keep in touch 
with people from my past (j = 19,714, z = 2.760, p = .006, r = .139, ꚍ = .124) and To make new friends (j = 
19,764.5, z = 3.091, p = .002, r = .156, ꚍ = .144). The less time respondents had lived in Australia at the time 
of the survey, the more likely they were to have used Facebook for both of these reasons. According to the  r
scores and ꚍ values, however, the effect sizes were small (Table 43 & Table B3).
Table 43. Length of time lived in Australia and reasons for using Facebook – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test
Reasons for using Facebook a * N Observed J-TStatistic
Mean J-T
Statistic
Std. Devn. of
J-T Statistic
Std. J-T
Statistic
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
To keep in touch with friends 4 391 18001.500 17054.500 889.878 1.064 .287 .053
To keep in touch with family 4 391 18480.000 17054.500 955.993 1.491 .136 .075
To keep in touch with people from my past 4 391 19714.000 17054.500 963.667 2.760 .006 .139
To make new friends 4 391 19764.500 17054.500 876.646 3.091 .002 .156
To meet new romantic or sexual partners 4 391 17134.000 17054.500 514.313 0.155 .877 .007
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 4 391 17700.000 17054.500 916.631 0.704 .481 .035
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
4 391 16566.000 17054.500 962.936 -0.507 .612 .025
To ask for advice or help 4 391 18383.500 17054.500 927.798 1.432 .152 .072
To feel less lonely 4 391 17214.000 17054.500 909.103 0.175 .861 .008
To enhance my image 4 391 17669.500 17054.500 836.633 0.735 .462 .037
To project my best self 4 391 18289.500 17054.500 869.835 1.420 .156 .071
To express who I am 4 391 17364.000 17054.500 943.534 0.328 .743 .016
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline 4 391 18105.000 17054.500 858.349 1.224 .221 .061
To share my news 4 391 17183.500 17054.500 959.069 0.135 .893 .006
To share my thoughts and feelings 4 391 17946.500 17054.500 948.433 0.940 .347 .047
To find like-minded people 4 391 17960.000 17054.500 869.605 1.041 .298 .052
To find people who share similar interests 4 391 17696.000 17054.500 884.805 0.725 .468 .036
To work with others who have similar goals 4 391 17105.000 17054.500 876.918 0.058 .954 .002
To find out about people I am curious about 4 391 17786.500 17054.500 952.035 0.769 .442 .038
To keep an eye on someone 4 391 16204.000 17054.500 918.139 -0.926 .315 .046
To expand my network 4 391 17940.000 17054.500 881.530 1.005 .315 .050
To have fun 4 391 17671.500 17054.500 970.372 0.636 .525 .032
To put off doing my work 4 391 15239.500 17054.500 977.206 -1.857 .063 .093
Because I’m bored 4 391 16.136.500 17054.500 975.481 -0.941 .347 .047
a. Grouping Variable Length of time lived in Australia in total
* Number of Levels in Length of time lived in Australia in total
A Mann-Whitney U test showed significant trends regarding respondents’ countries of birth in relation to 
Australia for five out of the 24 reasons for using Facebook: To keep in touch with people from my past, To 
make new friends, To keep an eye on someone, To put off doing my work, and Because I’m bored (Table B4 &
Table 44). Respondents who were not born in Australia tended to use Facebook more for the reasons To 
keep in touch with people from my past (Mean Rank for Australian born = 206.45 and for Another COB = 
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178.65, U = 15383.00, z = -2.479, p = .013, r = .126), and To make new friends (Mean Rank for Australian 
born = 206.75 and for Another COB = 178.16, U = 15311.50, z = -2.802, p = .005, r = .141) than those who 
were born in Australia, but respondents who were born in Australia tended to use Facebook more for the 
reasons To keep an eye on someone (Mean Rank for Australian born = 187.03 and for Another COB = 210.88,
U = 15746.00, z = -2.232, p = .026, r = .112), To put off doing my work (Mean Rank for Australian born = 
181.53 and for Another COB = 220.01, U = 14404.00, z = -3.383, p = .001, r = .171), and Because I’m bored 
(Mean Rank for Australian born = 185.64 and for Another COB = 213.19, U = 15406.50, z = -2.427, p = .015, r
= .122) than those who were not born in Australia. The most pronounced effects were for the reasons To 
put off doing my work followed by To make new friends, but as per the r scores, the effect size for all five 
reasons was small.
Table 44. Respondents’ country of birth and reasons for using Facebook – Mann-Whitney Test Statistics
Reasons for using Facebook a N* Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W z
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
To keep in touch with friends 391 17897.500 28775.500 -0.038 .969 .002
To keep in touch with family 391 16080.500 26958.500 -1.816 .069 .091
To keep in touch with people from my past 391 15383.000 26261.000 -2.479 .013 .126
To make new friends 391 15311.500 26189.500 -2.802 .005 .141
To meet new romantic or sexual partners 391 17508.000 28386.000 -0.776 .438 .039
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 391 17435.000 47325.000 -0.510 .610 .025
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
391 17908.500 47798.500 -0.025 .980 .001
To ask for advice or help 391 17443.000 28321.000 -0.496 .620 .025
To feel less lonely 391 17314.500 28192.500 -0.638 .523 .032
To enhance my image 391 17684.500 47574.500 -0.279 .780 .014
To project my best self 391 17433.000 28311.000 -0.539 .590 .027
To express who I am 391 17665.000 47555.000 -0.267 .789 .013
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline 391 17856.500 47746.500 -0.085 .933 .004
To share my news 391 17342.500 47232.500 -0.578 .564 .029
To share my thoughts and feelings 391 17902.000 47792.000 -0.032 .975 .001
To find like-minded people 391 17449.500 28327.500 -0.522 .602 .026
To find people who share similar interests 391 17647.000 28525.000 -0.304 .761 .015
To work with others who have similar goals 391 17312.000 28190.000 -0.664 .507 .033
To find out about people I am curious about 391 16981.500 46871.500 -0.937 .349 .047
To keep an eye on someone 391 15746.000 45636.000 -2.232 .026 .112
To expand my network 391 17217.500 28095.500 -0.761 .447 .038
To have fun 391 17108.000 46998.000 -0.797 .425 .040
To put off doing my work 391 14404.000 44294.000 -3.383 .001 .171
Because I’m bored 391 15406.500 45296.500 -2.427 .015 .122
a. Grouping Variable: Respondents’ COB
A Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b showed significant trends regarding respondents’ parents’ 
countries of birth in relation to Australia for three out of the 24 reasons for using Facebook: To keep an eye 
on someone (j = 21,008, z = -2.640, p = .008, r = .133, ꚍ = -.120), To put off doing my work (j = 19,340.5, z = 
-3.937, p = .000, r = .199, ꚍ = -.174), and Because I’m bored (j = 20,143.5, z = -3.241, p = .001, r = .163, ꚍ = 
-.143). The results show that respondents with both parents born in Australia tended to use Facebook the 
most for all three reasons, and respondents with neither parent born in Australia tended to use Facebook 
the least for all three reasons. According to the r scores and ꚍ values, the effect sizes for the first and third 
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reasons were small, but the effect size for the second reason (To put off doing my work) was small-medium 
(Table 45 & Table B5).
Table 45. Parents’ country of birth and reasons for using Facebook – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test
Reasons for using Facebook a * N Observed J-TStatistic
Mean J-T
Statistic
Std. Devn. of
J-T Statistic
Std. J-T
Statistic
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
To keep in touch with friends 3 391 23453.500 23849.000 1042.865 -0.379 .705 .019
To keep in touch with family 3 391 25659.000 23849.000 1120.351 1.616 .106 .081
To keep in touch with people from my past 3 391 26017.500 23849.000 1129.344 1.920 .055 .097
To make new friends 3 391 25381.500 23849.000 1027.358 1.492 .136 .075
To meet new romantic or sexual partners 3 391 23261.500 23849.000 602.731 -0.975 .330 .049
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 3 391 22895.000 23849.000 1074.218 -0.888 .374 .044
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
3 391 22947.000 23849.000 1128.488 -0.799 .424 .040
To ask for advice or help 3 391 23228.500 23849.000 1087.305 -0.571 .568 .028
To feel less lonely 3 391 23182.000 23849.000 1065.396 -0.626 .531 .031
To enhance my image 3 391 22925.000 23849.000 980.465 -0.942 .346 .047
To project my best self 3 391 23779.500 23849.000 1019.376 -0.068 .946 .003
To express who I am 3 391 22471.000 23849.000 1105.748 -1.246 .213 .063
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline 3 391 22672.000 23849.000 1005.915 -1.170 .242 .059
To share my news 3 391 22665.500 23849.000 1123.956 -1.053 .292 .053
To share my thoughts and feelings 3 391 23422.000 23849.000 1111.490 -0.384 .701 .019
To find like-minded people 3 391 22521.000 23849.000 1019.107 -1.303 .193 .065
To find people who share similar interests 3 391 22587.500 23849.000 1036.921 -1.217 .224 .061
To work with others who have similar goals 3 391 22751.000 23849.000 1027.677 -1.068 .285 .053
To find out about people I am curious about 3 391 22167.500 23849.000 1115.711 -1.507 .132 .076
To keep an eye on someone 3 391 21008.000 23849.000 1075.986 -2.640 .008 .133
To expand my network 3 391 23719.000 23849.000 1033.082 -0.126 .900 .006
To have fun 3 391 21816.500 23849.000 1137.203 -1.787 .074 .090
To put off doing my work 3 391 19340.500 23849.000 1145.212 -3.937 .000 .199
Because I’m bored 3 391 20143.500 23849.000 1143.190 -3.241 .001 .163
* Number of Levels in Parents’ COB
a. Grouping Variable: Parents’ COB
In summary, and according to the statistically significant associations for the three measures of Australian 
cultural influence, the less time respondents had lived in Australia at the time of the survey, the more likely 
they were to have used Facebook for the reasons To keep in touch with people from my past and To make 
new friends. Similarly respondents who were not born in Australia also tended to use Facebook more for 
these two reasons. However, respondents whose parents were born in Australia and who were born in 
Australia themselves were the most likely to use Facebook for the reasons To keep an eye on someone, To 
put off doing my work, and Because I’m bored (Table 46). In all instances, however, the effect sizes, as per 
the r scores, were small.
Table 46. Australian cultural influence and reasons for using Facebook – Summary
Reasons for using Facebook r  (r = z ÷ ⎷n)
Time lived Australia Respondents’ COB Parents’ COB
To keep in touch with people from my past .139 .126
To make new friends .156 .141
To keep an eye on someone .112 .133
To put off doing my work .171 .199
113
Reasons for using Facebook r  (r = z ÷ ⎷n)
Time lived Australia Respondents’ COB Parents’ COB
Because I’m bored .122 .163
Note. Where the r scores are not provided, the p value is not statistically significant.
 
5.5.4 Completed education and reasons for using Facebook
A Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b showed significant trends across groups describing the 
‘highest’ completed level of formal education for 19 of the 24 reasons for using Facebook. Two of these 
reasons had both an r score and a ꚍ value above .2: Because I’m bored (j = 34,624, z = 5.398, p = .000, r = .
272, ꚍ = .230), and To make new friends (j = 33,113, z = 4.601, p = .000, r = .232, ꚍ = .205).  For all 19 reasons,
the ‘higher’ the level of formal education completed, the less likely respondents were to use Facebook for 
that reason (Table 47 & Table B6).
Table 47. Completed education and reasons for using Facebook – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test
Reasons for using Facebook a * N Observed J-TStatistic
Mean J-T
Statistic
Std. Devn. of
J-T Statistic
Std. J-T
Statistic
Asymp. Sig.
(2-tailed)
r
(r = z ÷ ⎷n)
To keep in touch with friends 4 391 32714.500 28167.500 1091.001 4.168 .000 .210
To keep in touch with family 4 391 29908.000 28167.500 1172.082 1.485 .138 .075
To keep in touch with people from my past 4 391 29714.000 28167.500 1181.493 1.309 .191 .066
To make new friends 4 391 33113.000 28167.500 1074.777 4.601 .000 .232
To meet new romantic or sexual partners 4 391 30545.000 28167.500 630.541 3.771 .000 .190
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 4 391 32934.500 28167.500 1123.806 4.242 .000 .214
To be there for others\
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest
4 391 31396.500 28167.500 1180.598 2.735 .006 .138
To ask for advice or help 4 391 32961.000 28167.500 1137.499 4.214 .000 .213
To feel less lonely 4 391 32398.500 28167.500 1114.578 3.796 .000 .191
To enhance my image 4 391 29444.000 28167.500 1025.716 1.244 .213 .062
To project my best self 4 391 29043.500 28167.500 1066.429 0.821 .411 .041
To express who I am 4 391 31612.500 28167.500 1156.798 2.978 .003 .150
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline 4 391 30405.500 28167.500 1052.346 2.127 .033 .107
To share my news 4 391 30232.500 28167.500 1175.856 1.756 .079 .088
To share my thoughts and feelings 4 391 30798.000 28167.500 1162.809 2.262 .024 .114
To find like-minded people 4 391 32654.500 28167.500 1066.147 4.209 .000 .212
To find people who share similar interests 4 391 32546.000 28167.500 1084.786 4.036 .000 .204
To work with others who have similar goals 4 391 32157.500 28167.500 1075.114 3.711 .000 .187
To find out about people I am curious about 4 391 32254.000 28167.500 1167.224 3.501 .000 .177
To keep an eye on someone 4 391 32904.500 28167.500 1125.657 4.208 .000 .212
To expand my network 4 391 31121.000 28167.500 1080.767 2.733 .006 .138
To have fun 4 391 33667.000 28167.500 1189.719 4.623 .000 .233
To put off doing my work 4 391 32184.000 28167.500 1198.100 3.352 .001 .169
Because I’m bored 4 391 34624.000 28167.500 1195.984 5.398 .000 .272
* Number of Levels in Completed education
a. Grouping Variable: Completed education
These test results may indicate an age-related as opposed to an education-related trend, as respondents 
aged 18-24 were most likely to have completed Year 12 as the ‘highest’ level of formal education 
completed, and those aged 25-34 were most likely to have completed an undergraduate or Honours 
qualification as the ‘highest’ level of formal education completed. Also, the percentage of respondents who 
had completed a post-secondary qualification as the ‘highest’ level of formal education completed drops 
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steadily as age increases, and those aged 18-24 were least likely to have completed a post-graduate 
qualification as the ‘highest’ level of formal education completed (Figure 4 & Table 48).
Table 48. Completed education and age – Crosstabs 
My age group YR12 TAFE UGH PG Total
18-24 years old 67 48 42 6 163
25-34 years old 14 38 51 22 125
35-44 years old 2 20 9 16 47
45-54 years old 1 16 10 17 44
55-64 years old 0 3 1 8 12
Total 84 125 113 69 391
In fact, a Jonckheere-Terpstra test and Kendall’s Tau-b confirmed an age-related trend regarding the 
‘highest’ level of formal education completed (j = 36,673, z = 8.583, p = .000, r = .433, ꚍ = .368) (a medium-
large effect). However, it was possible that, in spite of this association, the ‘highest’ level of formal 
education completed may, in itself, have influenced reasons for using Facebook. To test this theory, I used 
Kendall’s tau-b in the context of conditional correlation, and found that the impact of formal education per 
se on reasons for using Facebook, while still existent, was much reduced: instead of 19 of the 24 reasons for 
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           Figure 4. Completed education and age
using Facebook being significantly associated with education, only 13 reasons were, and only 1- 3 of the five
age groups showed an educational association, independent of age, with each of those reasons (Table B7).
In this chapter I have analysed the survey data related to Hypotheses #1 and #2, and in Chapter 6 I analyse 
the survey data related to Hypotheses #3 and #4.
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6. RESULTS – PRIVACY PERCEPTIONS, PRIVACY CONCERNS, SOCIAL NEEDS, AND FACEBOOK USE
Hypothesis #3 states that Facebook users’ privacy perceptions (what users think is happening in regard to 
their privacy on Facebook) influence the nature and degree of their privacy concerns on Facebook. User-
user concerns are centred on other Facebook users, whereas user-corporate concerns are centred on the 
Facebook corporation (Facebook, Inc.) and its affiliated businesses. Facebook refers, in this thesis, to both 
the Facebook corporation and the Facebook platform. Businesses linked to the Facebook platform are of 
four types: other businesses owned by the Facebook corporation (e.g., Instagram and WhatsApp), 
independent app developers who integrate their apps into the Facebook platform, businesses that advertise
on the Facebook platform, and websites that link to the Facebook platform via social plugins and Single 
Sign-On (SSO).
The Perceptions section of the survey, based on a similar (in some cases almost identical) set of statements 
by O’Brien and Torres (2012, p. 85), presented respondents with two questions: WHO CAN I HIDE MY 
INFORMATION FROM? and WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME? comprising five statements each, 
and respondents were asked to select True, False or Don’t know for each statement. There was also a 
multiple choice question: WHO DOES FACEBOOK SHARE MY INFORMATION WITH? with three choices. Table 
49 shows the correct answers to these questions at the time of the survey in 2014.
Table 49. Privacy perceptions – Background (as of 28.7.2014)
WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM? (Q1)
Please indicate whether you think the following statements are true or false.
# Statement True False Background
1.1 I can control who sees all of my information on Facebook.

False: You cannot hide your ‘public information’ (your name, 
profile pictures, cover photos, gender, networks, username, 
and User ID [account number]) on Facebook, and although 
you can control who sees the friends section of your Timeline,
your friends control who can see their friendships on their 
own Timelines. If people can see your friendship on another 
Timeline, they will also be able to see it in News Feed, search 
and other places on Facebook. Also, anyone who has your 
username or User ID can access your age range, language and
country.
(Facebook FAQ, 2014; Facebook Help Centre, 2014a; 
Facebook Help Centre, 2014b)
1.2 My friends’ activities on Facebook may result in my 
information being made available to other businesses.

True: Your friends’ friends lists (in the form user IDs [account 
numbers]) are made available to the games & apps they use. 
Once they have your account number, those games & apps 
can access your public information as listed above, as well as 
your age range, language and country. You can only stop this 
happening by opting out, in the privacy settings, of using 
games and apps yourself.
(Facebook, 2014b; Facebook Help Centre, 2014c)
1.3 Only my friends can tag me in photos and videos.  False: Any Facebook member can tag you. However, Facebook
offers four tools to help users manage tags: Timeline review 
(which needs to be turned on), tag review (which also needs 
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to be turned on), an option to choose an audience for tagged 
posts after they appear on your Timeline, and an option to 
turn off tag suggestions.
(Facebook Help Centre, 2014d; Facebook Help Centre, 2014e; 
Facebook Help Centre, 2014f; Facebook Help Centre, 2014g)
1.4 Information I set to ‘Public’ is available to everyone on the 
internet, not just Facebook users.

True: Information you set to ‘Public’ can show up on a public 
search engine, even if you block public search engines from 
linking to your profile in your privacy settings. Also, when you 
write on a Page’s wall or comment on a news article that uses 
Facebook’s comments plugin, you do not get to choose an 
audience, as these posts are always public.
(Facebook Help Centre, 2014b; Facebook Help Centre, 2014h)
1.5 Using the games and applications means I am making my 
information available to other businesses.

True: Games & apps are other businesses in the sense that, 
even though they are affiliated with Facebook, they are not 
owned by Facebook. Games and apps have access to your 
‘public information’ (your name, profile pictures, cover 
photos, gender, networks, username, user ID [account 
number], and any information you choose to make public), 
your friend list, and through your account number, your age 
range, language and country.
(Facebook, 2014b; Facebook Help Centre, 2014c)
WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME? (Q2)
Please indicate whether you think the following statements are true or false.
2.1 Facebook may know where I am when I log in.

True: Facebook collects device locations, including specific 
geographic locations, such as through GPS, Bluetooth, and 
WiFi signals.
(Facebook, 2014)
2.2 Businesses that advertise on Facebook do not share 
information with Facebook about how I respond to their ads.

False: Facebook receives information about you and your 
activities on and off Facebook from third-party partners 
including advertisers.
(Facebook, 2014)
2.3 Facebook gathers data about all my actions on Facebook.

True.
(Facebook, 2014)
2.4 When I post photos and videos on Facebook, Facebook may 
receive data about the time, place and date I took them. 
True.
(Facebook, 2014)
2.5 Facebook has access to all the information I post and put on 
my profile. 
True.
(Facebook, 2014)
WHO DOES FACEBOOK SHARE MY INFORMATION WITH? (Q3)
Please indicate which statement you think is true.
3A Facebook may share my information with other businesses in 
a way that allows me to be personally identified. 
It is true that Facebook does not share personally identifying 
information with advertisers, but it does allow app developers
access to your personally identifying information. The 
Facebook platform also shares your personally identifying 
information with other businesses owned by the Facebook 
corporation (e.g., Instagram). 
(Facebook, 2014)
3B Facebook may share my information with other businesses, 
but never in a way that allows me to be personally identified. 
3C Facebook doesn’t share any of my information with other 
businesses. 
Note. 
• Background information was correct as of 27.7.2014. 
• For the purpose of clarity, I have not enclosed direct quotations within quotation marks within the table cells. 
• On 30.8.2019, some of the cited URLs were automatically redirected by Facebook, and much of the web page content had changed. 
• Since the time of the survey in 2014, Facebook has changed some of its practices in relation to apps’ access to user data. For instance, according
to Facebook documentation, in 2019, an app only has access to those friends in users’ friends lists who use the app (Facebook for developers, 
2019c, Friend permissions > question #2), and to access those friends, the app must request prior permission from Facebook (Facebook for 
developers, 2019d, User data > user_friends). Also, “in order for a person to show up in another’s friend list, both people must have shared their
list of friends with the app and not disabled permission during login” (Facebook for developers, 2019d, User data > user_friends).  
6.1 Respondents’ privacy perceptions
Table 50 shows respondents’ perceptions regarding Q1, Q2, and Q3.
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Table 50. Respondents’ privacy perceptions
WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM? (Q1)
Please indicate whether you think the following statements are true or false.
# Statement True False
Respondents’ perceptions 
True False Don’t know
Freq Percent Freq Percent Freq Percent
1.1 I can control who sees all of my information on Facebook.  240 61.38 112 28.64 39 9.97
1.2 My friends’ activities on Facebook may result in my information being made available to other businesses.  277 70.84 38 9.72 76 19.44
1.3 Only my friends can tag me in photos and videos.  261 66.75 86 21.99 44 11.25
1.4 Information I set to ‘Public’ is available to everyone on the internet, not just Facebook users.  307 78.52 43 11.00 41 10.49
1.5 Using the games and applications means I am making my information available to other businesses.  287 73.40 19 4.86 85 21.74
WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME? (Q2)
Please indicate whether you think the following statements are true or false.
2.1 Facebook may know where I am when I log in.  354 90.54 15 3.84 22 5.63
2.2 Businesses that advertise on Facebook do not share information with Facebook about how I respond to their ads.  43 11.00 196 50.13 152 38.87
2.3 Facebook gathers data about all my actions on Facebook.  348 89.00 4 1.02 39 9.97
2.4 When I post photos and videos on Facebook, Facebook may receive data about the time, place and date I took them.  337 86.19 17 4.35 37 9.46
2.5 Facebook has access to all the information I post and put on my profile.  370 94.63 3 .77 18 4.60
WHO DOES FACEBOOK SHARE MY INFORMATION WITH? (Q3)
Please indicate which statement you think is true.
3A Facebook may share my information with other businesses in a way that allows me to be personally identified.  152 38.90
3B Facebook may share my information with other businesses, but never in a way that allows me to be personally identified.  204 52.20
3C Facebook doesn’t share any of my information with other businesses.  35 9.00
The five statements comprising the WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM? question (Q1) are polarised 
into two groups in terms of response rates: three of the statements  (statements 1.2, 1.4 and 1.5), all of 
which are True, had correct response rates of between approximately 71-79%, and the other two 
statements (statements 1.1 and 1.3), both of which are False, had a correct response rate of approximately 
22% and 29% respectively. Similarly, four of the five statements comprising the WHAT DOES FACEBOOK 
KNOW ABOUT ME? question (Q2), all of which are True, had correct response rates of approximately 86-
95% (statements 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5), and the remaining statement (statement 2.2), the only False 
statement in this question, had a correct response rate of approximately 50%. It is unlikely to be 
coincidental that the three statements in Q1 and Q2 with the lowest correct response rates are all False, 
whereas the other seven statements are True. This raises the possibility that even though there was a Don’t 
know option, some respondents may have chosen the True or False options when they were not sure of the 
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answers. Together with the fact that some respondents did choose the Don’t know option, most notably for 
statement 2.2, this suggests that a considerable percentage of respondents may have been confused about 
privacy issues on Facebook. 
For the WHO DOES FACEBOOK SHARE MY INFORMATION WITH? question, over 50% of respondents chose 
statement 3B (Facebook may share my information with other businesses, but never in a way that allows 
me to be personally identified) as being True. These respondents may not have taken into account the fact 
that other businesses besides those that advertise on Facebook (the platform) are associated with it, and 
these businesses do receive personally identifiable information about users.
6.2 Association between privacy perceptions and privacy concerns (Hypothesis #3)
To explore the veracity of Hypothesis #3, I used a Kruskal-Wallis test to measure the relationship between 
responses to the ten statements comprising the WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM? and WHAT 
DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME? questions (True, False, Don’t know) plus responses to the WHO DOES 
FACEBOOK SHARE MY INFORMATION WITH? multiple choice question (Please indicate which statement you 
think is true), and the 12 privacy concerns. Note that for the testing of this hypothesis, what is relevant is 
not whether respondents were correct or incorrect in assessing the truth of the statements, but, rather, 
what they believed to be the case. 
A Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that responses to six of the 10 statements, as well as the WHO DOES 
FACEBOOK SHARE MY INFORMATION WITH? multiple choice question, were significantly associated with 
one or more privacy concerns on Facebook. Responses to the statement Facebook gathers data about all 
my actions on Facebook paired significantly with by far the most privacy concerns (11 out of 12), followed 
by the responses to the statement When I post photos and videos on Facebook, Facebook may receive data 
about the time, place and date I took them (four out of 12) (Table 51). According to the Kruskal-Wallis mean 
ranks, for all the significant statement/concern pairs comprising Q1 and Q2, respondents who selected True 
expressed more privacy concern than those who selected False or Don’t know (Table B8 & Table B9). For five
of the six statements, this was not surprising, because these statements were phrased so that those who 
selected True indicated a belief in the worst case scenario (My friends’ activities on Facebook may result in 
my information being made available to other businesses; Using the games and applications means I am 
making my information available to other businesses; Facebook gathers data about all my actions on 
Facebook; When I post photos and videos on Facebook, Facebook may receive data about the time, place 
and date I took them; and Facebook has access to all the information I post and put on my profile). However,
for the remaining statement, it was surprising, because the statement was phrased so that those who 
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selected True indicated a belief in the BEST case scenario (Businesses that advertise on Facebook do not 
share information with Facebook about how I respond to their ads). 
Also surprising was the fact that, according to the Kruskal-Wallis mean ranks, those who indicated the least 
concern were not always those who selected False: for seven of the 20 significant pairs, those who selected 
Don’t know indicated the least concern (Table B8 & Table B9). One might have expected the perceptions 
variable to be ordinal, the order being True, Don’t know, False, but for almost one third of the significant 
statement/concern pairs, this was not the case. How could the Don’t know response be associated with less 
concern than the False response? Perhaps those who selected Don’t know were less concerned about 
privacy issues on Facebook than those who selected False, and thus had been less motivated to find out 
how Facebook works from a privacy perspective. 
In some instances, there appeared to be a direct causal link between significant statement/concern pairs 
(e.g., Facebook gathers data about all my actions on Facebook and Facebook knowing too much about me), 
whereas in other instances the reason for the significant link between a perception and a concern was 
puzzling (e.g., Facebook gathers data about all my actions on Facebook and Bullying or harassment). In 
most instances, however, there was a loose association between significant statement/concern pairs.
Table 51. Privacy perceptions and privacy concerns – Kruskal-Wallis Test
PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11 PC12
Q1.1 WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM? 
I can control who sees all of my information on Facebook.
Kruskal-Wallis H .958 1.499 1.802 .244 3.891 1.881 2.063 4.783 4.269 4.231 4.445 2.857
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .619 .473 .406 .885 .143 .390 .356 .091 .118 .121 .108 .240
Q1.2 WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM? 
My friends’ activities on Facebook may result in my information being made available to other businesses.
Kruskal-Wallis H 3.535 6.661 5.417 .105 1.293 1.614 1.662 .367 2.940 2.990 5.051 4.701
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .171 .036 .067 .949 .524 .446 .436 .832 .230 .224 .080 .095
Q1.3 WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM?
Only my friends can tag me in photos and videos.
Kruskal-Wallis H 2.561 1.815 4.502 .973 4.209 .554 1.783 3.612 2.657 2.108 2.588 1.913
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .278 .403 .105 .615 .122 .758 .410 .164 .265 .348 .274 .384
Q1.4 WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM?
Information I set to ‘Public’ is available to everyone on the internet, not just Facebook users.
Kruskal-Wallis H .698 2.002 .702 1.824 2.051 4.743 4.617 2.514 5.736 3.072 3.734 2.951
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .705 .367 .704 .402 .359 .093 .099 .285 .057 .215 .155 .229
Q1.5 WHO CAN I HIDE MY INFORMATION FROM?
Using the games and applications means I am making my information available to other businesses.
Kruskal-Wallis H 2.163 2.931 1.692 2.414 1.074 1.452 1.461 .452 5.503 5.461 9.722 14.043
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .339 .231 .429 .299 .585 .484 .482 .798 .064 .065 .008 .001
Q2.1 WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME?
Facebook may know where I am when I log in.
Kruskal-Wallis H .571 .027 .229 2.972 1.261 .182 .689 .185 1.560 2.243 .749 .104
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11 PC12
Asymp. Sig. .752 .986 .892 .226 .532 .913 .709 .912 .458 .326 .688 .949
Q2.2 WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME?
Businesses that advertise on Facebook do not share information with Facebook about how I respond to their ads.
Kruskal-Wallis H 2.024 .722 .334 .549 7.874 .348 1.284 3.117 1.524 1.589 .667 .830
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .363 .697 .846 .760 .020 .840 .526 .210 .467 .452 .717 .660
Q2.3 WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME?
Facebook gathers data about all my actions on Facebook.
Kruskal-Wallis H 7.080 3.509 8.228 6.646 6.490 7.730 7.356 7.124 7.856 10.285 8.188 8.308
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. * .029 .173 .016 .036 .039 .021 .025 .028 * .020 .006 .017 .016
Q2.4 WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME?
When I post photos and videos on Facebook, Facebook may receive data about the time, place and date I took them.
Kruskal-Wallis H 3.254 8.602 6.040 9.263 3.934 2.606 1.646 .061 1.348 1.327 10.381 5.839
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .196 * .014 * .049 .010 .140 .272 .439 .970 .510 .515 .006 .054
Q2.5 WHAT DOES FACEBOOK KNOW ABOUT ME?
Facebook has access to all the information I post and put on my profile.
Kruskal-Wallis H 2.560 1.618 .601 1.033 2.605 1.682 .598 .245 7.195 4.841 4.089 5.353
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .278 .445 .740 .597 .272 .431 .742 .885 .027 .089 .129 .069
Q3 WHO DOES FACEBOOK SHARE MY INFORMATION WITH?
Please indicate which statement you think is true.
Kruskal-Wallis H 1.755 1.476 2.577 4.539 4.292 6.405 5.521 3.125 6.616 2.531 3.760 .602
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Asymp. Sig. .416 .478 .276 .103 .117 * .041 .063 .210 .037 .282 .153 .740
PC1. Bullying or harassment
PC2. Other people posting sensitive information about me
PC3. Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me
PC4. The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos
PC5. Stalking
PC6. Identity theft
PC7. Fraud
PC8. Someone impersonating me
PC9. Facebook knowing too much about me
PC10. Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me
PC11. Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook
PC12. Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook
*  Though the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic was significant, the pairwise comparisons were not
Pairwise comparisons with adjusted p values revealed that in most instances where the Kruskal-Wallis result
was significant, the significant differences lay in the True/False pairs only. However, in one instance (Q1.5 
and PC12) both the True/False and True/Don’t know pairs were significant and in another instance (Q2.4 
and PC11) both the True/False and False/Don’t know pairs were significant. Also, in two instances (Q1.2 and 
PC2; Q1.5 and PC11) only the True/Don’t know pairs were significant (Table 52). For Q3 (Please indicate 
which statement you think is true), those who thought Statement A (Facebook may share my information 
with other businesses in a way that allows me to be personally identified) was true were significantly more 
concerned about PC9 (Facebook knowing too much about me) than those who thought Statement B 
(Facebook may share my information with other businesses, but never in a way that allows me to be 
personally identified) was true. The r scores of the Kruskal-Wallis pairwise comparisons indicated that in all 
cases the effect of perceptions on privacy concerns was small, the highest r score being r = .162 followed by
r = .151 (Table 52). Given the few significant pairings and the small r scores, we must conclude that privacy 
perceptions as tested did not greatly influence privacy concerns on Facebook.
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Table 52. Privacy perceptions and privacy concerns – Kruskal-Wallis Pairwise Comparisons 
Privacy
concerns
True – Don’t know True –  False Don’t know – False
Test Stat. z Adj. Sig. r Test Stat. z Adj. Sig. r Test Stat. z Adj. Sig. r
 Q1.2 My friends’ activities on Facebook may result in my information being made available to other businesses.
PC2 -35.484 -2.514 .036 .127
Q1.5 Using the games and applications means I am making my information available to other businesses.
PC11 -33.231 -2.473 .040 .125
PC12 -34.782 -2.596 .028 .131 -76.931 -2.993 .008 .151
Q2.2 Businesses that advertise on Facebook do not share information with Facebook about how I respond to their ads.
PC5 -47.632 -2.592 .029 .131
Q2.3 Facebook gathers data about all my actions on Facebook.
PC3 -135.010 -2.456 .042 .124
PC4 -140.322 -2.557 .032 .129
PC5 -139.743 -2.546 .033 .128
PC6 -148.417 -2.699 .021 .136
PC7 -143.945 -2.617 .027 .132
PC8 -135.871 -2.477 .040 .125
PC10 -151.795 -2.775 .017 .140
PC11 -131.105 -2.396 .050 .121
PC12 -151.171 -2.770 .017 .140
Q2.4 When I post photos and videos on Facebook, Facebook may receive data about the time, place and date I took them.
PC4 -70.811 -2.610 .027 .131
PC11 -87.121 -3.221 .004 .162 81.429 2.554 .032 .129
Q2.5 Facebook has access to all the information I post and put on my profile.
PC9 -165.007 -2.622 .026 .132
Q 4.3 Please indicate which statement you think is true.
A – B
Test Stat. z Adj. Sig. r
PC9 -29.237 -2.514 .036 .127
Note. Only statistically significant values provided.
PC1. Bullying or harassment
PC2. Other people posting sensitive information about me
PC3. Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me
PC4. The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos
PC5. Stalking
PC6. Identity theft
PC7. Fraud
PC8. Someone impersonating me
PC9. Facebook knowing too much about me
PC10. Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me
PC11. Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook
PC12. Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook
A. Facebook may share my information with other businesses in a way that allows me to be personally identified.
B. Facebook may share my information with other businesses, but never in a way that allows me to be personally identified
C. Facebook doesn’t share any of my information with other businesses.
6.3 How respondents use Facebook
6.3.1 Time spent on Facebook
Of those respondents with an active Facebook account, most (approx. 80%, n = 312) visited Facebook every 
day, and only eight respondents (approx. 2%) visited Facebook less than once a week. Of those respondents 
who visited Facebook every day, approximately 40% (n = 127) visited Facebook six or more times a day, and, 
at the other end of the scale, approximately 5% (n = 17) visited Facebook once a day. Of those respondents 
who did not visit Facebook every day, approximately 65% (n = 51) sometimes logged in more than once a 
day on the days they did visit it. Almost 85% (n = 43) of these respondents logged in 2-3 times a day, 
approximately 12% (n = 6) logged in 4-5 times a day, and 2 respondents logged in six or more times a day 
(Table 53).
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Table 53. Frequency of Facebook visits
Frequency of Facebook visits Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Please indicate how many days a week, fortnight or month, on average, you visit Facebook.
Every day 312 79.80 79.80 79.80
6 days a week 18 4.60 4.60 84.40
5 days a week 12 3.07 3.07 87.47
4 days a week 10 2.56 2.56 90.03
3 days a week 9 2.30 2.30 92.33
2 days a week 7 1.79 1.79 94.12
1 day a week 15 3.84 3.84 97.95
One day a fortnight 2 .51 .51 98.47
One day every three weeks 1 .26 .26 98.72
One day a month 3 .77 .77 99.49
Less than one day a month 2 .51 .51 100.00
Total 391 100.00 100.00
How many times a day, on average, do you visit Facebook? (respondents who visited Facebook daily)
Once a day 17 4.35 5.45 5.45
2-3 times a day 102 26.09 32.69 38.14
4-5 times a day 66 16.88 21.15 59.29
6 or more times a day 127 32.48 40.71 100.00
79 20.20 Missing
Total 391 100.00
On those days that you visit Facebook, do you ever do so more than once a day?
(respondents who did not visit Facebook daily)
Yes 51 13.04 64.56 64.56
No 28 7.16 35.44 100.00
312 79.80 Missing
Total 391 100.00
On those days that you visit Facebook, how many times a day, on average, do you do so? 
(respondents who selected ‘Yes’ to the question above)
2-3 times a day 43 11.00 84.31 84.31
4-5 times a day 6 1.53 11.76 96.08
6 or more times a day 2 .51 3.92 100.00
340 86.96 Missing
Total 391 100.0
Over seventy percent of respondents with an active Facebook account (n = 277) spent less than 15 minutes 
on Facebook per visit on average, approximately 27% (n = 107) spent 15-60 minutes on Facebook per visit 
on average, and less than two percent (n = 7) spent more than an hour on Facebook per visit on average 
(Table 54).
Table 54. Time spent on Facebook per visit
Time spent on Facebook per visit Frequency Percent
Less than 15 minutes 277 70.84
15-60 minutes 107 27.37
More than an hour 7 1.79
Total 391 100.00
Over 90% of respondents (n = 356) had been Facebook members for more than two years, approximately 
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7% (n = 29) had been Facebook members for 1-2 years, and less than two percent (n = 6) had been 
Facebook members for less than a year (Table 55).
Table 55. Length of Facebook membership
Length of Facebook membership Frequency Percent
More than 2 years 356 91.05
1-2 years 29 7.42
Less than a year 6 1.53
Total 391 100.00
More than half of respondents spent more time on Facebook than when they first joined: approximately 
33% (n = 129) spent a lot more time on Facebook, and over 20% (n = 82) spent a little more time on 
Facebook. Over 30% of respondents spent less time on Facebook than when they first joined – 
approximately 18% (n = 69) spent much less time on Facebook and approximately 14% (n = 54) spent a little 
less time on Facebook – and approximately 15% of respondents (n = 57) spent about the same amount of 
time on Facebook as when they first joined (Table 56).
Table 56. Changes in time spent on Facebook
Which one of the following statements is true for you? Frequency Percent
I spend a little more time on Facebook than I used to when I first joined. 82 20.97
I spend a lot more time on Facebook than I used to when I first joined. 129 32.99
I spend a little less time on Facebook than I used to when I first joined. 54 13.81
I spend a lot less time on Facebook than I used to when I first joined. 69 17.65
The amount of time I spend on Facebook is about the same as when I first joined. 57 14.58
Total 391 100.00
6.3.2 Registration and profile
Most respondents with an active Facebook account gave their real details when they registered on 
Facebook: approximately 95% (n = 371) gave their real first name, approximately 94% (n = 367) gave their 
real surname, approximately 98% (n = 382) gave their real gender, and approximately 85% (n = 334) gave 
their real date of birth (Table 57). 
Table 57. Information provided on registration
When you registered on Facebook, did you provide the following information?
Your real first name Frequency Percent
Yes 371 94.88
No 20 5.12
Total 391 100.00
Your real surname Frequency Percent
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When you registered on Facebook, did you provide the following information?
Yes 367 93.86
No 24 6.14
Total 391 100.00
Your real gender Frequency Percent
Yes 382 97.70
No 9 2.30
Total 391 100.00
Your real date of birth Frequency Percent
Yes 334 85.42
No 57 14.58
Total 391 100.00
Some respondents may not have given their real name when they registered on Facebook in order to 
protect their privacy. In fact, focus group respondents indicated that they knew people who, when 
registering on Facebook, had altered their name for this reason.
Over seventy percent of respondents (n = 276) used a recognisable photo of themselves as their current 
profile picture, 11.00% (n = 43) used a photo of themselves but were not sure if it was recognisable, and 
approximately 18% (n = 72) did not use a recognisable photo of themselves. Of those who did not use a 
recognisable photo of themselves, approximately 56% (n = 40) selected Privacy reasons, one respondent 
selected Cultural reasons, and approximately 43% (n = 31) selected Other reasons (Table 58). These reasons 
included: Liking other photos better, because they are of loved ones, or they reflect the respondent’s 
interests, or they are fun, cute, quirky or artistic – they are just great photos (21 respondents); Not liking 
how they look in photos (3 respondents); “Personal security” (1 respondent) (this could perhaps be classed 
as a privacy reason); Religious reasons (1 respondent) (this could perhaps be classed as a cultural reason); 
and a “work requirement” (I respondent).
Table 58. Is your current profile picture a recognisable photo of you? If not, why not?
Current profile picture Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Is your current profile picture a recognisable photo of you?
Yes 276 70.59 70.59 70.59
No 72 18.41 18.41 89.00
It is a photo of me but I don’t know if it’s recognisable 43 11.00 11.00 100.00
Total 391 100.00 100.00
If no, why not?
Privacy reasons 40 10.23 55.56 55.56
Other reasons (please specify) 31 7.93 43.06 98.61
Cultural reasons 1 .26 1.39 100.00
319 81.59 Missing
Total 391 100.00
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Facebook encourages users to supply information about themselves on their profile. Respondents were 
asked whether they had supplied the following 14 key pieces of information on their profile: High school, 
Post-secondary education, Job(s), Hometown, Current city, Relationship status, Interested in women or men, 
Family members/relatives, About you, Favourite quote(s), Religious views, Political views, Phone number(s), 
and Address. Of these pieces of information, respondents had most frequently supplied Post-secondary 
education (approx. 77% of respondents, n = 302), Current city (approx. 74% of respondents, n = 290), and 
High school (approx. 74% of respondents, n = 289), and least frequently supplied Political views (approx. 
19% of respondents, n = 74), Phone number(s) (approx. 15% of respondents, n = 59), and Address (approx. 
3% of respondents, n = 12) (Table B10). At the time of the survey, Facebook gave users the option of 
adjusting the privacy settings for each piece of information to Public, Friends, Only me, and Custom. For all 
14 pieces of information, Friends was by far the most frequently used setting, Public was the second most 
frequently used, and Only me and Custom were the least frequently used. For 10 of the 14 pieces of 
information, the Public setting was used by 15-20% of respondents who had supplied the information. 
However, Current city was set to Public by almost 25% of respondents (n = 71), and, at the other end of the 
spectrum, Family members/relatives was set to Public by approximately 10% (n = 20) of respondents who 
had supplied the information, while Phone numbers(s) and Address were set to Public by 8.47% (n = 5) and 
8.33% (n = 1) respectively of respondents who had supplied the information. Finally, for 13 of the 14 pieces 
of information, between approximately 5% (n = 5) and 10% (n = 27) of respondents who had supplied the 
information indicated that they did not know which setting governed it. The exception was Address: all 
respondents who had supplied their address knew which setting governed this piece of information (Table 
B11). 
Facebook also encourages users to supply information regarding their interests and likes on their profile. 
Respondents were asked whether they had supplied the following: Movies watched, wanting to watch, or 
liked; TV shows, watched, wanting to watch, or liked; Music liked, or wanting to listen to; Books read, 
wanting to read, or liked; Sports teams or athletes liked; and Likes. The first four of these interests/likes 
were supplied by approximately 50-57% of respondents (n = 197-224), but Sports teams or athletes liked 
was supplied by approximately 38% of respondents (n = 150), and conversely, Likes was supplied by 
approximately 75% of respondents (n = 295) (Table B12). At the time of the survey, as for the information 
above, Facebook gave users the option of adjusting the privacy settings for each piece of information to 
Public, Friends, Only me, and Custom. For all six interests/likes (and as for the 14 pieces of information 
referred to above), Friends was by far the most frequently used setting, Public was the second most 
frequently used, and Only me and Custom were the least frequently used. Also, for all six interests/likes, the 
Public setting was used by 17-20% of respondents who had supplied the information. Finally, for all six 
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interests/likes, approximately 12% of respondents (n = 30-52) who had supplied the information indicated 
that they did not know which setting governed it (Table B13).
6.3.3 Posts and privacy measures
Facebook allows users to set the audience for future posts. At the time of the survey, the options were (as 
for profile information): Public, Friends, Only me, and Custom. Respondents were asked who could see their 
future posts. Most respondents used the Friends setting (approx. 78%, n = 304), followed by Custom 
(11.00%, n = 43), Public (approx. 4%, n = 16), and Only me (approx. 1.5%, n = 6). Over five percent of 
respondents (n = 22) indicated that they did not know which setting governed the visibility of their future 
posts (Table 59).
Table 59. Visibility of future posts
Who can see your future posts? Frequency Percent
Public 16 4.09
Friends 304 77.75
Only me 6 1.53
Custom 43 11.00
Don’t know 22 5.63
Total 391 100.00
Respondents were asked how often they changed the audience for something they posted using the 
‘audience selector’ for that post. Forty-five percent of respondents (n = 176) never did so, approximately 
42% of respondents (n = 165) sometimes did so, approximately 10% of respondents (n = 38) quite often did 
so, and approximately 3% of respondents (n = 12) very often did so. Respondents were also asked how 
often they had deleted a post for privacy reasons. Almost 58% of respondents (n = 225) had sometimes 
done so, approximately 29% of respondents (n = 112) had never done so, and almost 7% of respondents 
had quite often or very often done so (n = 27 in both instances). Finally, respondents were asked how often 
they had decided not to post something because the wrong person might see it. Over 46% of respondents 
(n = 181) had sometimes done so, 22% (n = 86) had quite often done so, approximately 20% (n = 77) had 
very often done so, and 12% (n = 47) had never done so (Table 60).
Table 60. Proactive privacy measures re posts
Proactive privacy measures re posts Frequency Percent
How often do you change the audience for something you post using the ‘audience
selector’ for that post?
Very often 12 3.07
Quite often 38 9.72
Sometimes 165 42.20
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Proactive privacy measures re posts Frequency Percent
Never 176 45.01
Total 391 100.00
How often, if ever, have you deleted a post for privacy reasons?
Very often 27 6.91
Quite often 27 6.91
Sometimes 225 57.54
Never 112 28.64
Total 391 100.00
How often, if ever, have you decided not to post something because the wrong person
might see it?
Very often 77 19.69
Quite often 86 21.99
Sometimes 181 46.29
Never 47 12.02
Total 391 100.00
6.3.4 Third-party access to one’s information
Respondents were asked whether they let search engines outside of Facebook link to their timeline. Over 
65% of respondents (n = 255) did not, almost 9% of respondents (n = 34) did, and over 26% of respondents 
(n = 102) indicated that they did not know whether search engines outside of Facebook could link to their 
timeline. Respondents were also asked whether they had Facebook Platform turned on. Over 45% of 
respondents (n = 179) did not, almost 5% (n = 19) did, and almost 50% (n = 193) indicated that they did not 
know whether they had Facebook Platform turned on. Finally, respondents were asked whether they used 
third-party apps, games, or instant personalisation. This question was asked to further explore respondents’
understanding of the role of Facebook Platform: without having Platform turned on, users cannot use third-
party apps, games or instant personalisation. However, the responses to this question did not tally with the 
responses to the last question. Over 58% of respondents (n = 229) answered No to this question, almost 
27% (n = 105) answered Yes, and almost 15% of respondents (n = 57) answered Don’t know. The combined 
results of these two questions may indicate that respondents did not fully comprehend the role of Platform 
in allowing third-party business access to their information (Table 61).
Table 61. Allowing third-party access to one’s information on Facebook
Allowing third-party access to one’s information Frequency Percent
Do you let search engines outside Facebook link to your timeline?
Yes 34 8.70
No 255 65.22
Don’t know 102 26.09
Total 391 100.00
Do you have Facebook Platform turned on?
Yes 19 4.86
No 179 45.78
Don’t know 193 49.36
Total 391 100.00
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Allowing third-party access to one’s information Frequency Percent
Do you use third-party apps, games or instant personalisation?
Yes 105 26.85
No 229 58.57
Don’t know 57 14.58
Total 391 100.00
6.3.5 Number of Facebook friends, groups, and networks
Respondents were asked how many Facebook friends they had. The most frequently selected categories 
were: 101-200 (approx. 19% of respondents, n = 76), 201-300 (approx. 17% of respondents, n = 65), and 
More than 500 (also approx. 17% of respondents, n = 65). Less than 2% of respondents (n = 7) had 10 or less
Facebook friends. Respondents were also asked how many groups they belonged to. The most frequently 
selected category for this question was 5 or more (almost 45% of respondents, n = 173). The other 
categories (None, 1, 2, 3, 4) were approximately equally represented with 7-15% of respondents selecting 
each. Respondents were also asked how many networks they belonged to.38 Most respondents indicated 
that they did not belong to any networks (approx. 58%, n = 225), and fewest respondents indicated that 
they belonged to three, four, or five networks (approx. 15% in total, n = 58). Finally, almost 62% of 
respondents (n = 241) had used Facebook’s Find friends function (Table 62).
Table 62. Facebook friends, groups, and networks
How many Facebook friends do you have? Frequency Percent
10 or less 7 1.79
11-25 19 4.86
26-50 30 7.67
51-100 54 13.81
101-200 76 19.44
201-300 65 16.62
301-400 50 12.79
401-500 25 6.39
More than 500 65 16.62
Total 391 100.00
How many groups do you belong to? Frequency Percent
None 37 9.46
1 28 7.16
2 45 11.51
3 57 14.58
4 51 13.04
5 or more 173 44.25
Total 391 100.00
How many networks do you belong to? Frequency Percent
None 225 57.54
1 47 12.02
2 61 15.60
3 29 7.42
38 At one time, users could join up to five networks. However, Facebook began phasing out networks before the time of the 
survey. At the time of the survey, respondents could keep their old networks, but not join new ones.
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4 12 3.07
5 17 4.35
Total 391 100.00
Have you used Facebook’s ‘Find Friends’ function? Frequency Percent
Yes 241 61.64
No 150 38.36
Total 391 100.00
6.3.6 Means – Activities on Facebook
Respondents were given a list of 23 social/entertaining activities on Facebook, and were asked how often, 
using a 4 point Likert scale with levels of frequency ranging from 1 – Very often to 4 – Never, they performed
these activities (the lower the mean, the greater the frequency). The most frequently selected activities 
were: ‘Like’ a friend’s photo, video or post (Mean = 1.89, SD = .799), Send a message (Mean = 1.98, SD = .
849), Comment on or reply to a friend’s post (Mean = 2.21, SD = .789), Read group posts (Mean = 2.34, SD = .
937), Use Facebook Chat (Mean = 2.38, SD = 1.131), and Search for someone you want to find out more 
about (Mean = 2.51, SD = .900). The least frequently selected activities were: Play games by yourself (Mean 
= 3.56, SD =.826), Use other apps (Mean = 3.60, SD =.708), Write a note (Mean = 3.69, SD = .589), and Play 
games with your friends (Mean = 3.78, SD = .568). Therefore, Facebook was used mostly to read and 
provide feedback to others’ posts, to message and chat, and to find out more about others. It was used 
least to access affiliated games and apps, and to write notes (Facebook Notes are like status updates, but 
use a text editor). Interestingly, posting status updates (as opposed to messaging and chatting) was not one 
of respondents’ most frequent activities on Facebook. When respondents did post, they most frequently 
posted photos (Mean = 2.69, SD = .589), then text (Mean = 2.81, SD = .764), and least frequently posted 
videos (Mean = 3.43, SD = .628) (Table 63).
Table 63. Activities on Facebook – Means
On Facebook, how often do you: N Mean * Std Dev
‘Like’ a friend’s photo, video or post 391 1.89 .799
Send a message a 391 1.98 .849
Comment on or reply to a friend’s post 391 2.21 .789
Read group posts 391 2.34 .937
Use Facebook Chat a 391 2.38 1.131
Search for someone you want to find out more about 391 2.51 .900
Post a photo on your timeline 391 2.69 .719
Tag people in something you post 391 2.70 .872
RSVP to an event 391 2.71 .839
Post on a friend’s timeline 391 2.76 .712
Post a ‘status update’ or ‘life event’ with just words on your timeline 391 2.81 .764
Post on a group’s page 391 2.84 .924
Share a friend’s photo or video 391 3.04 .839
Organise an event for friends or family 391 3.09 .908
Add a location to something you post 391 3.09 .799
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Create a photo album 391 3.14 .640
Organise a group event 391 3.17 .893
Tag people in a photo or video you didn’t post 391 3.40 .819
Post a video on your timeline 391 3.43 .628
Play games by yourself 391 3.56 .826
Use other apps 391 3.60 .708
Write a note b 391 3.69 .589
Play games with your friends 391 3.78 .568
*      The lower the mean, the more frequent the activity (1 – Very often; 2 – Quite often; 3 – Sometimes; 4 – Never)
a. At the time of the survey, Facebook had just obligated users to download the separate Messenger app if they wished to keep using Facebook 
messaging and chat on their device (Coldewey, 2014). However, to this day, Messenger is still integrated into the Facebook website.
b. “Facebook Notes is a simple word-processing feature for Facebook users” (Leon, 2019).
6.4 How privacy concerns and social needs impact behaviours on Facebook (Hypothesis #4)
Hypothesis #4 states that the nature and degree of privacy concerns and social needs on Facebook combine 
to influence behaviours on Facebook. For this hypothesis, I measured the effect of privacy concerns and 
social needs (reasons for using Facebook) on several behaviours on Facebook: engagement in 
social/entertaining activities on the site, the number of Facebook friends, groups and networks, use of the 
Find Friends function, post-protective behaviours, and the provision of profile information.
6.4.1 Privacy concerns, reasons for using Facebook, and activities on Facebook
Kendall’s Tau-b indicated that reasons for using Facebook were associated with social/entertaining activities 
on Facebook far more than privacy concerns were (Table B14, Table B15 – Part 1 & Table B15 – Part 2). In 
fact, less than 25% of the privacy concern/activity pairings correlated significantly (64 significant 
associations out of a possible 276), and two privacy concerns did not correlate significantly with activities 
on Facebook at all – Facebook knowing too much about me and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out 
too much about me. Note that these two concerns differ from the other ten concerns in that they do not 
specify tangible repercussions in the way that, for example, Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked 
to Facebook and Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook do: rather, they 
solely indicate a feeling of unease. The two privacy concerns that were by far the most frequently 
associated with activities on Facebook were Stalking (significantly correlated with 19 of the 23 activities on 
Facebook) and Bullying or harassment (significantly correlated with 14 of the 23 activities on Facebook). 
Both of these are user-user concerns. None of the correlations between activities and privacy concerns are 
above .2 (significant correlations ranged from .085 to .177), hence, although the associations are statistically
significant, they are not strong (Table B14).
Since only one of the correlations is negative (i.e., Using Facebook Chat is negatively correlated with Spam), 
in each instance but one, an increase in activity on Facebook is associated with an increase in privacy 
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concern (Table B14). It is likely that, in most of these instances, increased activity caused increased privacy 
concern due to increased exposure to risk (e.g., posting a video on my timeline would increase the risk of 
both the wrong person seeing my videos and being stalked). However, in some instances the reason for the 
association between an activity and a concern is less obvious (e.g., the activity Search for someone you 
want to find out more about and the concern Stalking; the activity Tag people in something you post and all 
eight user-user concerns). Perhaps in these instances, high Facebook use ‘across the board’ led to privacy 
concerns not directly associated with the activity in question. In a minority of instances, the concern is likely
to have dictated the activity (e.g., the concern Bullying and harassment could plausibly lead to a preference 
for the solitary activity Play games by yourself).
Regarding the association between reasons for using Facebook and social/entertaining activities on 
Facebook, 19 out of the 23 activities correlated significantly with between 21-24 of the 24 reasons each 
(Table B15 – Part 1 & Table B15 – Part 2). The activity Write a note was significantly correlated with by far 
the least reasons for using Facebook (nine out of 24 reasons) and included the only two negative significant 
correlations between activities and reasons: To put off doing my work and Because I’m bored. These 
negative correlations signify that the more likely the respondent was to write a Facebook note, the less 
likely his or her reason for using Facebook was procrastination or boredom. Because all the other significant 
correlations between activities and reasons are positive, they indicate that the more likely the respondent 
was to use Facebook for the specified activity, the more likely he or she was to use it for the associated 
reason. The other three activities that correlated significantly with less than 21 reasons were Play games 
with your friends, Play games by yourself (both 15 out of 24 reasons), and Use other apps (19 out of 24 
reasons). 
Seven reasons correlated significantly with all 23 activities: To make new friends, To express myself in ways 
that I can’t offline, To share my thoughts and feelings, To find people who share similar interests, To work 
with others who have similar goals, To put off doing my work, and Because I’m bored. The reason that 
correlated with the least activities was To meet new romantic or sexual partners (13 out of 23 activities). 
This result is consistent with the fact that, according to the means, To meet new romantic or sexual partners 
was the least common reason for using Facebook (Table 33).
Table 64 shows the frequency of correlations at or above .2 between reasons for using Facebook and 
social/entertaining activities on Facebook.
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Table 64. Activities on Facebook and reasons for using Facebook – Frequency of correlations ≥.2 
Reasons for using Facebook
Frequency of correlations with
Activities on Facebook ≥.2
ꚍ =.2 – .299 ꚍ =.3 – .399 ꚍ =.4 –.499
To keep in touch with friends 11 5 1
To keep in touch with family 10 - -
To keep in touch with people from my past 6 - -
To make new friends 2 - -
To meet new romantic or sexual partners 2 - -
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners 4 1 -
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
6 - -
To ask for advice or help 12 2 -
To feel less lonely 6 - -
To enhance my image 10 - -
To project my best self 8 - -
To express who I am 9 3 -
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline 10 - -
To share my news 11 2 4
To share my thoughts and feelings 9 3 1
To find like-minded people 7 - -
To find people who share similar interests 10 - -
To work with others who have similar goals 9 - -
To find out about people I am curious about 2 - 1
To keep an eye on someone 4 1 -
To expand my network 12 - -
To have fun 10 7 -
To put off doing my work 8 3 -
Because I’m bored 11 3 -
In most instances there appeared to be a cause-and-effect relationship between the reason for using 
Facebook and the associated activity on the site (e.g., the respondent’s wish to keep in touch with friends is 
likely to have led her to ‘Like’ a friend’s photo, video or post), but in some instances, the reason for the 
association between an activity and reason for using Facebook was not clear (e.g., To keep in touch with 
family and Play games by yourself; To share my news and ‘Like’ a friend’s photo, video or post). In these 
instances, it is possible that respondents routinely visited Facebook to complete one activity and ended up 
being drawn into other activities on the site. 
Therefore, it appears that social needs (reasons for using Facebook) did indeed largely influence behaviours 
on Facebook in the form of social/entertaining activities. However, as regards privacy concerns, in most 
instances the reverse appeared to be the case: an increase in social/entertaining activity appeared to cause 
an increase in privacy concern due to increased exposure to risk. In a minority of instances, however, privacy
concerns did appear to influence the choice of social/entertaining activities on Facebook.
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6.4.2 Privacy concerns, reasons for using Facebook, and Facebook friends, groups, and networks
Regarding associations between privacy concerns on Facebook and the number of Facebook friends, 
Kendall’s Tau-b found statistically significant but weak inverse correlations between the number of 
Facebook friends and three out of the 12 concerns listed: Bullying and harassment (ꚍ = -.126, p = .002), 
Stalking (ꚍ = -.167, p = .000) and Someone impersonating me (ꚍ = -.097, p = .017) (Table B16). The direction 
of the correlations indicates that the more Facebook friends respondents had, the more concerned they 
were about these three issues: therefore, the number of Facebook friends appears to have triggered the 
privacy concerns. 
The number of groups respondents belonged to correlated significantly, inversely and weakly with the 
privacy concerns Bullying and harassment (ꚍ = -.121, p = .004) and Stalking (ꚍ = -.092, p = .029), and the 
number of networks respondents belonged to correlated significantly, inversely and weakly with the privacy
concerns Bullying and harassment (ꚍ = -.092, p = .033), Stalking (ꚍ = -.155, p = .000), Identity theft (ꚍ = -.092, 
p = .031), Fraud (ꚍ = -.110, p = .011), and Someone impersonating me (ꚍ = -.108, p = .012) (Table B16). The 
inverse correlations indicate that the more groups and networks respondents belonged to, the greater their 
degree of concern about the associated issues. It seems likely, therefore, that group and network 
membership triggered the privacy concerns.
All 24 reasons for using Facebook correlated significantly and inversely with the number of Facebook 
friends, so the more Facebook friends respondents had, the more likely they were to use Facebook for all 24
reasons (Table B17). The lowest correlation was for the reason To feel less lonely (ꚍ = -.090, p = .031) and the
highest were for the reasons To find out more about potential or new friends and partners (ꚍ = -.262, p = .
000), Because I’m bored (ꚍ = -.245, p = .000), To have fun (ꚍ = -.229, p = .000), and To put off doing my work 
(ꚍ = -.220, p = .000).  As for the associations between reasons for using Facebook and the 23 listed activities 
on Facebook, it appears that respondents’ reasons for using Facebook motivated their accumulation of 
Facebook friends.
Twenty-three of the 24 reasons for using Facebook correlated significantly and inversely with the number of
groups respondents belonged to. The lowest significant correlation was for the reason To project my best 
self (ꚍ = -.097, p = .027) and the highest was for the reason To ask for advice or help (ꚍ = -.271, p = .000). The 
reason To enhance my image did not correlate significantly but was close to doing so (ꚍ = -.083, p = .060). 
Eighteen of the 24 reasons for using Facebook correlated significantly and inversely with the number of 
networks respondents belonged to (Table B17). The lowest significant correlation was for the reason To 
keep in touch with friends (ꚍ = -.099, p = .028) and the highest was for the reason To expand my network (ꚍ = 
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-.285, p = .000). The reasons that did not correlate significantly with the number of networks respondents 
belonged to were To keep in touch with family, To share my news, To share my thoughts and feelings, To 
have fun, To put off doing my work, and Because I’m bored. The inverse correlations indicate that the more 
groups and networks respondents belonged to, the more likely they were to use Facebook for the 
associated reasons. Therefore, it appears likely that respondents’ reasons for using Facebook motivated 
group and network membership.
6.4.3 Privacy concerns, reasons for using Facebook, and Facebook’s ‘Find friends’ function
Kendall’s Tau-b found weak but statistically significant positive correlations between whether or not 
respondents had used Facebook’s Find friends function and the privacy concerns Bullying and harassment (ꚍ
= .143, p = .002), Stalking (ꚍ = .135, p = .004), Identity theft (ꚍ = .119, p = .010), Fraud (ꚍ = .119, p = .010), 
Someone impersonating me (ꚍ = .136, p = .003), and Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to 
Facebook (ꚍ = .103, p = .026) (Table B16). All but the last of these were the same privacy concerns that 
correlated significantly with the number of networks respondents belonged to. These correlations indicate 
that in each instance, respondents who had used the Find friends function had a greater degree of privacy 
concern than those who had not. It seems likely, therefore, that the increased concern stemmed from the 
perceived risk of using the function.
Kendall’s Tau-b found weak but statistically significant positive correlations between whether or not 
respondents had used Facebook’s Find friends function and eight of the 24 reasons for using Facebook: To 
keep in touch with people from my past (ꚍ = .108, p = .021), To be there for others (ꚍ = .127, p = .007), To feel 
less lonely (ꚍ = .115, p = .016), To express who I am (ꚍ = .101, p = .033), To express myself in ways that I can’t 
offline (ꚍ = .118, p = .015), To find out about people I am curious about (ꚍ = .094, p = .046), To expand my 
network (ꚍ = .132, p = .006), and To have fun (ꚍ = .102, p = .029) (Table B17). These correlations indicate that 
in each instance, respondents who had used the Find friends function used Facebook more for the 
associated reasons than those who had not. It seems likely that in most of these instances, the reason for 
using Facebook motivated use of the Find Friends function (e.g., a wish to keep in touch with people from 
one’s past could indeed motivate use of the Find friends function). However, a cause-and-effect relationship 
between use of the Find friends function and two of the significantly associated reasons – To express who I 
am and To express myself in ways that I can’t offline, while possible, does not seem likely. Perhaps, in these 
instances, respondents engaged in a number of activities on Facebook to meet their social needs, even 
activities not closely related to those needs. 
136
6.4.4 Privacy concerns, reasons for using Facebook, and post-protection
Respondents were asked three questions to ascertain what steps they took to ensure the privacy of their 
posts: How often do you change the audience for something you post using the ‘audience selector’ for that 
post? How often, if ever, have you deleted a post for privacy reasons? and How often, if ever, have you 
decided not to post something because the wrong person might see it? Kendall’s Tau-b found that all eight 
user-user privacy concerns correlated significantly with the first question. Correlations were weak and 
ranged from .124 (p = .005) for Other people posting sensitive information about me to .166 (p = .000) for 
Someone impersonating me. None of the four user-corporate privacy concerns (Facebook knowing too 
much about me, Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me, Spam/unsolicited email 
from businesses linked to Facebook, and Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to 
Facebook) correlated significantly with this question. However, all 12 privacy concerns correlated 
significantly with the second and third questions. Correlations above .2 for the second question were: The 
wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos (ꚍ = .286, p = .000), Stalking (ꚍ = .282, p = .000), Other 
people posting sensitive photos or videos of me (ꚍ = .207, p = .000), Fraud (ꚍ = .207, p = .000), and Someone 
impersonating me (ꚍ = .207, p = .000). Correlations above .2 for the third question were: The wrong person 
seeing my posts, photos or videos (ꚍ = .275, p = .000), Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 
(ꚍ = .240, p = .000), and Stalking (ꚍ = .208, p = .000). The weakest correlation for the second question was for
the concern Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook (ꚍ = .116, p = .009) and 
the weakest correlation for the third question was for the concern Spam/unsolicited email from businesses 
linked to Facebook (ꚍ = .139, p = .001): both of these are user-corporate concerns (Table B16). All the 
correlations are positive, indicating that the more often respondents had changed the audience for 
something they posted using the ‘audience selector’ for that post, deleted a post for privacy reasons, or 
decided not to post something because the wrong person might see it, the greater their degree of privacy 
concern. It is likely, therefore, that respondents’ privacy concerns motivated these privacy-protective 
strategies on Facebook (e.g., the respondent’s fear of being stalked could motivate her not to post 
something on Facebook).
Kendall’s Tau-b found that reasons for using Facebook correlated less significantly and less consistently than 
privacy concerns for the above three questions (Table B17). The first question (How often do you change 
the audience for something you post using the ‘audience selector’ for that post?) correlated with the most 
reasons for using Facebook (18 out of 24), with the weakest significant correlation being for the reason To 
make new friends (ꚍ = .092, p = .047), and the strongest being for the reason To keep in touch with friends (ꚍ 
= .188, p = .000). The reasons that did not correlate significantly with this question were: To keep in touch 
with people from my past, To meet new romantic or sexual partners, To feel less lonely, To enhance my 
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image, To project my best self, and To keep an eye on someone. The second question (How often, if ever, 
have you deleted a post for privacy reasons?) correlated significantly with 10 of the 24 reasons for using 
Facebook, the weakest significant correlation being for the reason Because I’m bored (ꚍ = .091, p = .039), 
and the strongest being for the reason To keep an eye on someone (ꚍ = .143, p = .002). The third question 
(How often, if ever, have you decided not to post something because the wrong person might see it?) 
correlated significantly with only five of the 24 reasons for using Facebook: To find out more about potential
or new friends or partners (ꚍ = .175, p = .000), To keep an eye on someone (ꚍ = .125, p = .005), To keep in 
touch with family  (ꚍ = .112, p = .010),  To be there for others (ꚍ = .109, p = .012), and To expand my network 
(ꚍ = .090, p = .045). The direction of the correlations indicates that the more often respondents had changed
the audience for something they posted using the ‘audience selector’ for that post, deleted a post for 
privacy reasons, or decided not to post something because the wrong person might see it, the more they 
had used Facebook for the significantly correlated reasons. It may be that there was no direct relationship 
between the use of Facebook for the correlated reasons and the three privacy-protection strategies, or, 
alternatively, that the perceived privacy risks of Facebook use for the correlated reasons necessitated use of 
the strategies (e.g., the respondent’s use of Facebook to keep in touch with family could motivate her to not
to post something because the wrong person might see it). The significant correlations are all below .2, 
indicating a small effect.
6.4.5 Privacy concerns, reasons for using Facebook, and profile information
Respondents were asked whether they had provided the following 14 key pieces of information on their 
profile: Your high school, Your post-secondary education, Your job(s), Your hometown, Your current city, Your 
relationship status, A list of family members/relatives, Something ‘About You’, Your favourite quote(s), Your 
religious views, Your political views, Your phone number(s), Your address, and Whether you are ‘interested 
in’ women or men. Respondents were also asked whether they had added the following six likes to their 
profile: Movies watched, wanting to watch, or liked; TV shows watched, wanting to watch, or liked; Books 
read, wanting to read, or liked; Music liked, or wanting to listen to; Likes; and Sports teams or athletes liked. 
Kendall’s tau-b indicated that, for the most part, respondents’ choice whether or not to provide this 
information did not correlate significantly with their privacy concerns on Facebook. However, there were 
some exceptions. The privacy concerns Bullying or harassment and Stalking featured most prominently, 
correlating positively and significantly with three and two respectively of the 14 key pieces of information, 
and five and four respectively of the six likes. Also, the two user-corporate concerns Facebook knowing too 
much about me and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me correlated negatively and
significantly with four and five respectively of the 14 key pieces of information. Finally, the privacy concerns 
Identity theft and Fraud correlated positively and significantly with one of the key pieces of information: 
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Your phone number (Table B18 & Table B19).
The negative direction of the significant correlations between the user-corporate privacy concerns 
Facebook knowing too much about me and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 
with the nine key pieces of information indicates that respondents who did NOT provide the information 
had a greater degree of concern about Facebook and its related businesses finding out too much about 
them than those who did. The implication, therefore, is that respondents’ decision not to provide the 
information was motivated by their concern about these two issues. However, all the correlations between 
the user-user concerns Bullying or harassment, Stalking, Identity theft, and Fraud with the provision of 
information were positive, indicating that respondents who DID provide the information had a greater 
degree of concern about these four issues. The implication with regard to these user-user concerns, 
therefore, is that the perceived risk of providing the information triggered the concerns. However, all the 
statistically significant correlations between privacy concerns and the provision of profile information were 
weak (ranging from ꚍ = .093, p = .046 to ꚍ = -.159, p = .001) (Table B18 & Table B19).
Reasons for using Facebook correlated significantly with the provision of profile information to a far greater 
extent than privacy concerns did. The reason that correlated significantly with the most pieces of profile 
information was To have fun, which correlated significantly with all 20 pieces of profile information. This 
was followed by To share my thoughts and feelings and To expand my network, which correlated 
significantly with 19 pieces of profile information. Next were the reasons To ask for advice or help, To 
express myself in ways that I can’t offline, To find like-minded people, and To find people who share similar 
interests, which correlated significantly with 18 pieces of profile information, followed by To express who I 
am, which correlated significantly with 17 pieces of information. The reason that correlated significantly 
with the least pieces of profile information was To keep in touch with family (5 pieces of information) (Table 
B20 & Table B21). 
The strongest significant correlations were between the reason To express who I am and the provision of 
Books read, wanting to read, or liked (ꚍ = .278, p = .000), and TV shows watched, wanting to watch, or liked 
(ꚍ = .244, p = .000); the reason To find like-minded people and the provision of TV shows watched, wanting 
to watch, or liked (ꚍ = .278, p = .000), Movies watched, wanting to watch, or liked (ꚍ = .257, p = .000), and 
Books read, wanting to read, or liked (ꚍ = .243, p = .000); the reason To find people who share similar 
interests and the provision of TV shows watched, wanting to watch, or liked (ꚍ = .255, p = .000), Likes (ꚍ = .
245, p = .000), and Movies watched, wanting to watch, or liked (ꚍ = .244, p = .000); the reason To express 
myself in ways that I can’t offline and the provision of Books read, wanting to read, or liked (ꚍ = .254, p = .
000); and the reason To keep in touch with family and the provision of A list of family members/relatives (ꚍ =
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.245, p = .000). All of this provided information, except for A list of family members/relatives, falls into the 
Likes category (Table B20 & Table B21). All of the significant correlations between reasons for using 
Facebook and the provision of information are positive, indicating that respondents who provided the 
significantly correlated information were likely to use Facebook for the given reason. It is possible and 
perhaps even likely that in many instances the provision of information was motivated by the associated 
reason for using Facebook. 
In summary, reasons for using Facebook were far more frequently correlated with the 23 Facebook-related 
social/entertaining activities than privacy concerns were. Similarly, the number of Facebook friends 
respondents had, the number of groups and networks they belonged to, and the provision of the 14 key 
pieces of profile information and six profile-based likes correlated significantly with reasons for using 
Facebook far more frequently than privacy concerns did. Therefore, it appears that reasons for using 
Facebook influenced participation in social/entertaining activities on Facebook, the number of Facebook 
friends respondents had, the number of groups and networks they belonged to, and the provision of profile 
information far more than privacy concerns did. However, use of the Find Friends function correlated 
significantly with privacy concerns more than reasons for using Facebook did, as did the three post-related 
privacy-protective strategies. Therefore, privacy concerns appeared to influence use of the Find friends 
function, and use of the three post-related privacy-protective strategies more than reasons for using 
Facebook did.
In these last two chapters, I have analysed the survey data related to Hypotheses #1, #2, #3, and #4, and in 
Chapter 7 I compare and contrast the results of the analysis with the relevant literature, and also 
incorporate focus group and survey comments into the discussion to amplify and support the quantitative 
survey findings.
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7. DISCUSSION
This research aimed to investigate the relationship between Facebook users’ privacy concerns and social 
needs on Facebook, as manifested in reported behaviours on the site. To this end, I developed a model 
based on the literature and encompassing privacy concerns, social needs, demographic factors, and privacy 
perceptions in the context of Facebook. I theorised that demographic factors and privacy perceptions 
influence privacy concerns on Facebook, that demographic factors influence the use of Facebook to satisfy 
social needs, and that both privacy concerns and social needs influence behaviours on Facebook. I also 
differentiated between user-user and user-corporate privacy concerns on Facebook, which few researchers 
have explicitly done in an SNS context (some exceptions being Young and Quan-Haase [2013] and Heyman 
et al. [2014]). Influential in developing the social needs component of the model were Nadkarni and 
Hoffman’s (2012) proposal that Facebook use is motivated by both “the need to belong” and “the need for 
self-presentation”, Siedman’s (2014) study of “true self expression” on Facebook, and Friedlander’s (2011) 
concept of “self-portrayal”. Influential in developing Hypothesis #3 (Privacy perceptions influence the nature
and degree of privacy concerns on Facebook) was O’Brien and Torres’ (2012) study, entitled Social 
networking and online privacy: Facebook users’ perceptions, and influential in developing Hypothesis #4 
(The nature and degree of privacy concerns and social needs on Facebook combine to influence behaviours 
on Facebook) were Utz and Kramer’s (2009) exploration of “the trade-off between privacy concerns and 
impression management” (p. 1) on SNS, as well as Grimmelmann’s (2009) analysis of the link between 
“peer-to-peer privacy violations” (p. 1137) on Facebook and users’ motives for using the site (“identity”, 
“relationship”, and “community”).
7.1 Privacy concerns on Facebook
In this thesis, I proposed that privacy concerns on Facebook are best understood as user-user concerns and 
user-corporate concerns. User-user concerns revolve around other Facebook users, whereas user-corporate 
concerns revolve around The Facebook corporation (Facebook, Inc.) and its affiliated businesses. However, 
confirmatory factor analysis revealed that a three factor extraction (with factor loadings ≥ .3) more 
accurately reflected respondents’ Facebook-related privacy concerns. The factors identified were (with 
variables listed in order of prominence): User-user security concerns (Fraud; Identity theft; Someone 
impersonating me; Stalking; Bullying or harassment), User-user privacy concerns (Other people posting 
sensitive photos or videos of me; Other people posting sensitive information about me; The wrong person 
seeing my posts, photos or videos; Bullying or harassment; Stalking), and User-corporate privacy and 
security concerns (Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me; Facebook knowing too 
much about me; Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook; Viruses, spyware or other 
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malware from businesses linked to Facebook). In this extraction, two variables loaded onto two factors: 
Stalking and Bullying or harassment. Conceptually, it makes sense that Stalking and Bullying or harassment 
should load as not only as privacy concerns, but also as security concerns: cyberstalking “[can] convey 
implicit or explicit threats...thus induc[ing] fear in online victims” (Lowry et al., 2016, p. 964), cyberbullying 
“is an aggressive...act” (Smith et al., 2008, p. 376), and cyberharassment, by definition, “[is] intended to 
upset, disturb, or threaten other people” (Lowry et al., 2016, p. 964).
In addition to the 12 listed privacy concerns, respondents expressed concern about hacking (which is 
related to the concerns Fraud, Identity theft, and Someone impersonating me), Facebook’s policy of allowing
user data to be used for research purposes, and “Records of private conversations held somewhere, even 
after deleting them”. Also, some respondents’ comments were centred on the concerns Facebook knowing 
too much about me and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me: “I have an unhealthy 
paranoia about Facebook collecting personal info for marketing purposes”; “As soon as I became engaged, 
suddenly all the advertisements were wedding and marriage related. It feels a little unnerving”; and 
“Facebook uses third-party cookies to track your online activity even if you’re logged out and then uses that 
information for commercial use”. Other respondents expressed concern about Facebook’s continually 
changing privacy policy and privacy settings: “Settings continually being updated without warning”; and “I 
get the impression they change the terms and conditions and settings a lot so you never know how private 
anything is”. One respondent also commented on the time-consuming nature of the privacy settings (“Photo
privacy – all aspects of hiding from timeline or deleting takes a long time one by one”), and another 
respondent commented on the confusing nature of the privacy settings (“Inconsistent privacy settings that 
are hard to understand”). It is worth noting here that over half of respondents (53%) agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement I get confused when trying to adjust my privacy settings on Facebook.
Some respondents also expressed concern about being over-exposed to other Facebook users. This concern
appeared to be similar to – but not as focussed and intense as – a fear of being stalked: perhaps it was a 
fear of the repercussions of “context collapse” (Marwick & boyd, 2011; Vitak et al., 2015), or maybe it was a 
simple desire for “freedom from interference and observation” (Ramsey, 2010, p. 289). Comments 
expressing concern about over-exposure to other users were: “That people who are not friends can still see 
posts or pictures from people not in their ‘friend list’ vicariously”; “I hate it when other people can see that 
I like a page or made a comment”; “People knowing where I am at any time – I do not post where I am, or 
allow others to tag me”; “I deliberately try not to think about [who can see my information], as I think then I
would be more worried”; and “Who really can access my information? Even if I post ‘private’, can it still be 
viewed by someone? Where does the information go?” This last comment also seems to indicate frustration
with Facebook’s lack of transparency from both a user-user and user-corporate privacy perspective. 
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Also, regarding the concern The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos, one respondent wrote: “I 
do not need to worry about people seeing sensitive photos or videos of me as I do not post them”. This 
comment inadvertently highlighted a major privacy-related issue on Facebook: i.e., even though users may 
be careful about what they post, other users could post sensitive material on their behalf. For this reason, 
users are not fully in control of their information on the site. Another respondent indicated concern about 
this lack of control: “Not everyone has the same ideas about privacy and respect as I do so I’m a little 
concerned that someone else may treat my information/posts more informally or casually than I would like 
them to”. A number of researchers have also noted Facebook users’ concern about lack of control over their
information (e.g., Trottier, 2012; Marder et al., 2016; Metzger & Suh, 2017).
Finally, respondents indicated that they modified their behaviour off Facebook so as to control how they 
were represented on the site: “I very much filter what I post, but I also just don’t get drunk in public”, and 
“If you lose control and somebody else takes [a photo of you and posts it on Facebook], it could ruin your 
career”. Marder et al. (2016) and Trottier (2012) noted that similar concerns were expressed by Facebook 
users, and similar preventative actions taken.
7.2 Social needs on Facebook
Regarding the social needs component of this thesis, I proposed that socially-related Facebook use is driven 
by two fundamental motives: self-portrayal (inspired by Friedlander, 2011) and belonging (Seidman, 2014). 
Self-portrayal comprises strategic self-presentation (Utz et al., 2012) and expression of the true self 
(McKenna et al., 2002), whereas belonging comprises intimacy (McAdams, 1989) and affiliation (Murray, 
1938). The key difference between strategic self-presentation and expression of the true self is 
motivational: expression of the true self is driven by a need to express oneself authentically, whereas 
strategic self-presentation is motivated by a need to present oneself in such a way as to gain the approval of
others. Additionally, intimacy differs from affiliation, for the purposes of this thesis, in that intimate 
relationships are ‘deep’ relationships with a chosen few, whereas affiliative relationships are more 
superficial relationships with a greater number and broader range of others. Intimate relationships provide 
emotional sustenance (bonding capital) whereas affiliative relationships provide group identity and helpful 
contacts (bridging capital) (Luarn et al., 2015; Trepte & Reinecke, 2013; De Meo, 2014; Robards & Bennett, 
2011). 
Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that a seven factor extraction (with factor loadings ≥ .3) best reflected 
respondents’ socially-related reasons for using Facebook. The factors identified were (with variables listed in
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order of prominence): Affiliation (To find people who share similar interests; To find like-minded people; To 
work with others who have similar goals; To expand my network; To make new friends), Strategic yet 
authentic self-presentation (To project my best self; To enhance my image; To express who I am; To express 
myself in ways that I can’t offline); Relationship maintenance (To keep in touch with friends; To keep in touch
with family; To keep in touch with people from my past; To be there for others [i.e., to be supportive, offer 
help or show an interest]), Entertainment, procrastination, and fun (Because I’m bored; To put off doing my 
work; To have fun), Authentic self-expression (To share my thoughts and feelings; To share my news; To 
express who I am; To have fun; To express myself in ways that I can’t offline), Relationship seeking (To meet 
new romantic or sexual partners; To make new friends; To find out more about potential or new friends or 
partners; To ask for advice or help; To feel less lonely); and Facestalking (To find out about people I am 
curious about; To keep an eye on someone). In this extraction, four variables loaded onto two factors: the To
express who I am and the To express myself in ways that I can’t offline variables loaded onto both the 
Strategic yet authentic self-presentation and Authentic self-expression factors, the To make new friends 
variable loaded onto both the Affiliation and Relationship seeking factors, which suggests that respondents 
were seeking both intimate and affiliative friendships, and the To have fun variable loaded onto both the 
Entertainment, procrastination, and fun and Authentic self-expression factors. This last loading suggests that
respondents enjoyed expressing their authentic selves on Facebook. 
This seven factor extraction indicated that the social needs part of the hypothesised model (Figure 3) was 
accurate in some, but not all, respects. The Affiliation factor aligns directly with the hypothesised model, 
the Authentic self-expression factor aligns with the expression of the true self component in the 
hypothesised model, and the Relationship maintenance and Relationship seeking factors encompass both 
the intimacy and affiliation components in the hypothesised model, but appear to lean more toward 
intimacy than affiliation. The fact that the To ask for advice or help and To feel less lonely variables loaded 
onto the Relationship seeking factor suggests that respondents were not deriving enough social support 
from existing relationships. The Entertainment, procrastination, and fun and Facestalking factors were not 
included in the hypothesised model, not being directly related to social needs. However, facestalking is, in a 
sense, a social activity in that it involves an interest in other people, and respondents’ comments indicated 
that the use of Facebook for entertainment, procrastination, and fun also most likely included engagement 
in social activities: e.g., “[Facebook offers] fun and laughs” and is “an avenue to talk nonsense which I guess 
is entertainment”. Also, Niland et al. (2015) found (and respondents confirmed) that fun and facestalking 
converged in that offline friends “have fun together” (p. 129) stalking others on Facebook.
However, perhaps the most interesting finding of the seven factor extraction is that the strategic self-
presentation component in the hypothesised model was not entirely accurate: instead of presenting 
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themselves strategically on Facebook, respondents presented themselves strategically yet authentically on 
the site (i.e., respondents aimed at eliciting the approval of others whilst simultaneously remaining true to 
themselves). The Strategic yet authentic self-presentation factor does, however, align directly with the self-
portrayal component in the hypothesised model. As previously noted, this component comprises strategic 
self-presentation and expression of the true self, and was inspired by Friedlander (2011), who wrote that 
“the subject in an SNS must balance his or her desire for an acceptable public representation with a need to 
express himself or herself in some authentic and private way” (p. 4). I did not expect factor extraction to 
reveal a self-portrayal factor per se, only its constituent components, but perhaps I should have. In Chapter 
3 I noted that there is a continuum between intimate and affiliative relationships (Altman & Taylor, 1973; 
Claridge, 2018) (which was reflected in the factor loadings): it appears that there is also a continuum 
between strategic self-presentation and authentic self-expression, and strategic yet authentic self-
presentation lies along this continuum. (However, the factor extraction also revealed an authentic self-
expression factor [as well as an affiliation factor].)
There is some (but not much) direct support in the literature for the concept of strategic yet authentic self-
presentation on SNS: Zhang et al. (2017) found that stressed Facebook users, who made an effort to present
themselves strategically whilst posting about their stress, received more social support than those who did 
not. Hence, the supported users were presenting themselves both strategically and authentically. Also, 
Forest and Wood (2012) found that Facebook users with low self-esteem posted more “negative” status 
updates on the site than those with higher self-esteem, and this barrage of negativity provoked a negative 
response from other users. The authors therefore advised depressed users not to be “inauthentic” on the 
site, but to make an effort to post about the “positive” events in their lives as well as the negative ones (p. 
300). 
The concept of strategic self-presentation, as described in the literature, however, usually involves or 
implies some degree of authenticity: Jones and Pittman (1982), for instance, maintained that strategic self-
presentational behaviours are not necessarily “false”, but rather, “typically involve selective disclosures and 
omissions, matters of emphasis and toning rather than of deceit and simulation” (p. 233). In relation to SNS,
Grimmelmann’s (2009) description of impression management on Facebook, whereby “each additional 
datum is a strategic revelation, one more daub of paint in your self-portrait” (p. 1152), suggests the 
“selective self-presentation” (Rui & Stefanone, 2013, p. 111) of which Jones and Pittman (1982) wrote. 
Therefore, what is the difference between strategic self-presentation and strategic yet authentic self-
presentation? Perhaps the difference between the two is partly a matter of the degree of authenticity 
involved: Gil-Or et al. (2015), who measured “the gap between the true and Facebook self” and “the gap 
between the Facebook self and real-life self” (p. 5) found that, for some of their respondents, these gaps 
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were “large” (p. 1), but for other respondents they were not. Those respondents with a small gap between 
“the true and Facebook self” and “the Facebook and real-life self” (p. 5) were perhaps acting strategically 
yet authentically on Facebook.
To further clarify the difference between strategic self-presentation and strategic yet authentic self-
presentation, we need to look at the motives for authentic self-expression (expression of the true self) and 
strategic self-presentation. Authenticity “is the degree to which one is true to his or her own personality, 
spirit, or character, despite external pressures” (Gil-or et al., 2015, p. 4). The needs for both self-validation 
(Seidman, 2014) and relationship formation (McKenna et al., 2002) have been found to be motives for 
authentic self-expression online (McKenna et al., 2002) and on SNS (Seidman, 2014): according to Seidman 
(2014), the expression of “identity-important self-aspects” on Facebook, which are then “validated by 
others can ultimately increase self-acceptance” (p. 368), and according to McKenna et al. (2002), the 
expression of one’s true self online is a prerequisite for the formation and maintenance of “real, deep, and 
meaningful relationships” (p. 28). Strategic self-presentation, however, “[is a striving] to manipulate how 
[one is] viewed by others” (AliAlassiri, Muda, Ghazali, & Ahamefula, 2014, p. 45). People engage in strategic 
self-presentation “to invoke a desired response from others” (Vannini & Franzese, 2008, p. 1627), such as, in
the context of SNS, “liking and respect” (Bareket-Bojmel et al., 2016, p. 788), and, in fact, Gil-Or et al. (2015)
found that “low self-esteem and unawareness of the true self” are “personality characteristics that 
contribute to the presentation of a false-self” (p. 3) on Facebook. Therefore, authentic self-expression is 
said to be coming from a place of self-acceptance (Gil-Or et al., 2015), or the striving for self-acceptance 
(Seidman, 2014), and the wish for the formation and maintenance of genuine and deep relationships based 
on self-acceptance and other-acceptance of oneself (McKenna et al., 2002), whereas strategic self-
presentation is said to be motivated by a need for approval (Vannini & Franzese, 2008; Bareket-Bojmel et 
al., 2016). Strategic yet authentic self-presentation, a combination of the two, may therefore encompass a 
need for self- and other-acceptance and approval of one’s true self, providing a foundation for genuine 
relationships.
Although there is not much direct support in the literature for strategic yet authentic self-presentation on 
Facebook, existing research confirms that the other six factors are motivations for Facebook use. For 
instance, Special and Li-Barber (2012) found that relationship maintenance was one of the “most common 
motives” for Facebook use (p. 624); Seidman (2014) found that Facebook was used for “true self 
expression” (p. 367); Young (2011) found that ‘facestalkingʼ was a popular activity on Facebook; Basak and 
Calisir (2015) found that Facebook use was partially motivated by entertainment; Przepiorka et al. (2016) 
found that procrastination was associated with “intensity” (p. 61) of Facebook use; Robards and Bennett 
(2011) found that affiliation on SNS helped provide a sense of identity; Kim, Sohn, and Choi (2011) found 
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that “seeking friends” was a “major” motive for SNS use (p. 365); and Park et al. (2011) found that frequent 
positive communication on Facebook promoted a feeling of intimacy between friends.
One aspect of Facebook, supported in the literature but not directly enumerated in the factor analysis, is 
convenience (Trottier, 2012; Krasnova et al., 2010). Some respondents commented on the convenience of 
Facebook in regard to keeping in touch with family and friends living or travelling overseas or interstate: “I 
contact the people that I’ve met all around the world...on Facebook”; “It...cut[s] down on time spent 
emailing family and friends overseas”; “It offers me the chance to keep in touch with family members when 
they are overseas, using a fast but inexpensive mode of communication”; and “It is a convenient way of my 
large family keeping in touch, as in cousins, sisters etc., as we are spread all over Australia”. But Facebook is 
also a convenient way to keep in touch with people closer to home: “Keeps you in the same room as people 
you like. Makes everything easier rarely missing a beat”.
In the next section I relate the findings of this research to the hypotheses, and discuss whether or not these 
findings are in agreement with the existing research.
7.3 Demographic factors and privacy concerns on Facebook
The first hypothesis is: Demographic factors influence the nature and degree of privacy concerns on 
Facebook. There was a small but statistically significant gender-based difference in levels of concern for nine
out of the 12 privacy concerns on Facebook, with females being more concerned than males in every case. 
The three concerns that did not show a statistically significant gender-based difference were Identity theft, 
Fraud, and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me. There were also a small but 
statistically significant age-related trends for two out of the 12 privacy concerns on Facebook: Stalking and 
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook. Stalking was shown to be more of a concern 
among younger Facebook users, whereas Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook was 
shown to be more of a concern among older users. Australian cultural influence, measured by respondents’ 
and their parents’ countries of birth (Australia/not Australia), as well as the length of time respondents had 
lived in Australia, was significantly related to six of the privacy concerns on Facebook: Stalking; Fraud; 
Identity theft; Someone impersonating me; The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos;  and 
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook. In all six instances, the lesser degree
of Australian cultural influence, the greater the degree of concern. However, as was the case for the gender 
and age-based associations, the degree of influence was small. Finally, there were no statistically significant 
differences for the ‘highest’ level of formal education completed and privacy concerns on Facebook. 
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How do these findings tally with those from other studies? Some researchers have found that females were 
more likely than males to use privacy-protective strategies on SNS. These strategies included use of the 
privacy settings (Litt, 2013), non-provision of contact information (Special & Li-Barber, 2012; Fogel & 
Nehmad, 2009), and the careful selection of Facebook friends (De Wolf et al., 2014; Grubbs-Hoy & Milne, 
2010). Possibly, females used more privacy-protective strategies than males due to greater fears about 
stalking and harassment (Malik et al., 2016; Litt, 2013; Grubbs-Hoy & Milne, 2010; Fogel & Nehmad, 2009). 
This study similarly found that females were more concerned about Bullying or harassment and Stalking 
than were males. 
Regarding the influence of age on SNS-related privacy concerns, other studies have found that younger 
users tended to be more concerned about user-user privacy issues than older users, whereas older users 
tended to be more concerned about user-corporate privacy issues than younger users (Malik et al, 2016; 
OʼBrien & Torres, 2012; Jeong & Coyle, 2014; Elueze & Quan-Haase, 2018). Younger users’ increased 
concern about user-user privacy issues on SNS was possibly due to the fact that they posted more (Malik et 
al., 2016; Ozimek & Bierhoff, 2016; Kezer et al., 2016; McAndrew & Jeong, 2012), and had more Facebook 
friends (Kezer et al., 2016) than older users. This study similarly found that older users were more 
concerned about the user-corporate concern Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook 
than were younger users, but the reverse was the case for the user-user concern Stalking. 
Regarding the influence of education on privacy concerns, Blank et al. (2014) found that higher levels of 
formal education were associated with greater use of the privacy settings on SNS, and several researchers 
have found that higher levels of formal education were associated with increased user-corporate privacy 
concern in an e-commerce context (Riquelme & Roman, 2014; Yang et al., 2009; Cho et al., 2009). In 
contrast, this study did not find a statistically significant association between education and privacy 
concern. 
A number of studies have found that cultural background impacts upon privacy concern on SNS (e.g., Cho et
al., 2018 [Singapore, South Korea and the US]; James et al., 2017 [South Korea and the US]; Bauer & 
Schiffinger, 2016 [meta-analysis of 38 studies]; Park et al., 2015 [South Korea and the US]; Krasnova et al., 
2012 [Germany and the US]; Thomson et al., 2017 [Japan and the US]; Gunsoy et al., 2015 [Turkey and the 
US]), but I have not found any studies referring specifically to the influence of Australian cultural 
background. 
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7.4 Demographic factors and reasons for using Facebook
The second hypothesis is: Demographic factors influence the nature and degree of social needs on 
Facebook. There was a small but statistically significant difference between genders for eight of the 24 
reasons for using Facebook. Females used Facebook more than males for the following reasons: To keep in 
touch with friends, To keep in touch with family, To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or to 
show an interest), To share my news, and To put off doing my work. However, males used Facebook more 
than females for the following reasons: To make new friends, To meet new romantic or sexual partners, and 
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners. There was also a statistically significant age-
related trend for 21 of the 24 reasons for using Facebook: the younger the age group, the more Facebook 
was used for each reason. In most cases, this age-related trend was medium-large. The reasons that did not 
show an age-related trend were: To keep in touch with family, To share my news, and To work with others 
who have similar goals. Australian cultural influence was found to be significantly associated with five 
reasons for using Facebook: To keep in touch with people from my past, To make new friends, To keep an eye
on someone, To put off doing my work, and Because I’m bored. Respondents who had not been born in 
Australia and who had lived in Australia for less than a year were the most likely to use Facebook for the 
reasons To keep in touch with people from my past and To make new friends, whereas respondents who had
been born in Australia, and whose parents had been born in Australia, were the most likely to use Facebook 
for the reasons To keep an eye on someone, To put off doing my work, and Because I’m bored. However, for 
all five reasons, the degree of influence was small. Finally, there were small but statistically significant 
differences across groups describing the ‘highest’ level of formal education completed for 13 of the 24 
reasons for using Facebook, independent of the effect of age. For all 13 reasons, the ‘higher’ the level of 
completed education, the less Facebook was used for that reason.
How do these findings compare with those from other studies? Regarding gender, other researchers have 
also found that males used SNS more to find new friends and romantic partners than did females, whereas 
females used SNS more to communicate with family and existing friends than did males (Muscanell & 
Guadagno, 2012; McAndrew & Jeong, 2012). Krasnova et al. (2017), however, found that males and females 
were equally likely to use Facebook for the purpose of strategic self-presentation. This study similarly found 
that Facebook use for the reasons To enhance my image and To project my best self did not differ 
significantly between the genders, but that Facebook use for the reasons To keep in touch with friends, To 
keep in touch with family, and To meet new romantic or sexual partners did, with females being more likely 
to use Facebook for the first two reasons, and males being more likely to use the site for the third reason.
Regarding age, other studies have found that although younger users spent more time on Facebook than 
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did older users (Ozimek & Bierhoff, 2016; Malik et al., 2016; Kezer et al., 2016; McAndrew & Jeong, 2012), 
and had more Facebook friends than did older users (Kezer et al., 2016), older users derived more “social 
connectedness” from the site (Grieve & Kemp, 2015, p. 241). The different ways in which younger and older 
people used Facebook reflected (or caused?) the differing levels of social connectedness they derived from 
the site: younger users tended to use Facebook more “as a pastime activity” (Papacharissi, as cited in Malik 
et al., 2016, p. 465), and for the purposes of social comparison (Ozimek & Bierhoff, 2016) and “voyeurism” 
(Van den Broeck et al., 2015, p. 6) than did older users, whereas older users tended to use Facebook more 
for the purpose of deepening bonds with significant others than did younger users (Grieve & Kemp, 2015). 
The findings of this study partially confirmed the aforementioned findings. Younger users were found to use
Facebook more for most the 24 listed reasons, including To find out about people I am curious about, 
Stalking, To put off doing my work, Because I’m bored, and To have fun. On the other hand, younger users 
were also found to use Facebook more for the reason To be there for others (among other reasons that 
imply a wish for social connectedness). Also, younger and older users used Facebook approximately equally 
for the reasons To keep in touch with family and To share my news. 
I was only able to find one study regarding the effect of formal education on reasons for using Facebook. 
Syn and Oh (2015) found that Facebook users with a higher level of formal education enjoyed knowledge-
sharing on the site more than did users with a lower level of formal education. The authors noted that not 
only was knowledge-sharing on Facebook enjoyable and educational, but it also enhanced users’ 
reputation. The reasons for using Facebook that align most closely with knowledge sharing as explored in 
Syn and Oh’s study (2015) are To find people who share similar interests and To work with others who have 
similar goals. Both these reasons correlated significantly with completed education, even when age was 
taken into account, but in contrast to Syn and Oh’s findings (2015), the higher the level of formal education 
completed, the less likely respondents were to use Facebook for them.
I did not find any comparable studies exploring the effect of culture on Facebook use.
7.5 Privacy perceptions and privacy concerns on Facebook
The third hypothesis is: Privacy perceptions influence the nature & degree of privacy concerns on Facebook. 
To test this hypothesis, I gave respondents ten statements concerning the workings of Facebook in relation 
to privacy (e.g., Only my friends can tag me in photos and videos) and respondents were asked to select 
True, False or Don’t know for each statement. Respondents were also asked which one of the following 
statements was true: A) Facebook may share my information with other businesses in a way that allows me 
to be personally identified, B) Facebook may share my information with other businesses, but never in a way
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that allows me to be personally identified, or C) Facebook doesn’t share any of my information with other 
businesses. Test results indicated that respondents’ privacy perceptions, as indicated by their selection of 
True, False or Don’t know, and A, B or C, were associated with privacy concern on Facebook, but not to a 
great extent, as evidenced by the fact that most perception/concern pairs were not significantly associated, 
and the significant associations were not strong.
In some instances, there appeared to be a direct causative link between a perception and its associated 
concern, but in other instances the reason for significant perception/concern pairings was not readily 
apparent. Of particular interest is the fact that respondents who selected False for a worst case scenario 
statement were not always the least concerned – sometimes those who selected Don’t know were (e.g., 
respondents who selected Don’t know for the statement My friends’ activities on Facebook may result in my
information being made available to other businesses were less concerned about Other people posting 
sensitive information about me than those who selected False were). Perhaps, in these instances, 
respondents who selected Don’t know had a lesser degree of Facebook-related privacy concern than those 
who selected False, and had therefore been less motivated to find out how Facebook works from a privacy 
perspective. 
It is also notable that there was a high incorrect response rate for some of the questions (up to over 66%), 
and the Don’t know response also rated quite highly for some questions (up to over 38%). These 
percentages seem to indicate that respondents were confused about privacy issues on Facebook. 
Furthermore, respondents who selected statements A or B for the Please indicate which statement you 
think is true question were asked who they thought Facebook shared their information with, and 
respondents’ answers (via a text box) indicated confusion about this topic. Confusion about third-party 
access to users’ information was also noted by O’Brien and Torres in 2012, and more recently by Golbeck 
and Mauriello (2016), who found that Facebook users “did not fully understand the extent to which apps 
could access their data” (p. 1).
Respondents’ privacy perceptions did not appear to predict their privacy concerns on Facebook to the 
extent that I had expected. Perhaps, therefore, there were other factors (aside from demographic factors) 
that shaped respondents’ privacy concerns on the site. For instance, Taddei and Contena (2013) and 
Krasnova et al. (2010) found that both trust in one’s SNS provider and perceived control over one’s 
information on SNS mitigated SNS-related privacy concerns.
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7.6 The effect of privacy concerns and social needs on Facebook-related behaviours
The last hypothesis is: The nature and degree of privacy concerns and social needs on Facebook combine to 
influence behaviours on Facebook. 
7.6.1 Privacy concerns and behaviours on Facebook
For this hypothesis, I measured the relationship between privacy concerns on Facebook and 23 Facebook-
related activities, the number of Facebook friends respondents had, the number of groups and networks 
they belonged to, and whether or not they had used Facebook’s Find friends function. Regarding the 23 
Facebook-related activities, less than a quarter of the privacy concern/activity pairs correlated significantly, 
and all of the significant correlations were low. Notwithstanding these caveats, the analysis found that the 
more users engaged in the 23 activities, the higher their privacy concerns tended to be. Therefore, it seems 
likely that in most instances, increased activity on Facebook led to increased privacy concern due to 
increased risk perception. Similarly, the more Facebook friends respondents had, and the more groups and 
networks they belonged to, the more concerned they tended to be about Bullying or harassment and 
Stalking (amongst other issues, but these two concerns were in common). Also, respondents who had used 
Facebook’s Find friends function tended to be more concerned about Bullying or harassment and Stalking 
(amongst other issues) than those who had not. Therefore, it appears likely that increased privacy concern 
was generated by increased connection via Facebook friends, group and network membership, and use of 
Facebook’s Find friends function.
I also measured the relationship between privacy concerns on Facebook and the provision of 14 key pieces 
of profile information and six profile-based likes. In general, respondents’ choice whether or not to provide 
this information did not correlate significantly with their privacy concerns on Facebook – there were only 25
significant associations out of a possible 240. The privacy concerns that featured most prominently, 
however, were the user-user concerns Bullying or harassment and Stalking, correlating significantly with the
provision of eight and six pieces of profile information respectively, followed by the user-corporate concerns
Facebook knowing too much about me and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me, 
correlating significantly with the provision of four and five pieces of profile information respectively. The 
direction of the user-user correlations indicated that respondents who had provided the associated 
information had a greater degree of privacy concern than those who had not, but for the user-corporate 
correlations, the reverse was the case: respondents who had not provided the information had a greater 
degree of privacy concern. It seems, therefore, that respondents’ user-user concerns were escalated by the 
provision of the associated information, whereas their user-corporate privacy concerns acted to discourage 
the provision of the associated information.
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Finally, I measured the relationship between privacy concerns on Facebook and respondents’ privacy-
protective strategies regarding their posts, as measured by three questions: How often do you change the 
audience for something you post using the ‘audience selector’ for that post? How often, if ever, have you 
deleted a post for privacy reasons? and How often, if ever, have you decided not to post something because 
the wrong person might see it? All eight user-user privacy concerns correlated significantly with the first 
question, and all 12 privacy concerns correlated significantly with the second and third questions. The 
significant correlations consistently indicated that the greater respondents’ degree of privacy concern, the 
more proactive they were about protecting their posts. It therefore appears likely that respondents’ privacy 
concerns motivated these post-related privacy-protective strategies. The concern Stalking correlated 
comparatively highly for all three questions but the concern Bullying or harassment did not correlate 
significantly for any of the questions.
7.6.2 Social needs and behaviours on Facebook
I also measured the relationship between reasons for using Facebook and the 23 Facebook-related 
activities, the number of Facebook friends respondents had, the number of groups and networks they 
belonged to, and whether or not they had used Facebook’s Find friends function. Reasons for using 
Facebook correlated for more frequently and strongly with the 23 Facebook-related activities than privacy 
concerns did. Nineteen of the 23 activities correlated significantly with between 21-24 of the 24 reasons, 
and three activities correlated significantly with 15-19 reasons. The activity Write a note was exceptional in 
that it was significantly correlated with only nine of 24 the reasons, and two of these correlations were 
negative: these were the only two negative significant correlations for the activity/reason pairs. All the 
other correlations were positive, indicating that the more respondents used Facebook for the specified 
activity, the more they tended to use it for the associated reason. In most instances there appeared to be a 
direct causative link between a reason for using Facebook and its associated activity.
Similarly, there were a high number of correlations between reasons for using Facebook and the number of 
Facebook friends respondents had, and the number of groups and networks they belonged to. All 24 
reasons for using Facebook correlated significantly with the number of Facebook friends respondents had, 
23 reasons correlated significantly with the number of groups they belonged to, and 18 reasons correlated 
significantly with the number of networks they belonged to. The direction of the significant correlations 
indicated that the more Facebook friends respondents had, and the more groups and networks they 
belonged to, the more they used Facebook for the associated reasons. It appears likely, therefore, that 
increased accumulation of Facebook friends, together with increased group and network membership, was 
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motivated by increased use of Facebook for the associated reasons.
The provision of the 14 key pieces of profile information and six profile-based likes was also associated far 
more frequently with reasons for using Facebook than privacy concerns were. The direction of the 
significant correlations indicated that, once again, the more likely respondents were to provide the 
information, the more likely they were to use Facebook for the associated reason. In many instances there 
appeared to be a causative link between the provision of information and the associated reason.
Finally, use of the three post-related privacy-protective strategies was associated far more frequently with 
privacy concerns than with reasons for using Facebook. The direction of all the significant correlations 
indicated that the more respondents used the three post-related privacy-protective strategies, the more 
they used Facebook for the significantly correlated reasons. Regarding causation, it is possible, even likely 
that the perceived risks of Facebook use for the correlated reasons necessitated use of the strategies.
7.6.3 Putting it all together
In summary, increased social (and entertainment-based) activity on Facebook was associated with increased
privacy concerns: therefore, it appears that the activity sparked the concerns rather than the concerns 
curbing the activity. The only exceptions to this rule were that the user-corporate privacy concerns 
Facebook knowing too much about me and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 
were associated with the non-provision of some key pieces of profile information: in these instances, 
therefore, privacy concerns appeared to curb the provision of information. Regarding the three post-related
privacy-protective strategies, increased privacy concerns were associated with increased use of the 
strategies, so, in these instances, the concerns appeared to motivate the strategies (this is not surprising). 
Increased social activity was also associated with increased use of the strategies, which suggests that the 
more respondents used Facebook for the associated reasons, the more they felt they needed to protect 
their post-related privacy on the site. The three strategies, in essence, revolve around attempts to prevent 
“context collapse” (Marwick & boyd, 2011; Vitak et al., 2015), which is the merging of one’s social networks 
(e.g., family, work colleagues, and close friends), and which is considered to be one of the major privacy-
related problems of Facebook use.
The findings suggest that the benefits of using Facebook in terms of social interaction and entertainment far
outweighed the privacy concerns that these activities generated: i.e., respondents used Facebook in spite of
their privacy concerns. However, privacy concerns did appear to trigger privacy-protective strategies in the 
form of post regulation and the non-provision of certain key pieces of profile information. What is especially
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interesting about the latter is that it was user-corporate concerns – not user-user concerns – that appeared 
to trigger the non-provision of the information. Perhaps user-user privacy concerns were not significant 
motivators regarding the non-provision of profile information because respondents had the option of 
making the information available to the audience of their choice. Similarly, the four user-corporate concerns
(as well as all eight user-user concerns) were associated with the second and third post-related privacy-
protective strategies (deleting a post for privacy reasons, and deciding not to post something because the 
wrong person might see it) but not the first (using the ‘audience selector’ to change the audience for a 
post), probably because using the audience selector cannot limit Facebook’s access to posts. Both these 
findings indicate that respondents were, in fact, concerned about user-corporate as well as user-user 
privacy.
Overall, reasons for using Facebook were found to outweigh Facebook-related privacy concerns. The privacy
paradox was evidenced by the fact that increased socially motivated action in the forms of increased 
participation in the 23 activities, increased numbers of Facebook friends, increased group and network 
membership, use of the Find friends function, and the provision of profile information (with the exception 
of the curbing effect of user-corporate concerns) was associated with increased privacy concern. On the 
other hand, there was some evidence in support of the privacy calculus too, because privacy concern did 
appear to influence self-disclosure to some extent, as indicated by the use of the three post-related privacy-
protective strategies and the non-provision of some key pieces of profile information. Therefore, evidence 
was found to support the existence of both the privacy paradox and the privacy calculus, but the privacy 
paradox was paramount. 
These findings suggest that respondents felt that they did not have a real choice when it came to providing 
information on Facebook – social needs were too important. Respondents’ comments supported this view: 
“Facebook to me is a security blanket as many people can’t actually make friends in the ‘old’ way of talking 
to people”, and “I had held off joining for so long, but found out I was missing out on a lot of news about my
friends and event invites as they were all on Facebook”. Other researchers have also found that social needs
outweigh privacy concerns in influencing self-disclosure on SNS (e.g., Dienlin & Metzger, 2016; Min & Kim, 
2015; Lee et al., 2013). However, even though Facebook users may prioritise their social needs over their 
privacy concerns, that doesn’t mean they are happy about having to do so. The following post on 
Facebook’s privacy page sums up this clash between user-corporate privacy concerns and the lure of social 
needs:
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Stop pretending [you’re] giving us more control. With every [change] you make you remove the best 
of what [Facebook] used to be...or maybe stand for. It is simple. We just want to be connected. We 
[don’t] want [you] to spy, intrude, advertise etc. We just want to CONNECT. (Descoteaux, 2014)
An argument could be made here that the privacy paradox and the privacy calculus are one and the same: 
i.e., it could be that SNS (and other internet) users with privacy concerns consistently weigh up the costs 
and benefits of self-disclosure (or information disclosure) and act accordingly. When they act in favour of 
their privacy concerns, it is referred to as the privacy calculus, but when they act in favour of their social (or 
other) needs it is referred to, perhaps misleadingly, as the privacy paradox. To apply this argument to the 
context of this study, respondents appeared to modify their behaviour on Facebook in response to privacy 
concerns in some instances, but appeared to act in ways that increased their privacy concerns in other 
instances. I have cited the former instances as suggestive of the privacy calculus and the latter instances as 
evidence of the privacy paradox. However, I also inferred that, in these latter instances, respondents’ social 
needs took precedence over their privacy concerns. If this is the case, respondents actually used the privacy
calculus in both sets of instances. However, the way in which respondents used the calculus may not always 
have been entirely informed, conscious (Kehr et al., 2015), or rational (Barth & de Jong, 2017), and when it 
was at least reasonably so, respondents still chose to put themselves at perceived privacy-related risk 
because the fulfilment of their social needs was more important to them than their privacy concerns.
In Chapter 1 I proposed that, due to several factors, Facebook users’ decision whether or not, when and 
how to use Facebook is not made ‘on a level playing field’. First, there is the issue of information asymmetry.
In relation to user-corporate privacy issues, many Facebook (and internet) users do not understand the 
complex workings of big data (Hull, 2015; Nissenbaum, 2011) and may not know how to protect themselves 
from corporations online. Also, constant change in Facebook’s privacy practices acts to confuse users 
(Watson et al., 2015; Hull, 2015), and its faux-friendly, “broadly phrased” (Meyer, 2018, para. 6) privacy 
policy may lull them them into a false sense of security. Second, Facebook users labour under the twin 
burdens of “bounded rationality” (limited rationality due to limited information, time and cognitive capacity
[BusinessDictionary, 2019; Barth & de Jong, 2017, pp. 1055-1056]) and “systematic psychological deviations 
from rationality” (such as “hyperbolic discounting” and “optimism bias”) (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005, pp. 
26-27) when making privacy-related decisions on Facebook. Third, Facebook’s interface is designed to 
encourage ‘sharing’ and to discourage use of the privacy settings (Jones, 2010; Light & McGrath, 2010; 
Waldman, 2016). Facebook does provide users with options to tailor the visibility of their content to other 
users, but it hides most of the privacy settings and presents them in such a way as to maximise effort (Stern 
& Kumar, 2014; Watson et al., 2015; Hull, 2015, p. 98). In contrast, sharing is quick, easy, and very inviting 
(Light & McGrath, 2010; Waldman, 2016). Fourth, Facebook has been deliberately made to be, and has 
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been found to be, addictive (Parker, as cited in Allen, 2017; Marino et al., 2018), and last, Facebook is an 
intrinsic part of users’ daily lives, in terms of both habit and social necessity (Debatin et al., 2009; Blank et 
al., 2014). These factors could help to explain why respondents prioritised their social needs over their 
privacy concerns on Facebook.
7.7 Limitations
There are some limitations to the data. First, I invited people who had deactivated or deleted their 
Facebook account, or who had never had a Facebook account, to complete the survey along with those who
had an active account, but there were only 13 completed responses of this nature, and therefore not 
enough to compare to the group with an active account. Second, gender and age groups were unevenly 
sized. There were only three respondents (two with an active account) who selected Another identity for 
gender, so these responses could not, unfortunately, be included in gender analyses. Also, there was an 
uneven number of male and female respondents (77 and 312 respectively), and age groups were, likewise, 
unevenly sized, the largest with 165 respondents (18-24 years old) and the smallest with 14 respondents 
(55-64 years old). Third, because the survey was advertised predominantly through ECU, there was a 
disproportionately large number of respondents with an undergraduate or postgraduate background, and 
the sample was therefore not representative of the Australian population as a whole. Fourth, the survey 
was very long with a high attrition rate, and the survey length could have been the reason why some 
respondents who completed it had ticked the same response for every item in one or more of the longer 
multiple item Likert scale questions. There were 10 completed surveys in which this had been done for two 
or more of the longer questions, and I did not include these surveys in the analysis. However, I still included 
46 completed surveys in which respondents had ticked the same response for every item in only one of the 
longer questions. However, one cannot be sure that these responses are genuine. Finally, the data for this 
study were collected five years ago, in August to November 2014. The nature and/or degree of users’ 
Facebook-related privacy concerns may have changed in the interim, particularly given the Cambridge 
Analytica data scandal (Herhold, 2019). Also, Facebook usage patterns are reportedly changing, particularly 
among younger users (Hutchinson, 2019; Adorjan & Ricciardelli, 2019),39 although, as recent studies have 
shown, Facebook still remains relevant for satisfying users’ social needs (Ferris & Hollenbaugh, 2018 
[developing new relationships with others, exhibitionism, relationship maintenance, passing time]; Stiff, 
2019 [surveillance]; Brailovskaia, Rohmann, Bierhoff, Schillack, & Margraf, 2019 [social support]; High & 
Buehler, 2019 [social support]).
39 Adorjan and Ricciardelli (2019) conducted a study centred on teenagers aged 13-19 and found that: “A prominent theme 
among our participants is the gravitation away from Facebook, in preference for newer SNS platforms [predominantly 
Snapchat, Twitter, and Instagram], although Facebook did still remain central in the online lives of...participants” (p. 17). The 
authors found that the move to Snapchat and other platforms was largely motivated by user-user privacy concerns and “online 
impression management” (p. 17).
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7.8 Suggestions for further research
Two gaps in the social media-related research are as follows. First, there is a dearth of studies comparing 
Australian Facebook users with Facebook users from other countries, and second, most research concerning
Facebook use (including this research) is focussed on university students and is thus not representative of 
the general population, either in age or educational level. Therefore, there is a need for research centred on
Australian SNS users that is reflective of different sectors of the Australian population, and that compares 
Australian SNS users to those from other countries. 
Another topic for further research is the concept of strategic yet authentic self-presentation on SNS. This 
concept resulted from a factor analysis of respondents’ reasons for using Facebook, but there is, at present, 
little research dealing directly with the topic.
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8. CONCLUSION
This research has explored how privacy concerns and social needs combined to influence Facebook use. The
findings demonstrated that there was a privacy paradox in relation to Facebook in that increased social 
activity on the site was associated, in some instances, with increased privacy concern. However, the findings
also indicated the existence of the privacy calculus in that increased privacy concern was associated, in 
some instances, with increased use of privacy-protective strategies. When discussing these findings, I 
suggested that the privacy paradox can be explained by the fact that, in every instance, respondents 
balanced their social needs against their privacy concerns and made the best decision they could in the 
circumstances. Sometimes that decision led to the denial of social needs in favour of privacy-protective 
strategies, but at other times it led to the curbing of privacy concerns in favour of the fulfilment of social 
needs. I proposed that several factors, identified by other researchers, predisposed respondents to curb 
their privacy concerns on Facebook in favour of the fulfilment of their social needs: information asymmetry;
“bounded rationality” together with “systematic psychological deviations from rationality” (Acquisti & 
Grossklags, 2005, p. 26); Facebook’s biased user interface, designed to promote ‘sharing’ and inhibit privacy
protection; Facebook addiction; and reliance upon Facebook in everyday life. 
A unique aspect of this study is that it was undertaken in an Australian context. There is little research 
focussed on Australian Facebook users in regard to social needs versus privacy concerns on Facebook. The 
results of the study, however, were largely consistent with studies from other countries. Also unique, in 
some respects, is the model upon which the research was based. User-user and user-corporate privacy 
concerns were juxtaposed against the social needs of self-portrayal (Friedlander, 2011) and belonging as 
motivators of Facebook use. Self-portrayal was explored in the contexts of both strategic self-presentation 
and expression of the true self, and belonging was explored in the contexts of both intimacy and affiliation. 
The results confirmed that respondents differentiated between user-user and user-corporate concerns on 
Facebook, although respondents further differentiated these concerns into security versus privacy concerns.
The results also confirmed that respondents used Facebook for expression of the true self, intimacy, and 
affiliation, but instead of using Facebook for strategic self-presentation, respondents presented themselves 
strategically yet authentically on the site. Of the demographic factors tested (gender, age, completed 
education, and Australian cultural influence), gender was most strongly associated with respondents’ 
privacy concerns on Facebook and age was most strongly associated with their reasons for using Facebook.
This research underscores the need for a resolution to privacy concerns on Facebook. However, in reality, a 
complete resolution to such concerns is unlikely to occur. It has been suggested that Facebook should 
implement more user-friendly privacy settings, and make more transparent “the flows of information” (Hull 
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et al., 2011, p. 289) in a user-user context. Legal measures have also been suggested, along with greater 
user responsibility, and use of open-source SNS in preference to Facebook. The last approach, along with 
closure of one’s Facebook account, would, of course, resolve Facebook-related privacy concerns most 
effectively, but even this would not do so entirely, because one’s information can be ‘shared’ by others on 
Facebook without his or her knowledge or consent.
In terms of both user-corporate and user-user privacy issues, Facebook’s privacy paradox is representative 
of other social media, and in terms of user-corporate privacy issues, it is representative of the internet as a 
whole, particularly now that the internet has branched out from our computer screens and smartphones 
into all aspects of our lives in the form of the Internet of Things. Therefore, the issue of internet users’ 
needs versus their privacy concerns is bigger than Facebook, and a combination of research, governmental, 
watchdog, developer, and user efforts is needed to guide the future development of commercially based 
online activity.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Respondents without an active Facebook account
A.1.1 Demographic profile
Of the 404 valid survey responses, 5 respondents (1.24%) used to have a Facebook account but had deleted 
it, 4 respondents (.99%) had a Facebook account but had deactivated it, and another 4 respondents (.99%) 
had never had a Facebook account, making a total of 13 respondents without an active Facebook account. 
The demographic profile of these 13 respondents is shown in Table A1.
Table A1. Demographic profile (respondents without an active Facebook account)
Gender Frequency Percent
Male 7 53.84
Female 5 38.46
Another identity 1 7.69
Total 13 100.00
Age Frequency Percent
25-34 years old 4 30.76
35-44 years old 4 30.76
18-24 years old 2 15.38
55-64 years old 2 15.38
45-54 years old 1 7.69
65 years old or older - -
Total 13 100.00
Time lived in Australia Frequency Percent
More than 15 years 11 84.62
Less than a year 1 7.69
6-15 years 1 7.69
Total 13 100.00
COB, P#1 COB, P#2 COB, time lived in Australia Frequency Percent
Aus, Aus, Aus, 15+yrs 5 38.46
UK, UK, UK, 15+yrs a 2 15.38
COB, P#1 COB, P#2 COB, time lived Aus b 6 46.16
Total 13 100.00
Completed education * Frequency Percent
Postgraduate 7 53.85
Undergraduate or Honours 3 23.08
Year 12 2 15.38
Post-secondary 1 7.69
Total 13 100.00
*      The ‘highest’ level of formal education completed
a. ‘UK’ is comprised of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
b. There were 6 unique combinations of COB, P#1 COB, P#2 COB and time lived in Australia
A.1.2 Reasons for not having an active account
Respondents who had deleted or deactivated their account, or who had never had an account, could select 
their reasons for not having an active account from the following options: Too busy to spend time on 
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Facebook, Privacy concerns, No longer interested /Never been interested, and Other (please specify). For 
each group of respondents, all options were selected at least once, with Privacy concerns being selected by 
3 of the 5 respondents who had deleted their account, 2 of the 4 respondents who had deactivated their 
account, and 3 of the 4 respondents who had never had an account (Table A2). One of the four respondents
who had deactivated his or her account wrote that he or she did so because “[I d]ecided I was spending too 
much time caught up in others’ lives”. A similar comment was made by one of the five respondents who had
deleted his or her account: “Overwhelmed by others seemingly endless pleasurable activities and friends 
and ridiculous comments and time wasting”. However, one of the four respondents who had never had a 
Facebook account wrote that he or she did so because “I don’t want people from my past to find me” – a 
different motive entirely. 
Table A2. Reasons for deactivation or deletion of one’s account, or never having had an account
Why have you deleted your Facebook account?                   (5 respondents) True
Too busy to spend time on Facebook 2
Privacy concerns 3
No longer interested 3
Other (please specify) 1
Why have you deactivated your Facebook account?           (4 respondents) True
Too busy to spend time on Facebook 2
Privacy concerns 2
No longer interested 3
Other (please specify) 1
Why have you never had a Facebook account?                     (4 respondents) True
Too busy to spend time on Facebook 2
Privacy concerns 3
Never been interested 1
Other (please specify) 1
Note. Respondents could select multiple options.
A.1.3 Privacy concerns
Respondents who had deleted or deactivated their account, or who had never had an account, were asked 
to rate their privacy concerns on Facebook. Twelve Facebook-related privacy concerns were listed, and 
respondents used a 4 point Likert scale with levels of concern ranging from 1 – Very much to 4 – Not at all 
(the lower the mean, the greater the level of concern). The greatest Facebook-related privacy concerns for 
respondents who had deleted or deactivated their account, or who had never had an account, were 
Facebook knowing too much about me (M = 1.23, SD = .44) and Businesses linked to Facebook finding out 
too much about me (M = 1.54, SD = .66), whereas Bullying or harassment (M = 2.85, SD = 1.14) was of least 
concern (Table A3).
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Table A3. Privacy concerns – Means (respondents without an active Facebook account)
Privacy concerns * N Mean Std.Devn.
Facebook knowing too much about me 13 1.23 .44
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me 13 1.54 .66
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos 13 1.62 .77
Other people posting sensitive information about me 13 1.69 .86
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook 13 1.69 .86
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me 13 1.85 .90
Fraud 13 2.30 1.18
Identity theft 13 2.38 1.12
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook 13 2.46 1.27
Stalking 13 2.54 1.05
Someone impersonating me 13 2.54 1.05
Bullying or harassment 13 2.85 1.14
* Respondents were asked:
• When you had a Facebook account, how much, if at all, did the following possibilities concern you? (Deleted accounts)
• On Facebook, how much, if at all, do the following possibilities concern you? (Deactivated accounts)
• If you were to open a Facebook account, how much, if at all, would the following possibilities concern you? (Never had an account)
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APPENDIX B
Table B1. Gender and reasons for using Facebook – Mann-Whitney Ranks
Reasons for using Facebook Gender N* MW Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
To keep in touch with friends Male 77 216.59 16677.50
Female 312 189.67 59177.50
Total 389
To keep in touch with family Male 77 234.37 18046.50
Female 312 185.28 57808.50
Total 389
To keep in touch with people from my past Male 77 196.85 15157.50
Female 312 194.54 60697.50
Total 389
To make new friends Male 77 170.63 13138.50
Female 312 201.01 62716.50
Total 389
To meet new romantic or sexual partners Male 77 180.03 13862.00
Female 312 198.70 61993.00
Total 389
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners Male 77 168.06 12940.50
Female 312 201.65 62914.50
Total 389
To be there for others
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
Male 77 234.64 18067.00
Female 312 185.22 57788.00
Total 389
To ask for advice or help Male 77 199.39 15353.00
Female 312 193.92 60502.00
Total 389
To feel less lonely Male 77 206.43 15895.00
Female 312 192.18 59960.00
Total 389
To enhance my image Male 77 179.01 13784.00
Female 312 198.95 62071.00
Total 389
To project my best self Male 77 193.64 14910.50
Female 312 195.33 60944.50
Total 389
To express who I am Male 77 194.14 14949.00
Female 312 195.21 60906.00
Total 389
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline Male 77 189.68 14605.50
Female 312 196.31 61249.50
Total 389
To share my news Male 77 225.58 17369.50
Female 312 187.45 58485.50
Total 389
To share my thoughts and feelings Male 77 210.73 16226.50
Female 312 191.12 59628.50
Total 389
To find like-minded people Male 77 177.35 13656.00
Female 312 199.36 62199.00
Total 389
To find people who share similar interests Male 77 177.38 13658.50
Female 312 199.35 62196.50
Total 389
To work with others who have similar goals Male 77 191.55 14749.50
Female 312 195.85 61105.50
Total 389
To find out about people I am curious about Male 77 190.90 14699.00
Female 312 196.01 61156.00
Total 389
To keep an eye on someone Male 77 194.27 14958.50
Female 312 195.18 60896.50
Total 389
To expand my network Male 77 184.49 14206.00
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Reasons for using Facebook Gender N* MW Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Female 312 197.59 61649.00
Total 389
To have fun Male 77 203.17 15644.00
Female 312 192.98 60211.00
Total 389
To put off doing my work Male 77 220.69 16993.00
Female 312 188.66 58862.00
Total 389
Because I’m bored Male 77 203.41 15662.50
Female 312 192.92 60192.50
Total 389
* My gender ‘Another identity’ (N = 2) excluded
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Table B2. Age and reasons for using Facebook – Kendall’s Tau-b
Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s Tau-b Age group
To keep in touch with friends Correlation Coefficient .266
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To keep in touch with family Correlation Coefficient .048
Sig. (2-tailed) .265
N 391
To keep in touch with people from my past Correlation Coefficient .106
Sig. (2-tailed) .014
N 391
To make new friends Correlation Coefficient .154
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 391
To meet new romantic or sexual partners Correlation Coefficient .134
Sig. (2-tailed) .004
N 391
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners Correlation Coefficient .266
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest) Correlation Coefficient .096
Sig. (2-tailed) .027
N 391
To ask for advice or help Correlation Coefficient .125
Sig. (2-tailed) .005
N 391
To feel less lonely Correlation Coefficient .142
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 391
To enhance my image Correlation Coefficient .180
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To project my best self Correlation Coefficient .168
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To express who I am Correlation Coefficient .200
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline Correlation Coefficient .164
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To share my news Correlation Coefficient .057
Sig. (2-tailed) .189
N 391
To share my thoughts and feelings Correlation Coefficient .134
Sig. (2-tailed) .002
N 391
To find like-minded people Correlation Coefficient .139
Sig. (2-tailed) .002
N 391
To find people who share similar interests Correlation Coefficient .121
Sig. (2-tailed) .007
N 391
To work with others who have similar goals Correlation Coefficient .083
Sig. (2-tailed) .064
N 391
To find out about people I am curious about Correlation Coefficient .210
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To keep an eye on someone Correlation Coefficient .253
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To expand my network Correlation Coefficient .137
Sig. (2-tailed) .002
N 391
To have fun Correlation Coefficient .190
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
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Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s Tau-b Age group
N 391
To put off doing my work Correlation Coefficient .274
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
Because I’m bored Correlation Coefficient .385
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
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Table B3. Length of time lived in Australia and reasons for using Facebook – Kendall’s Tau-b
Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s Tau-b Time lived in Australia
To keep in touch with friends Correlation Coefficient .050
Sig. (2-tailed) .287
N 391
To keep in touch with family Correlation Coefficient .067
Sig. (2-tailed) .136
N 391
To keep in touch with people from my past Correlation Coefficient .124
Sig. (2-tailed) .006
N 391
To make new friends Correlation Coefficient .144
Sig. (2-tailed) .002
N 391
To meet new romantic or sexual partners Correlation Coefficient .007
Sig. (2-tailed) .877
N 391
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners Correlation Coefficient .033
Sig. (2-tailed) .481
N 391
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest) Correlation Coefficient -.023
Sig. (2-tailed) .612
N 391
To ask for advice or help Correlation Coefficient .066
Sig. (2-tailed) .152
N 391
To feel less lonely Correlation Coefficient .008
Sig. (2-tailed) .861
N 391
To enhance my image Correlation Coefficient .035
Sig. (2-tailed) .462
N 391
To project my best self Correlation Coefficient .066
Sig. (2-tailed) .156
N 391
To express who I am Correlation Coefficient .015
Sig. (2-tailed) .743
N 391
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline Correlation Coefficient .057
Sig. (2-tailed) .221
N 391
To share my news Correlation Coefficient .006
Sig. (2-tailed) .893
N 391
To share my thoughts and feelings Correlation Coefficient .043
Sig. (2-tailed) .347
N 391
To find like-minded people Correlation Coefficient .048
Sig. (2-tailed) .298
N 391
To find people who share similar interests Correlation Coefficient .034
Sig. (2-tailed) .468
N 391
To work with others who have similar goals Correlation Coefficient .003
Sig. (2-tailed) .954
N 391
To find out about people I am curious about Correlation Coefficient .035
Sig. (2-tailed) .442
N 391
To keep an eye on someone Correlation Coefficient -.043
Sig. (2-tailed) .354
N 391
To expand my network Correlation Coefficient .047
Sig. (2-tailed) .315
N 391
To have fun Correlation Coefficient .028
Sig. (2-tailed) .525
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Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s Tau-b Time lived in Australia
N 391
To put off doing my work Correlation Coefficient -.083
Sig. (2-tailed) .063
N 391
Because I’m bored Correlation Coefficient -.042
Sig. (2-tailed) .347
N 391
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Table B4. Respondents’ COB and reasons for using Facebook – Mann-Whitney Ranks
Reasons for using Facebook Respondents’COB N MW Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
To keep in touch with friends Australia 244 196.15 47860.50
not Australia 147 195.75 28775.50
Total 391
To keep in touch with family Australia 244 203.60 49677.50
not Australia 147 183.39 26958.50
Total 391
To keep in touch with people from my past Australia 244 206.45 50375.00
not Australia 147 178.65 26261.00
Total 391
To make new friends Australia 244 206.75 50446.50
not Australia 147 178.16 26189.50
Total 391
To meet new romantic or sexual partners Australia 244 197.75 48250.00
not Australia 147 193.10 28386.00
Total 391
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners Australia 244 193.95 47325.00
not Australia 147 199.39 29311.00
Total 391
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
Australia 244 195.90 47798.50
not Australia 147 196.17 28837.50
Total 391
To ask for advice or help Australia 244 198.01 48315.00
not Australia 147 192.66 28321.00
Total 391
To feel less lonely Australia 244 198.54 48443.50
not Australia 147 191.79 28192.50
Total 391
To enhance my image Australia 244 194.98 47574.50
not Australia 147 197.70 29061.50
Total 391
To project my best self Australia 244 198.05 48325.00
not Australia 147 192.59 28311.00
Total 391
To express who I am Australia 244 194.90 47555.00
not Australia 147 197.83 29081.00
Total 391
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline Australia 244 195.68 47746.50
not Australia 147 196.53 28889.50
Total 391
To share my news Australia 244 193.58 47232.50
not Australia 147 200.02 29403.50
Total 391
To share my thoughts and feelings Australia 244 195.87 47792.00
not Australia 147 196.22 28844.00
Total 391
To find like-minded people Australia 244 197.99 48308.50
not Australia 147 192.70 28327.50
Total 391
To find people who share similar interests Australia 244 197.18 48111.00
not Australia 147 194.05 28525.00
Total 391
To work with others who have similar goals Australia 244 198.55 48446.00
not Australia 147 191.77 28190.00
Total 391
To find out about people I am curious about Australia 244 192.10 46871.50
not Australia 147 202.48 29764.50
Total 391
To keep an eye on someone Australia 244 187.03 45636.00
not Australia 147 210.88 31000.00
Total 391
To expand my network Australia 244 198.94 48540.50
not Australia 147 191.13 28095.50
Total 391
To have fun Australia 244 192.61 46998.00
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Reasons for using Facebook Respondents’COB N MW Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
not Australia 147 201.62 29638.00
Total 391
To put off doing my work Australia 244 181.53 44294.00
not Australia 147 220.01 32342.00
Total 391
Because I’m bored Australia 244 185.64 45296.50
not Australia 147 213.19 31339.50
Total 391
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Table B5. Parents’ COB and reasons for using Facebook – Kendall’s Tau-b
Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s tau-b Parents’ COB
To keep in touch with friends Correlation Coefficient -.018
Sig. (2-tailed) .705
N 391
To keep in touch with family Correlation Coefficient .072
Sig. (2-tailed) .106
N 391
To keep in touch with people from my past Correlation Coefficient .086
Sig. (2-tailed) .055
N 391
To make new friends Correlation Coefficient .069
Sig. (2-tailed) .136
N 391
To meet new romantic or sexual partners Correlation Coefficient -.047
Sig. (2-tailed) .330
N 391
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners Correlation Coefficient -.041
Sig. (2-tailed) .374
N 391
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest) Correlation Coefficient -.036
Sig. (2-tailed) .424
N 391
To ask for advice or help Correlation Coefficient -.026
Sig. (2-tailed) .568
N 391
To feel less lonely Correlation Coefficient -.029
Sig. (2-tailed) .531
N 391
To enhance my image Correlation Coefficient -.044
Sig. (2-tailed) .346
N 391
To project my best self Correlation Coefficient -.003
Sig. (2-tailed) .946
N 391
To express who I am Correlation Coefficient -.056
Sig. (2-tailed) .213
N 391
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline Correlation Coefficient -.054
Sig. (2-tailed) .242
N 391
To share my news Correlation Coefficient -.047
Sig. (2-tailed) .292
N 391
To share my thoughts and feelings Correlation Coefficient -.017
Sig. (2-tailed) .701
N 391
To find like-minded people Correlation Coefficient -.060
Sig. (2-tailed) .193
N 391
To find people who share similar interests Correlation Coefficient -.056
Sig. (2-tailed) .224
N 391
To work with others who have similar goals Correlation Coefficient -.049
Sig. (2-tailed) .285
N 391
To find out about people I am curious about Correlation Coefficient -.068
Sig. (2-tailed) .132
N 391
To keep an eye on someone Correlation Coefficient -.120
Sig. (2-tailed) .008
N 391
To expand my network Correlation Coefficient -.006
Sig. (2-tailed) .900
N 391
To have fun Correlation Coefficient -.079
Sig. (2-tailed) .074
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Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s tau-b Parents’ COB
N 391
To put off doing my work Correlation Coefficient -.174
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
Because I’m bored Correlation Coefficient -.143
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 391
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Table B6. Completed education and reasons for using Facebook – Kendall’s Tau-b
Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s Tau-b Completed education
To keep in touch with friends Correlation Coefficient .185
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To keep in touch with family Correlation Coefficient .064
Sig. (2-tailed) .138
N 391
To keep in touch with people from my past Correlation Coefficient .056
Sig. (2-tailed) .191
N 391
To make new friends Correlation Coefficient .205
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To meet new romantic or sexual partners Correlation Coefficient .174
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To find out more about potential or new friends or partners Correlation Coefficient .187
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest) Correlation Coefficient .117
Sig. (2-tailed) .006
N 391
To ask for advice or help Correlation Coefficient .185
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To feel less lonely Correlation Coefficient .167
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To enhance my image Correlation Coefficient .056
Sig. (2-tailed) .213
N 391
To project my best self Correlation Coefficient .036
Sig. (2-tailed) .411
N 391
To express who I am Correlation Coefficient .130
Sig. (2-tailed) .003
N 391
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline Correlation Coefficient .094
Sig. (2-tailed) .033
N 391
To share my news Correlation Coefficient .075
Sig. (2-tailed) .079
N 391
To share my thoughts and feelings Correlation Coefficient .098
Sig. (2-tailed) .024
N 391
To find like-minded people Correlation Coefficient .187
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To find people who share similar interests Correlation Coefficient .178
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To work with others who have similar goals Correlation Coefficient .164
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To find out about people I am curious about Correlation Coefficient .152
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To keep an eye on someone Correlation Coefficient .185
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
To expand my network Correlation Coefficient .121
Sig. (2-tailed) .006
N 391
To have fun Correlation Coefficient .197
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
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Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s Tau-b Completed education
N 391
To put off doing my work Correlation Coefficient .142
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 391
Because I’m bored Correlation Coefficient .230
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 391
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Table B7. Completed education, age, and reasons for using Facebook – Crosstabs
Completed education / Age group Value AsymptoticStandard Error a Approximate T 
b Approximate
Significance
Completed education / Age – To keep in touch with friends
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .110 .070 1.562 .118
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .098 .081 1.204 .229
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.010 .130 -.073 .942
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .126 .125 1.008 .313
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .271 .283 .938 .348
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .185 .043 4.229 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To keep in touch with family
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .032 .071 .447 .655
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .066 .080 .823 .410
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .079 .125 .629 .529
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.012 .127 -.096 .924
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .193 .294 .652 .515
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .064 .043 1.471 .141
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To keep in touch with people from my past
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .031 .070 .441 .659
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.017 .077 -.224 .823
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.038 .120 -.313 .754
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .064 .131 .491 .623
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.345 .324 -1.019 .308
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .056 .041 1.363 .173
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To make new friends
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .076 .068 1.116 .264
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .118 .076 1.545 .122
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .496 .084 4.899 .000
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .259 .125 1.982 .047
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .094 .310 .299 .765
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .205 .040 5.005 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To meet new romantic or sexual partners
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .128 .060 2.012 .044
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .188 .076 2.183 .029
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .048 .138 .345 .730
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .c
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .c
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .174 .039 3.875 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To find out more about potential or new friends or partners
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .091 .068 1.337 .181
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Completed education / Age group Value AsymptoticStandard Error a Approximate T 
b Approximate
Significance
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .037 .075 .500 .617
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .225 .121 1.797 .072
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .056 .155 .362 .718
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .000 .274 .000 1.000
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .187 .041 4.492 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To be there for others (i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .099 .068 1.450 .147
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .082 .075 1.080 .280
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.084 .135 -.618 .537
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .176 .145 1.200 .230
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .206 .240 .831 .406
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .117 .042 2.766 .006
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To ask for advice or help
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .152 .069 2.213 .027
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .202 .073 2.729 .006
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.009 .133 -.067 .947
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .300 .124 2.403 .016
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .094 .310 .299 .765
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .185 .041 4.490 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To feel less lonely
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .100 .070 1.422 .155
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .151 .079 1.886 .059
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .268 .119 2.144 .032
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.022 .137 -.158 .874
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .221 .310 .663 .508
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .167 .042 3.892 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To enhance my image
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .037 .069 .543 .587
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.045 .077 -.589 .556
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.019 .136 -.139 .889
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.268 .121 -1.939 .052
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.204 .110 -1.044 .296
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .056 .043 1.282 .200
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To project my best self
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.024 .070 -.346 .729
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .023 .077 .293 .769
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.176 .139 -1.244 .214
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Completed education / Age group Value AsymptoticStandard Error a Approximate T 
b Approximate
Significance
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.174 .133 -1.269 .204
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.204 .110 -1.044 .296
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .036 .043 .849 .396
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To express who I am
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .086 .075 1.142 .253
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .045 .077 .583 .560
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.031 .136 -.230 .818
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .046 .139 .333 .739
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.541 .134 -2.928 .003
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .130 .041 3.150 .002
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To express myself in ways that I can’t offline
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .105 .070 1.509 .131
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .088 .081 1.077 .281
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.181 .131 -1.357 .175
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.232 .131 -1.531 .126
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.302 .121 -1.549 .121
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .094 .043 2.166 .030
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To share my news
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .013 .066 .205 .837
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .065 .076 .850 .395
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .073 .134 .540 .589
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .069 .144 .478 .632
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .394 .223 1.611 .107
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .075 .042 1.786 .074
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To share my thoughts and feelings
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .064 .062 1.032 .302
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .023 .080 .290 .772
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .098 .123 .798 .425
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .095 .124 .767 .443
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .102 .280 .361 .718
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .098 .041 2.381 .017
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To find like-minded people
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .134 .064 2.077 .038
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .152 .076 1.977 .048
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .338 .103 2.962 .003
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .032 .151 .214 .830
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.028 .293 -.096 .923
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Completed education / Age group Value AsymptoticStandard Error a Approximate T 
b Approximate
Significance
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .187 .040 4.550 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To find people who share similar interests
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .151 .066 2.278 .023
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .118 .075 1.553 .121
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .379 .099 3.490 .000
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.028 .147 -.192 .848
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .033 .294 .111 .912
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .178 .041 4.310 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To work with others who have similar goals
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .144 .067 2.130 .033
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .099 .079 1.241 .215
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .282 .114 2.362 .018
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .182 .147 1.232 .218
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .033 .294 .111 .912
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .164 .043 3.818 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To find out about people I am curious about
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .080 .071 1.121 .262
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .061 .077 .791 .429
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .104 .125 .831 .406
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .162 .141 1.141 .254
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.377 .122 -2.000 .046
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .152 .043 3.538 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To keep an eye on someone
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .024 .067 .354 .723
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .110 .079 1.388 .165
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.014 .136 -.104 .918
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .314 .149 1.952 .051
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .459 .209 1.134 .257
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .185 .041 4.463 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To expand my network
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .069 .069 1.006 .314
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.018 .077 -.232 .817
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .383 .104 3.378 .001
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .006 .149 .038 .970
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .c
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .121 .042 2.876 .004
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To have fun
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Completed education / Age group Value AsymptoticStandard Error a Approximate T 
b Approximate
Significance
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .149 .066 2.256 .024
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .059 .072 .818 .413
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .158 .124 1.284 .199
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .324 .127 2.536 .011
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .314 .239 1.241 .214
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .197 .041 4.792 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – To put off doing my work
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.081 .063 -1.280 .201
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .200 .080 2.497 .013
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .119 .131 .914 .361
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b -.103 .140 -.730 .465
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .541 .208 2.201 .028
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .142 .042 3.348 .001
N of Valid Cases 391
Completed education / Age – Because I’m bored
18-24 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .025 .068 .374 .708
N of Valid Cases 163
25-34 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .130 .079 1.639 .101
N of Valid Cases 125
35-44 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .211 .109 1.915 .056
N of Valid Cases 47
45-54 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .143 .143 1.002 .316
N of Valid Cases 44
55-64 years old Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .568 .205 2.251 .024
N of Valid Cases 12
Total Ordinal by Ordinal – Kendall’s tau-b .230 .041 5.556 .000
N of Valid Cases 391
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. No statistics are computed because R5 (To meet new romantic or sexual partners) is a constant.
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Table B8. Privacy perceptions (Q1) and privacy concerns – Kruskal-Wallis Mean Ranks
Privacy concerns
Q1.1 Q1.2 Q1.3 Q1.4 Q1.5
N
KW
Mean
Rank
N
KW
Mean
Rank
N
KW
Mean
Rank
N
KW
Mean
Rank
N
KW
Mean
Rank
Bullying or harassment True 240 191.838 277 192.809 261 191.211 307 195.897 287 192.073
False 112 201.549 38 180.105 86 198.715 43 186.733 19 187.395
Don’t know 39 205.679 76 215.579 44 219.102 41 206.488 85 211.182
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Other people posting sensitive information 
about me
True 240 193.5 277 187.305 261 193.674 307 192.818 287 190.505
False 112 194.308 38 205.803 86 192.413 43 197.349 19 201.342
Don’t know 39 216.244 76 222.789 44 216.807 41 218.415 85 213.359
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Other people posting sensitive photos or 
videos of me
True 240 193.79 277 187.778 261 192.123 307 193.754 287 191.765
False 112 192.982 38 218.934 86 190.93 43 200.558 19 213.789
Don’t know 39 218.269 76 214.5 44 228.909 41 208.037 85 206.324
Total 391 391 391 391 391
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos 
or videos
True 240 194.742 277 195.088 261 192.822 307 192.715 287 190.909
False 112 195.893 38 201.053 86 198.587 43 199.547 19 215.868
Don’t know 39 204.051 76 196.796 44 209.795 41 216.878 85 208.747
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Stalking True 240 187.444 277 195.574 261 190.82 307 192.783 287 192.573
False 112 208.196 38 213.382 86 195.703 43 197.291 19 203.184
Don’t know 39 213.628 76 188.862 44 227.307 41 218.732 85 205.965
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Identity theft True 240 190.879 277 191.495 261 194.13 307 190.249 287 191.99
False 112 200.357 38 206.395 86 195.843 43 206.651 19 206.474
Don’t know 39 215 76 207.224 44 207.398 41 227.89 85 207.2
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Fraud True 240 191.302 277 191.478 261 192.205 307 189.907 287 192.172
False 112 198.438 38 209.803 86 197.337 43 213.291 19 215.053
Don’t know 39 217.91 76 205.579 44 215.898 41 223.488 85 204.665
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Someone impersonating me True 240 187.206 277 194.029 261 188.918 307 191.668 287 193.918
False 112 205.455 38 197.342 86 206.453 43 205.907 19 196.263
Don’t know 39 222.962 76 202.513 44 217.58 41 218.049 85 202.971
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Facebook knowing too much about me True 240 199.863 277 190.056 261 194.331 307 190.676 287 188.256
False 112 180.134 38 206.105 86 188.645 43 232.988 19 219.737
Don’t know 39 217.795 76 212.612 44 220.273 41 197.073 85 216.841
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out 
too much about me
True 240 199.51 277 190.747 261 195.335 307 190.959 287 188.566
False 112 180.531 38 196.079 86 187.494 43 213.709 19 231.184
Don’t know 39 218.821 76 215.105 44 216.568 41 215.171 85 213.235
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses
 linked to Facebook
True 240 189.071 277 188.964 261 194.6 307 191.533 287 186.045
False 112 199.763 38 198.132 86 188.11 43 225.674 19 242.237
Don’t know 39 227.833 76 220.579 44 219.727 41 198.329 85 219.276
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Viruses, spyware or other malware from 
businesses linked to Facebook
True 240 195.267 277 188.383 261 196.699 307 192.914 287 184.7
False 112 188.402 38 216.526 86 185.262 43 222.767 19 261.632
Don’t know 39 222.333 76 213.5 44 212.841 41 191.037 85 219.482
Total 391 391 391 391 391
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Table B9. Privacy perceptions (Q2) and privacy concerns – Kruskal-Wallis Mean Ranks
Privacy concerns
Q2.1 Q2.2 Q2.3 Q2.4 Q2.5
N
KW
Mean
Rank
N
KW
Mean
Rank
N
KW
Mean
Rank
N
KW
Mean
Rank
N
KW
Mean
Rank
Bullying or harassment True 354 194.828 43 175.57 348 192.247 337 192.285 370 193.918
False 22 212.591 152 194.859 4 320 37 212.946 18 234
Don’t know 15 199.333 196 201.367 39 216.769 17 232.765 3 224.833
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Other people posting sensitive information 
about me
True 354 195.716 43 200.337 348 192.665 337 189.855 370 194.526
False 22 199.386 152 200.793 4 261.375 37 225.108 18 216.167
Don’t know 15 197.733 196 191.332 39 219.051 17 254.471 3 256.833
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Other people posting sensitive photos or 
videos of me
True 354 196.117 43 189.872 348 191.74 337 190.766 370 194.995
False 22 201.909 152 199.595 4 326.75 37 221.946 18 212.389
Don’t know 15 184.567 196 194.556 39 220.603 17 243.294 3 221.667
Total 391 391 391 391 391
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos 
or videos
True 354 192.944 43 206.186 348 193.803 337 189.807 370 195.155
False 22 222.386 152 192.365 4 334.125 37 222.716 18 203.222
Don’t know 15 229.433 196 196.584 39 201.436 17 260.618 3 256.833
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Stalking True 354 194.936 43 161.674 348 194.257 337 195.108 370 194.93
False 22 220.273 152 188.553 4 334 37 182.014 18 201.306
Don’t know 15 185.5 196 209.306 39 197.397 17 244.118 3 296.167
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Identity theft True 354 195.583 43 186.733 348 193.083 337 195.295 370 195.212
False 22 194.682 152 196.941 4 341.5 37 184.432 18 198.667
Don’t know 15 207.767 196 197.304 39 207.103 17 235.147 3 277.167
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Fraud True 354 196.021 43 184.128 348 193.055 337 194.935 370 196.095
False 22 183.477 152 191.839 4 337 37 190.649 18 186.833
Don’t know 15 213.867 196 201.832 39 207.821 17 228.765 3 239.333
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Someone impersonating me True 354 196.545 43 179.035 348 192.629 337 196.509 370 195.624
False 22 186.295 152 188.826 4 328.5 37 193.743 18 198.694
Don’t know 15 197.367 196 205.286 39 212.487 17 190.824 3 226.167
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Facebook knowing too much about me True 354 193.835 43 205.453 348 190.77 337 193.852 370 193.993
False 22 220.659 152 201.941 4 275.25 37 203.135 18 210.083
Don’t know 15 210.933 196 189.319 39 234.538 17 223.059 3 359
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out 
too much about me
True 354 193.958 43 199.5 348 191.33 337 194.337 370 193.582
False 22 201.341 152 203.783 4 343.125 37 197.649 18 226.972
Don’t know 15 236.367 196 189.196 39 222.577 17 225.382 3 308.333
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses 
linked to Facebook
True 354 196.335 43 198.616 348 191.645 337 191.674 370 194.043
False 22 180.318 152 200.97 4 322.75 37 197.365 18 217.25
Don’t know 15 211.1 196 191.571 39 221.859 17 278.794 3 309.833
Total 391 391 391 391 391
Viruses, spyware or other malware from 
businesses linked to Facebook
True 354 196.558 43 206.767 348 192.829 337 192.378 370 193.314
False 22 189.636 152 198.599 4 344 37 200.919 18 233.056
Don’t know 15 192.167 196 191.622 39 209.115 17 257.088 3 305
Total 391 391 391 391 391
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Table B10. Information provided on respondents’ profile – Key pieces
Do you provide the following information on your Facebook profile? (key pieces)
Your high school Frequency Percent
Yes 289 73.91
No 102 26.09
Total 391 100.00
Your post-secondary education Frequency Percent
Yes 302 77.24
No 89 22.76
Total 391 100.00
Your job(s) Frequency Percent
Yes 214 54.73
No 177 45.27
Total 391 100.00
Your hometown Frequency Percent
Yes 276 70.59
No 115 29.41
Total 391 100.00
Your current city Frequency Percent
Yes 290 74.17
No 101 25.83
Total 391 100.00
Your relationship status Frequency Percent
Yes 243 62.15
No 148 37.85
Total 391 100.00
Whether you are ‘interested in’ women or men Frequency Percent
Yes 152 38.87
No 239 61.13
Total 391 100.00
A list of family members/relatives Frequency Percent
Yes 209 53.45
No 182 46.55
Total 391 100.00
Something ‘About You’ Frequency Percent
Yes 147 37.60
No 244 62.40
Total 391 100.00
Your favourite quote(s) Frequency Percent
Yes 132 33.76
No 259 66.24
Total 391 100.00
Your religious views Frequency Percent
Yes 108 27.62
No 283 72.38
Total 391 100.00
Your political views Frequency Percent
Yes 74 18.93
No 317 81.07
Total 391 100.00
Your phone number(s) Frequency Percent
Yes 59 15.09
No 332 84.91
Total 391 100.00
Your address Frequency Percent
Yes 12 3.07
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Do you provide the following information on your Facebook profile? (key pieces)
No 379 96.93
Total 391 100.00
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Table B11. Visibility of information on respondents’ profile – Key pieces
Who can see this information on your profile? (key pieces)
Your high school Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 59 15.09 20.42 20.42
Friends 194 49.62 67.13 87.54
Only me 4 1.02 1.38 88.93
Custom 10 2.56 3.46 92.39
Don’t know 22 5.63 7.61 100.00
102 26.09 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your post-secondary education Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 63 16.11 20.86 20.86
Friends 208 53.20 68.87 89.74
Only me 1 .26 .33 90.07
Custom 9 2.30 2.98 93.05
Don’t know 21 5.37 6.95 100.00
89 22.76 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your job(s) Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 42 10.74 19.63 19.63
Friends 143 36.57 66.82 86.45
Only me 5 1.28 2.34 88.79
Custom 6 1.53 2.80 91.59
Don’t know 18 4.60 8.41 100.00
177 45.27 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your hometown Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 55 14.07 19.93 19.93
Friends 184 47.06 66.67 86.59
Only me 2 .51 .72 87.32
Custom 8 2.05 2.90 90.22
Don’t know 27 6.91 9.78 100.00
115 29.41 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your current city Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 71 18.16 24.48 24.48
Friends 187 47.83 64.48 88.97
Only me 1 .26 .34 89.31
Custom 8 2.05 2.76 92.07
Don’t know 23 5.88 7.93 100.00
101 25.83 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your relationship status Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 46 11.76 18.93 18.93
Friends 162 41.43 66.67 85.60
Only me 7 1.79 2.88 88.48
Custom 9 2.30 3.70 92.18
Don’t know 19 4.86 7.82 100.00
148 37.85 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Whether you are ‘interested in’ women or men Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 29 7.42 19.08 19.08
Friends 106 27.11 69.74 88.82
Only me 4 1.02 2.63 91.45
Custom 2 .51 1.32 92.76
Don’t know 11 2.81 7.24 100.00
214
Who can see this information on your profile? (key pieces)
239 61.13 Missing
Total 391 100.00
A list of family members/relatives Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 20 5.12 9.57 9.57
Friends 159 40.66 76.08 85.65
Only me 4 1.02 1.91 87.56
Custom 9 2.30 4.31 91.87
Don’t know 17 4.35 8.13 100.00
182 46.55 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Something ‘About You’ Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 25 6.39 17.01 17.01
Friends 106 27.11 72.11 89.12
Only me 3 .77 2.04 91.16
Custom 4 1.02 2.72 93.88
Don’t know 9 2.30 6.12 100.00
244 62.40 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your favourite quote(s) Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 20 5.12 15.15 15.15
Friends 99 25.32 75.00 90.15
Only me 1 .26 .76 90.91
Custom 3 .77 2.27 93.18
Don’t know 9 2.30 6.82 100.00
259 66.24 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your religious views Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 17 4.35 15.74 15.74
Friends 81 20.72 75.00 90.74
Only me 2 .51 1.85 92.59
Custom 2 .51 1.85 94.44
Don’t know 6 1.53 5.56 100.00
283 72.38 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your political views Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 14 3.58 18.92 18.92
Friends 53 13.55 71.62 90.54
Only me 1 .26 1.35 91.89
Custom 1 .26 1.35 93.24
Don’t know 5 1.28 6.76 100.00
317 81.07 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your phone number(s) Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 5 1.28 8.47 8.47
Friends 33 8.44 55.93 64.41
Only me 14 3.58 23.73 88.14
Custom 3 .77 5.08 93.22
Don’t know 4 1.02 6.78 100.00
332 84.91 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Your address Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 1 .26 8.33 8.33
Friends 8 2.05 66.67 75.00
Only me 2 .51 16.67 91.67
Custom 1 .26 8.33 100.00
Don’t know - - - -
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Who can see this information on your profile? (key pieces)
379 96.93 Missing
Total 391 100.00
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Table B12. Information provided on respondents’ profile – Likes
Have you added the following information to your profile? (likes)
Movies watched, wanting to watch, or liked Frequency Percent
Yes 212 54.22
No 179 45.78
Total 391 100.00
TV shows, watched, wanting to watch, or liked Frequency Percent
Yes 209 53.45
No 182 46.55
Total 391 100.00
Music liked, or wanting to listen to Frequency Percent
Yes 224 57.29
No 167 42.71
Total 391 100.00
Books read, wanting to read, or liked Frequency Percent
Yes 197 50.38
No 194 49.62
Total 391 100.00
Sports teams or athletes liked Frequency Percent
Yes 150 38.36
No 241 61.64
Total 391 100.00
Likes Frequency Percent
Yes 295 75.45
No 96 24.55
Total 391 100.00
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Table B13. Visibility of information on respondents’ profile – Likes
Who can see this information on your profile? (likes)
Movies watched, wanting to watch, or liked Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 38 9.72 17.92 17.92
Friends 139 35.55 65.57 83.49
Only me 3 .77 1.42 84.91
Custom 6 1.53 2.83 87.74
Don’t know 26 6.65 12.26 100.00
179 45.78 Missing
Total 391 100.00
TV shows, watched, wanting to watch, or liked Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 40 10.23 19.14 19.14
Friends 136 34.78 65.07 84.21
Only me 3 .77 1.44 85.65
Custom 5 1.28 2.39 88.04
Don’t know 25 6.39 11.96 100.00
182 46.55 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Music liked, or wanting to listen to Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 42 10.74 18.75 18.75
Friends 146 37.34 65.18 83.93
Only me 3 .77 1.34 85.27
Custom 5 1.28 2.23 87.50
Don’t know 28 7.16 12.50 100.00
167 42.71 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Books read, wanting to read, or liked Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 39 9.97 19.80 19.80
Friends 123 31.46 62.44 82.23
Only me 6 1.53 3.05 85.28
Custom 4 1.02 2.03 87.31
Don’t know 25 6.39 12.69 100.00
194 49.62 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Sports teams or athletes liked Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 30 7.67 20.00 20.00
Friends 96 24.55 64.00 84.00
Only me 1 .26 .67 84.67
Custom 4 1.02 2.67 87.33
Don’t know 19 4.86 12.67 100.00
241 61.64 Missing
Total 391 100.00
Likes Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cum Percent
Public 52 13.30 17.63 17.63
Friends 194 49.62 65.76 83.39
Only me 3 .77 1.02 84.41
Custom 12 3.07 4.07 88.47
Don’t know 34 8.70 11.53 100.00
96 24.55 Missing
Total 391 100.00
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Table B14. Activities on Facebook and privacy concerns – Kendall’s Tau-b
Activities on Fb Kendall’s Tau-b PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 P10 PC11 PC12
Post a ‘status 
update’ or ‘life 
event’ with just 
words on your 
timeline
Correlation Coefficient .092 0.041 0.052 0.045 .103 0.024 0.013 0.046 -0.029 -0.044 -0.011 0.019
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.036 0.351 0.235 0.303 0.018 0.582 0.768 0.294 0.501 0.316 0.801 0.671
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post a photo on 
your timeline
Correlation Coefficient .136 0.050 0.078 0.048 .113 0.023 0.014 0.053 -0.031 -0.056 0.043 0.001
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.261 0.075 0.271 0.010 0.598 0.746 0.230 0.479 0.209 0.330 0.982
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Create a photo 
album
Correlation Coefficient 0.083 0.032 0.044 0.040 .113 0.045 0.069 .103 -0.049 -0.057 0.012 0.008
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.064 0.468 0.322 0.375 0.012 0.318 0.124 0.021 0.273 0.205 0.792 0.851
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post a video on 
your timeline
Correlation Coefficient 0.078 0.011 0.023 .119 .101 0.031 0.045 0.056 -0.055 0.016 0.075 0.071
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.087 0.816 0.608 0.008 0.025 0.489 0.322 0.216 0.224 0.724 0.100 0.118
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post on a friend’s
timeline
Correlation Coefficient .105 0.045 0.071 0.042 .114 0.038 0.037 0.030 0.059 0.065 0.056 0.065
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.018 0.310 0.108 0.344 0.010 0.383 0.401 0.493 0.182 0.140 0.202 0.139
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Comment on or 
reply to a 
friend’s post
Correlation Coefficient .136 .105 .146 .089 .098 0.070 0.065 0.078 0.061 0.025 0.034 0.015
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.016 0.001 0.042 0.025 0.107 0.137 0.073 0.162 0.571 0.436 0.731
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post on a group’s
page
Correlation Coefficient 0.083 -0.015 0.024 0.015 0.066 0.002 0.015 0.027 -0.062 -0.050 0.010 0.013
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.054 0.727 0.580 0.724 0.124 0.971 0.733 0.522 0.149 0.247 0.818 0.759
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Read group posts Correlation Coefficient .141 -0.008 0.029 0.025 0.064 0.026 0.027 0.050 -0.016 -0.045 -0.024 -0.039
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.845 0.495 0.567 0.135 0.537 0.522 0.241 0.709 0.292 0.573 0.363
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Tag people in 
something you 
post
Correlation Coefficient .136 .096 .135 .136 .177 .100 .118 .132 0.051 0.027 0.039 0.048
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.027 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.020 0.006 0.002 0.240 0.538 0.368 0.266
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Add a location to
something you 
post
Correlation Coefficient .134 0.043 0.055 0.051 .128 0.054 0.080 0.077 -0.035 -0.020 0.024 0.022
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.327 0.211 0.245 0.003 0.212 0.065 0.076 0.424 0.649 0.577 0.623
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Tag people in a 
photo or video 
you didn’t post
Correlation Coefficient .129 -0.018 0.009 0.054 .109 0.062 0.085 0.075 -0.034 0.031 0.062 0.018
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 0.682 0.840 0.218 0.014 0.158 0.055 0.088 0.437 0.483 0.162 0.690
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
‘Like’ a friend’s 
photo, video or 
post
Correlation Coefficient .112 0.070 .125 .087 .124 0.040 0.012 0.020 0.080 0.056 0.021 -0.006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.010 0.107 0.004 0.046 0.005 0.360 0.778 0.652 0.069 0.199 0.630 0.887
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Share a friend’s 
photo or video
Correlation Coefficient 0.082 0.040 0.071 .089 .109 0.051 0.054 0.061 0.019 0.063 .092 .092
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.061 0.363 0.102 0.040 0.012 0.238 0.215 0.159 0.657 0.147 0.035 0.036
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Search for 
someone you 
want to find out 
more about
Correlation Coefficient 0.075 0.039 0.041 0.031 .103 0.020 0.032 0.058 -0.012 0.015 -0.053 -0.051
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.083 0.359 0.340 0.464 0.017 0.642 0.462 0.180 0.781 0.722 0.219 0.234
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Write a note Correlation Coefficient 0.064 -0.013 -0.027 0.012 0.027 0.050 0.070 .097 0.005 0.030 0.077 0.025
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.157 0.771 0.545 0.799 0.552 0.265 0.121 0.032 0.915 0.515 0.089 0.582
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Send a message Correlation Coefficient .089 0.054 0.070 0.060 .126 0.067 0.071 .090 -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 0.010
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.041 0.218 0.106 0.169 0.004 0.122 0.103 0.038 0.438 0.439 0.436 0.811
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Use Facebook 
Chat
Correlation Coefficient .099 0.024 0.035 0.037 .118 0.039 0.052 0.074 -0.073 -0.053 -.085 -0.033
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.020 0.564 0.405 0.388 0.005 0.360 0.217 0.081 0.084 0.213 0.044 0.439
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Organise an 
event for friends 
or family
Correlation Coefficient 0.075 0.044 0.082 0.060 .106 -0.004 0.021 0.017 -0.042 -0.034 0.031 0.027
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.087 0.315 0.059 0.170 0.014 0.924 0.632 0.690 0.331 0.434 0.478 0.530
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Organise a group
event
Correlation Coefficient 0.046 0.030 0.063 0.058 .088 -0.035 -0.020 0.013 -0.046 -0.057 0.003 -0.012
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.294 0.491 0.147 0.184 0.043 0.427 0.640 0.771 0.290 0.193 0.947 0.791
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
RSVP to an event Correlation Coefficient 0.066 0.059 .104 0.060 0.074 0.012 0.004 0.028 -0.020 0.003 0.008 0.023
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.127 0.173 0.016 0.165 0.086 0.774 0.935 0.511 0.638 0.954 0.851 0.601
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Play games with 
your friends
Correlation Coefficient .111 0.020 0.039 0.008 .093 0.080 .095 .102 -0.029 -0.018 0.010 0.030
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.015 0.664 0.392 0.855 0.042 0.078 0.037 0.025 0.524 0.695 0.829 0.506
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Activities on Fb Kendall’s Tau-b PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7 PC8 PC9 P10 PC11 PC12
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Play games by 
yourself
Correlation Coefficient .135 0.071 .108 0.037 .129 .125 .140 .167 0.064 0.049 0.054 .101
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.110 0.015 0.411 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.153 0.278 0.226 0.024
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Use other apps Correlation Coefficient .106 0.071 .122 0.056 .128 0.084 .092 .117 0.034 0.011 0.078 .121
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.018 0.117 0.007 0.212 0.004 0.061 0.040 0.009 0.450 0.814 0.083 0.007
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC1. Bullying or harassment
PC2. Other people posting sensitive information about me
PC3. Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me
PC4. The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos
PC5. Stalking
PC6. Identity theft
PC7. Fraud
PC8. Someone impersonating me
PC9. Facebook knowing too much about me
PC10. Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me
PC11. Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook
PC12. Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook
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Table B15 – Part 1. Activities on Facebook and reasons for using Facebook – Kendall’s Tau-b
Part 1
Activities on Fb Kendall’s Tau-b R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12
Post a ‘status 
update’ or ‘life 
event’ with just 
words on your 
timeline
Correlation Coefficient .280 .177 .148 .111 .124 0.055 .175 .279 .219 .210 .219 .356
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.015 0.009 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post a photo on 
your timeline
Correlation Coefficient .281 .271 .190 .149 .128 .130 .178 .256 .206 .250 .277 .350
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Create a photo 
album
Correlation Coefficient .258 .214 .188 .131 0.015 .101 .177 .199 0.084 .115 .119 .150
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.760 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.069 0.015 0.011 0.001
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post a video on 
your timeline
Correlation Coefficient .206 .207 .105 .126 .163 .155 .116 .239 .126 .085 .117 .206
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.074 0.013 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post on a friend’s
timeline
Correlation Coefficient .316 .239 .179 .155 .104 .126 .205 .173 .176 .135 .131 .215
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.029 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Comment on or 
reply to a friend’s
post
Correlation Coefficient .349 .283 .246 .112 0.045 0.011 .241 .258 .162 .141 .121 .229
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.339 0.811 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post on a group’s
page
Correlation Coefficient .254 .140 .102 .185 .102 .128 .216 .307 .184 .110 .113 .129
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.019 0.000 0.029 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.012 0.004
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Read group posts Correlation Coefficient .279 .149 .134 .127 0.042 .155 .204 .256 .178 0.080 0.073 .144
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.362 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.103 0.001
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Tag people in 
something you 
post
Correlation Coefficient .336 .252 .228 .118 .116 .154 .203 .235 .222 .280 .264 .340
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Add a location to
something you 
post
Correlation Coefficient .232 .226 .197 .146 0.076 .111 .127 .222 .161 .201 .213 .225
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.110 0.015 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Tag people in a 
photo or video 
you didn’t post
Correlation Coefficient .196 .160 .150 .198 .208 .232 .162 .214 .165 .222 .219 .227
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
‘Like’ a friend’s 
photo, video or 
post
Correlation Coefficient .342 .242 .215 .116 0.053 .143 .243 .200 .199 .199 .199 .247
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.264 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Share a friend’s 
photo or video
Correlation Coefficient .140 .179 .137 .112 0.051 .107 .122 .184 0.088 .101 .131 .187
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.014 0.279 0.017 0.005 0.000 0.050 0.028 0.004 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Search for 
someone you 
want to find out 
more about
Correlation Coefficient .249 .169 .268 .247 .097 .357 .193 .154 .132 .248 .223 .175
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Write a note Correlation Coefficient -0.064 0.031 .096 .155 0.081 0.009 -0.026 0.073 -0.014 0.067 0.057 0.085
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.178 0.499 0.036 0.001 0.099 0.848 0.571 0.119 0.758 0.164 0.233 0.068
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Send a message Correlation Coefficient .464 .269 .289 .195 .096 .221 .282 .277 .218 .194 .182 .237
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Use Facebook 
Chat
Correlation Coefficient .376 .210 .277 .218 .148 .226 .210 .312 .227 .216 .214 .247
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Organise an 
event for friends 
or family
Correlation Coefficient .253 .109 .160 .145 .152 .188 .171 .261 .157 .211 .182 .180
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Organise a group
event
Correlation Coefficient .254 0.058 .164 .150 .247 .197 .141 .288 .154 .208 .196 .194
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
RSVP to an event Correlation Coefficient .288 0.082 .146 .102 .115 .220 .233 .219 .200 .233 .221 .242
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.062 0.001 0.024 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Play games with 
your friends
Correlation Coefficient 0.076 0.088 .128 .129 0.020 0.001 .096 .095 0.092 0.002 0.002 0.083
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.109 0.058 0.006 0.007 0.691 0.976 0.036 0.044 0.051 0.972 0.969 0.074
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Play games by Correlation Coefficient 0.048 .095 0.042 .130 -0.037 -0.038 0.084 .182 .134 -0.020 -0.003 .129
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Part 1
Activities on Fb Kendall’s Tau-b R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12
yourself Sig. (2-tailed) 0.301 0.035 0.351 0.005 0.443 0.410 0.062 0.000 0.004 0.668 0.941 0.005
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Use other apps Correlation Coefficient .131 .128 0.087 .190 0.027 0.042 .141 .193 .157 0.046 0.066 .141
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 0.005 0.056 0.000 0.576 0.369 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.329 0.157 0.002
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R1. To keep in touch with friends
R2. To keep in touch with family
R3. To keep in touch with people from my past
R4. To make new friends
R5. To meet new romantic or sexual partners
R6. To find out more about potential or new friends or partners
R7. To be there for others
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
R8. To ask for advice or help
R9. To feel less lonely
R10. To enhance my image
R11. To project my best self
R12. To express who I am
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Table B15 – Part 2. Activities on Facebook and reasons for using Facebook – Kendall’s Tau-b
Part 2
Activities on Fb Kendall’s Tau-b R13 R14 R15 R16 R17 R18 R19 R20 R21 R22 R23 R24
Post a ‘status 
update’ or ‘life 
event’ with just 
words on your 
timeline
Correlation Coefficient .287 .457 .486 .200 .200 .164 .097 0.070 .176 .323 .191 .161
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post a photo on 
your timeline
Correlation Coefficient .274 .460 .376 .166 .193 .184 .138 .129 .245 .281 .223 .203
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Create a photo 
album
Correlation Coefficient .169 .289 .233 0.066 .092 .118 .129 0.090 .167 .238 .146 .100
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.157 0.049 0.012 0.005 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.026
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post a video on 
your timeline
Correlation Coefficient .207 .298 .294 .148 .169 .138 0.074 .112 .191 .211 .101 .107
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.107 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.018
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post on a friend’s
timeline
Correlation Coefficient .144 .297 .303 .232 .227 .205 .137 .135 .239 .351 .299 .279
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Comment on or 
reply to a friend’s
post
Correlation Coefficient .133 .388 .293 .185 .180 .218 .111 0.083 .169 .315 .262 .227
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Post on a group’s
page
Correlation Coefficient .140 .200 .194 .170 .220 .297 .129 .096 .247 .253 .174 .164
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Read group posts Correlation Coefficient .103 .181 .178 .193 .191 .283 .173 .107 .197 .198 .189 .222
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Tag people in 
something you 
post
Correlation Coefficient .259 .414 .338 .154 .172 .193 .175 .226 .271 .311 .295 .266
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Add a location to
something you 
post
Correlation Coefficient .181 .311 .238 .123 .138 .177 .178 .167 .285 .279 .146 .149
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Tag people in a 
photo or video 
you didn’t post
Correlation Coefficient .261 .203 .193 .225 .221 .233 .137 .120 .169 .278 .184 .240
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
‘Like’ a friend’s 
photo, video or 
post
Correlation Coefficient .197 .429 .280 .209 .210 .188 .219 .168 .200 .365 .393 .367
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Share a friend’s 
photo or video
Correlation Coefficient .146 .282 .237 .147 .205 .194 .121 0.080 .230 .248 .152 .130
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Search for 
someone you 
want to find out 
more about
Correlation Coefficient .166 .152 .190 .217 .206 .154 .406 .342 .269 .272 .239 .250
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Write a note Correlation Coefficient .112 0.070 .184 .120 .125 .136 -0.013 -0.079 0.086 0.019 -.092 -.200
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.018 0.126 0.000 0.012 0.008 0.004 0.787 0.094 0.069 0.674 0.042 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Send a message Correlation Coefficient .227 .293 .265 .227 .255 .240 .230 .211 .253 .374 .327 .321
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Use Facebook 
Chat
Correlation Coefficient .265 .232 .255 .227 .240 .232 .237 .214 .257 .347 .263 .293
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Organise an 
event for friends 
or family
Correlation Coefficient .226 .262 .198 .148 .185 .222 .188 .156 .265 .249 .242 .216
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Organise a group
event
Correlation Coefficient .232 .234 .189 .173 .175 .227 .140 .148 .243 .230 .232 .208
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
RSVP to an event Correlation Coefficient .204 .200 .210 .158 .173 .206 .187 .210 .241 .286 .319 .313
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Play games with 
your friends
Correlation Coefficient .118 .102 .157 .121 .153 .140 0.029 .119 .137 .183 .101 .102
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.013 0.027 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.003 0.528 0.012 0.004 0.000 0.027 0.025
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Play games by Correlation Coefficient .131 .129 .176 .198 .188 .136 0.041 0.088 .127 .216 .127 .120
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Part 2
Activities on Fb Kendall’s Tau-b R13 R14 R15 R16 R17 R18 R19 R20 R21 R22 R23 R24
yourself Sig. (2-tailed) 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.370 0.057 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.007
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Use other apps Correlation Coefficient .160 .150 .185 .175 .210 .109 .106 .100 .171 .184 .107 .110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.021 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.015
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R13. To express myself in ways that I can’t offline
R14. To share my news
R15. To share my thoughts and feelings
R16. To find like-minded people
R17. To find people who share similar interests
R18. To work with others who have similar goals
R19. To find out about people I am curious about
R20. To keep an eye on someone
R21. To expand my network
R22. To have fun
R23. To put off doing my work
R24. Because I’m bored
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Table B16. Privacy concerns, Facebook friends, groups, networks, ‘Find friends’, and posts – Kendall’s Tau-b
Privacy concerns Kendall’s tau-b
# of
Facebook
friends
# of groups
# of
networks
 Used ‘Find
friends’
function
(Y/N)
How often
used
‘Audience
selector’ a.
How often
deleted post
b.
How often
decided not
to post c.
Bullying or harassment Correlation Coefficient -0.126 -0.121 -0.092 0.143 0.144 0.194 0.183
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.004 0.033 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Other people posting 
sensitive information 
about me
Correlation Coefficient 0.010 0.024 -0.026 0.064 0.124 0.162 0.187
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.806 0.571 0.545 0.164 0.005 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Other people posting 
sensitive photos or videos 
of me
Correlation Coefficient -0.073 -0.026 -0.056 0.044 0.136 0.207 0.240
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.072 0.542 0.189 0.344 0.002 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
The wrong person seeing 
my posts, photos or videos
Correlation Coefficient -0.072 -0.070 -0.056 0.059 0.147 0.286 0.275
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.073 0.094 0.194 0.204 0.001 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Stalking Correlation Coefficient -0.167 -0.092 -0.155 0.135 0.161 0.282 0.208
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Identity theft Correlation Coefficient -0.052 -0.056 -0.092 0.119 0.140 0.188 0.162
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.195 0.177 0.031 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Fraud Correlation Coefficient -0.071 -0.047 -0.110 0.119 0.163 0.207 0.175
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.078 0.264 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Someone impersonating 
me
Correlation Coefficient -0.097 -0.074 -0.108 0.136 0.166 0.207 0.189
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.017 0.075 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Facebook knowing too 
much about me
Correlation Coefficient 0.006 0.044 -0.022 0.041 -0.015 0.189 0.187
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.873 0.292 0.618 0.382 0.739 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Businesses linked to 
Facebook finding out too 
much about me
Correlation Coefficient 0.053 0.068 -0.023 0.035 0.028 0.151 0.183
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.193 0.104 0.600 0.450 0.533 0.001 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Spam/unsolicited email 
from businesses linked to 
Facebook
Correlation Coefficient -0.015 -0.017 -0.063 0.103 0.017 0.140 0.139
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.718 0.683 0.145 0.026 0.693 0.002 0.001
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Viruses, spyware or other 
malware from businesses 
linked to Facebook
Correlation Coefficient -0.025 -0.045 -0.058 0.069 0.031 0.116 0.172
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.533 0.283 0.179 0.137 0.481 0.009 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Note. Respondents were asked:
   a. How often do you change the audience for something you post using the ‘audience selector’ for that post? 
   b. How often, if ever, have you deleted a post for privacy reasons?
   c. How often, if ever, have you decided not to post something because the wrong person might see it?
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Table B17. Reasons for using Facebook, Facebook friends, groups, networks, ‘Find friends’, and posts – 
Kendall’s Tau-b
Reasons for using
Facebook Kendall’s tau-b
# of
Facebook
friends
# of groups
# of
networks
 Used ‘Find
friends’
function
(Y/N)
How often
used
‘Audience
selector’ a.
How often
deleted post
b.
How often
decided not
to post c.
To keep in touch with 
friends
Correlation Coefficient -0.201 -0.141 -0.099 0.060 0.188 0.057 0.050
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.028 0.214 0.000 0.217 0.267
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To keep in touch with 
family
Correlation Coefficient -0.149 -0.127 -0.075 0.046 0.100 0.066 0.112
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.003 0.085 0.331 0.026 0.140 0.010
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To keep in touch with 
people from my past
Correlation Coefficient -0.205 -0.156 -0.158 0.108 -0.012 0.081 0.001
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.797 0.068 0.973
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To make new friends Correlation Coefficient -0.197 -0.146 -0.149 0.048 0.092 0.117 0.024
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.318 0.047 0.011 0.599
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To meet new romantic or 
sexual partners
Correlation Coefficient -0.203 -0.139 -0.122 -0.013 0.059 0.079 0.007
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.795 0.217 0.101 0.876
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To find out more about 
potential or new friends or 
partners
Correlation Coefficient -0.262 -0.144 -0.114 0.081 0.117 0.141 0.175
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.091 0.011 0.002 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer
help or show an interest)
Correlation Coefficient -0.147 -0.183 -0.165 0.127 0.125 0.082 0.109
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.005 0.065 0.012
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To ask for advice or help Correlation Coefficient -0.157 -0.271 -0.203 0.065 0.112 0.093 0.051
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.174 0.014 0.042 0.255
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To feel less lonely Correlation Coefficient -0.090 -0.228 -0.121 0.115 0.078 0.096 0.080
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.031 0.000 0.007 0.016 0.088 0.036 0.071
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To enhance my image Correlation Coefficient -0.204 -0.083 -0.191 0.072 0.053 0.057 0.048
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.144 0.261 0.224 0.291
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To project my best self Correlation Coefficient -0.181 -0.097 -0.175 0.089 0.064 0.066 0.085
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.067 0.168 0.151 0.059
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To express who I am Correlation Coefficient -0.172 -0.153 -0.169 0.101 0.121 0.095 0.053
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.008 0.037 0.234
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To express myself in ways 
that I can’t offline
Correlation Coefficient -0.183 -0.150 -0.196 0.118 0.152 0.102 0.077
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.015 0.001 0.027 0.085
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To share my news Correlation Coefficient -0.126 -0.168 -0.074 0.051 0.106 0.061 0.063
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.087 0.279 0.018 0.174 0.146
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To share my thoughts and 
feelings
Correlation Coefficient -0.095 -0.159 -0.050 0.050 0.158 0.054 0.024
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.021 0.000 0.252 0.293 0.000 0.233 0.591
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To find like-minded people Correlation Coefficient -0.164 -0.196 -0.143 0.043 0.135 0.089 0.081
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.375 0.003 0.053 0.072
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To find people who share 
similar interests
Correlation Coefficient -0.155 -0.202 -0.145 0.088 0.165 0.085 0.033
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.068 0.000 0.065 0.456
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To work with others who 
have similar goals
Correlation Coefficient -0.169 -0.232 -0.194 0.065 0.132 0.133 0.046
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.179 0.004 0.004 0.305
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To find out about people I 
am curious about
Correlation Coefficient -0.197 -0.163 -0.183 0.094 0.131 0.137 0.085
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.004 0.002 0.053
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To keep an eye on 
someone
Correlation Coefficient -0.207 -0.126 -0.151 0.063 0.084 0.143 0.125
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.190 0.067 0.002 0.005
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
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Reasons for using
Facebook Kendall’s tau-b
# of
Facebook
friends
# of groups
# of
networks
 Used ‘Find
friends’
function
(Y/N)
How often
used
‘Audience
selector’ a.
How often
deleted post
b.
How often
decided not
to post c.
To expand my network Correlation Coefficient -0.210 -0.204 -0.285 0.132 0.168 0.126 0.090
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.045
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To have fun Correlation Coefficient -0.229 -0.220 -0.077 0.102 0.130 0.056 0.084
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.076 0.029 0.003 0.209 0.051
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
To put off doing my work Correlation Coefficient -0.220 -0.171 -0.055 -0.001 0.152 0.062 0.077
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.983 0.001 0.162 0.071
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Because I’m bored Correlation Coefficient -0.245 -0.151 -0.048 -0.006 0.108 0.091 0.045
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.263 0.898 0.015 0.039 0.293
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
Note. Respondents were asked:
   a. How often do you change the audience for something you post using the ‘audience selector’ for that post?
   b. How often, if ever, have you deleted a post for privacy reasons?
   c. How often, if ever, have you decided not to post something because the wrong person might see it?
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Table B18. Privacy concerns and profile information provided (key pieces) – Kendall’s Tau-b
Privacy concerns
Kendall’s Tau-b
Do you provide the following information on your Facebook profile?
Your high school
Your post-secondary education
Your job(s)
Your hom
etow
n
Your current city
Your relationship status
A list of fam
ily 
m
em
bers/relatives
Som
ething ‘About You’
Your favourite quote(s)
Your religious view
s
Your political view
s
Your phone num
ber(s)
Your address
W
hether you are ‘interested in’
w
om
en or m
en
PC1
Correlation Coefficient 0.062 0.010 0.042 0.006 0.093 0.058 0.087 0.073 0.094 0.068 0.087 0.099 0.061 0.063
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.185 0.833 0.367 0.902 0.046 0.211 0.060 0.115 0.043 0.144 0.062 0.032 0.189 0.174
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC2
Correlation Coefficient -0.041 -0.034 -0.041 -0.071 -0.024 -0.028 0.033 0.037 0.003 0.003 0.038 0.013 0.032 -0.017
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.375 0.469 0.377 0.128 0.607 0.540 0.479 0.429 0.949 0.954 0.410 0.786 0.486 0.714
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC3
Correlation Coefficient -0.032 -0.059 -0.064 -0.049 -0.040 -0.009 0.041 0.007 -0.024 -0.041 -0.004 0.019 0.000 -0.017
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.483 0.200 0.167 0.290 0.391 0.851 0.378 0.884 0.611 0.375 0.932 0.684 0.993 0.709
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC4
Correlation Coefficient -0.035 -0.029 -0.030 0.003 0.013 0.009 0.088 0.010 0.043 0.015 0.049 0.076 0.015 -0.033
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.453 0.538 0.522 0.942 0.780 0.851 0.057 0.824 0.350 0.745 0.289 0.101 0.744 0.483
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC5
Correlation Coefficient -0.015 0.020 0.002 0.029 0.025 0.017 0.106 0.013 0.068 0.106 0.104 0.048 0.040 0.021
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.749 0.665 0.973 0.532 0.583 0.708 0.022 0.774 0.144 0.022 0.025 0.305 0.382 0.653
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC6
Correlation Coefficient -0.073 -0.013 -0.074 -0.071 -0.011 -0.006 -0.005 -0.032 0.022 0.000 0.057 0.124 0.031 -0.064
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.114 0.774 0.109 0.124 0.805 0.900 0.907 0.484 0.632 0.999 0.222 0.007 0.504 0.163
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC7
Correlation Coefficient -0.045 -0.007 -0.083 -0.061 0.000 -0.036 -0.013 -0.042 0.016 -0.011 0.038 0.093 0.017 -0.065
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.327 0.882 0.071 0.185 0.993 0.431 0.782 0.364 0.722 0.814 0.414 0.045 0.705 0.159
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC8
Correlation Coefficient -0.028 0.000 -0.068 -0.063 -0.001 0.021 0.002 -0.029 0.037 0.056 0.086 0.092 0.044 -0.019
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.544 1.000 0.139 0.171 0.979 0.655 0.958 0.536 0.426 0.227 0.065 0.047 0.339 0.675
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC9
Correlation Coefficient -0.108 -0.072 -0.142 -0.128 -0.109 -0.085 -0.081 -0.037 0.000 -0.007 0.010 0.014 0.035 -0.086
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.020 0.123 0.002 0.006 0.019 0.067 0.080 0.429 0.994 0.881 0.828 0.755 0.446 0.063
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC10
Correlation Coefficient -0.127 -0.057 -0.159 -0.101 -0.113 -0.114 -0.060 -0.031 -0.009 -0.027 0.011 0.011 0.032 -0.094
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006 0.219 0.001 0.030 0.015 0.014 0.199 0.504 0.846 0.564 0.817 0.813 0.485 0.043
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC11
Correlation Coefficient -0.034 0.007 -0.053 -0.082 -0.056 -0.061 -0.038 -0.031 -0.044 0.001 0.049 0.013 -0.022 -0.076
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.463 0.887 0.256 0.076 0.228 0.191 0.413 0.508 0.344 0.988 0.292 0.781 0.631 0.100
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC12 Correlation Coefficient -0.020 0.000 -0.057 -0.068 -0.049 -0.013 -0.005 0.022 0.015 0.019 0.042 0.059 -0.041 -0.057Sig. (2-tailed) 0.665 0.999 0.218 0.142 0.289 0.787 0.910 0.637 0.739 0.684 0.367 0.206 0.375 0.222
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
PC1. Bullying or harassment
PC2. Other people posting sensitive information about me
PC3. Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me
PC4. The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos
PC5. Stalking
PC6. Identity theft
PC7. Fraud
PC8. Someone impersonating me
PC9. Facebook knowing too much about me
PC10. Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about me
PC11. Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to Facebook
PC12. Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked to Facebook
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Table B19. Privacy concerns and profile information provided (likes) – Kendall’s Tau-b
Privacy concerns Kendall’s Tau-b
Have you added the following information to your profile?
M
ovies w
atched, w
anting to
w
atch, or liked
TV show
s w
atched, w
anting to
w
atch, or liked
Books read, w
anting to read,
or liked
M
usic liked, or w
anting to
listen to
Likes
Sports team
s or athletes liked
Bullying or harassment Correlation Coefficient 0.108 0.103 0.111 0.116 0.116 0.077
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.021 0.027 0.017 0.012 0.012 0.098
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Other people posting sensitive information about me Correlation Coefficient 0.021 0.020 0.027 0.000 0.017 -0.062
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.652 0.661 0.554 0.996 0.707 0.181
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Other people posting sensitive photos or videos of me Correlation Coefficient 0.047 0.029 0.039 0.015 0.031 -0.027
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.313 0.530 0.401 0.750 0.505 0.564
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
The wrong person seeing my posts, photos or videos Correlation Coefficient 0.045 0.046 0.061 0.057 0.040 -0.023
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.328 0.316 0.185 0.220 0.383 0.626
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Stalking Correlation Coefficient 0.095 0.111 0.119 0.115 0.049 0.034
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.041 0.017 0.010 0.013 0.290 0.457
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Identity theft Correlation Coefficient 0.048 0.063 0.044 0.080 0.024 -0.013
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.297 0.175 0.342 0.085 0.609 0.773
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Fraud Correlation Coefficient 0.055 0.060 0.058 0.086 0.032 0.009
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.232 0.197 0.214 0.064 0.493 0.843
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Someone impersonating me Correlation Coefficient 0.057 0.074 0.049 0.094 0.044 0.030
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.222 0.109 0.292 0.042 0.341 0.512
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Facebook knowing too much about me Correlation Coefficient -0.019 -0.023 0.002 -0.009 -0.006 -0.084
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.675 0.622 0.965 0.850 0.892 0.072
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Businesses linked to Facebook finding out too much about 
me
Correlation Coefficient -0.028 -0.044 -0.001 -0.016 -0.075 -0.048
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.552 0.343 0.976 0.726 0.109 0.297
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Spam/unsolicited email from businesses linked to 
Facebook
Correlation Coefficient -0.027 -0.018 -0.028 -0.014 -0.014 -0.041
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.563 0.693 0.540 0.764 0.759 0.377
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Viruses, spyware or other malware from businesses linked 
to Facebook
Correlation Coefficient 0.041 0.033 0.047 0.048 -0.014 0.011
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.379 0.481 0.315 0.303 0.760 0.815
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
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Table B20. Reasons for using Facebook and profile information provided (key pieces) – Kendall’s Tau-b
Reasons for using Facebook
Kendall’s Tau-b
Do you provide the following information on your Facebook profile?
Your high school
Your post-secondary education
Your job(s)
Your hom
etow
n
Your current city
Your relationship status
A list of fam
ily m
em
bers/
relatives
Som
ething ‘About You’
Your favourite quote(s)
Your religious view
s
Your political view
s
Your phone num
ber(s)
Your address
W
hether you are ‘interested in’
w
om
en or m
en
R1
Correlation Coefficient 0.172 0.178 0.096 0.134 0.189 0.158 0.206 0.084 0.083 0.068 0.082 0.063 0.003 0.153
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.085 0.088 0.161 0.090 0.192 0.945 0.002
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R2
Correlation Coefficient 0.087 0.134 0.075 0.070 0.094 0.084 0.245 0.100 0.070 0.093 0.091 0.003 0.010 0.023
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.065 0.004 0.113 0.137 0.046 0.074 0.000 0.033 0.137 0.047 0.053 0.941 0.838 0.626
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R3
Correlation Coefficient 0.186 0.197 0.079 0.139 0.139 0.141 0.106 0.097 0.073 0.072 0.089 0.121 0.052 0.145
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.094 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.024 0.038 0.121 0.124 0.059 0.010 0.269 0.002
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R4
Correlation Coefficient 0.101 0.076 0.052 0.099 0.166 0.077 0.123 0.142 0.139 0.073 0.084 0.193 0.163 0.141
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.037 0.118 0.281 0.042 0.001 0.113 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.130 0.083 0.000 0.001 0.004
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R5
Correlation Coefficient -0.007 0.006 0.046 0.037 0.012 0.072 -0.011 0.092 0.102 0.074 0.155 0.014 0.046 0.173
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.886 0.909 0.363 0.464 0.810 0.154 0.822 0.068 0.043 0.143 0.002 0.781 0.359 0.001
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R6
Correlation Coefficient 0.078 0.059 0.101 0.057 0.088 0.012 0.090 0.108 0.116 0.100 0.085 0.083 0.035 0.094
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.106 0.217 0.035 0.233 0.067 0.796 0.061 0.025 0.016 0.038 0.077 0.083 0.464 0.050
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R7
Correlation Coefficient 0.095 0.112 0.044 0.059 0.083 0.071 0.193 0.101 0.106 0.057 0.088 0.093 0.074 0.100
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.043 0.016 0.350 0.207 0.074 0.127 0.000 0.031 0.024 0.220 0.061 0.046 0.114 0.033
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R8
Correlation Coefficient 0.059 0.135 0.024 0.106 0.157 0.143 0.177 0.191 0.190 0.152 0.195 0.194 0.104 0.173
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.217 0.005 0.612 0.027 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R9
Correlation Coefficient 0.117 0.100 0.064 0.147 0.131 0.065 0.131 0.168 0.099 0.053 0.040 0.124 0.055 0.185
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.015 0.038 0.184 0.002 0.006 0.173 0.006 0.000 0.040 0.273 0.406 0.010 0.248 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R10
Correlation Coefficient 0.103 0.133 0.117 0.137 0.085 0.092 0.048 0.073 0.090 0.125 0.113 0.144 0.021 0.136
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.036 0.007 0.017 0.005 0.084 0.061 0.326 0.138 0.067 0.011 0.021 0.003 0.663 0.006
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R11
Correlation Coefficient 0.083 0.104 0.132 0.112 0.089 0.106 0.092 0.065 0.049 0.110 0.096 0.142 0.033 0.089
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.087 0.032 0.006 0.021 0.067 0.029 0.058 0.180 0.308 0.023 0.046 0.003 0.497 0.066
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R12
Correlation Coefficient 0.085 0.178 0.122 0.127 0.089 0.142 0.154 0.193 0.154 0.188 0.212 0.121 0.053 0.151
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.074 0.000 0.010 0.008 0.062 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.270 0.002
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R13
Correlation Coefficient 0.054 0.085 0.099 0.138 0.103 0.102 0.169 0.195 0.163 0.187 0.186 0.154 0.114 0.129
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.268 0.080 0.040 0.004 0.033 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.008
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R14
Correlation Coefficient 0.139 0.192 0.127 0.177 0.157 0.230 0.124 0.165 0.076 0.133 0.187 0.131 0.058 0.200
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.105 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.218 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R15
Correlation Coefficient 0.088 0.185 0.149 0.139 0.135 0.194 0.138 0.216 0.136 0.154 0.190 0.135 0.096 0.216
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.062 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.043 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R16
Correlation Coefficient 0.063 0.132 0.078 0.119 0.134 0.154 0.116 0.186 0.196 0.152 0.163 0.188 0.156 0.209
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.195 0.007 0.109 0.014 0.006 0.002 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R17
Correlation Coefficient 0.061 0.101 0.059 0.095 0.162 0.121 0.115 0.200 0.191 0.159 0.169 0.159 0.132 0.222
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.205 0.037 0.220 0.047 0.001 0.012 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R18
Correlation Coefficient 0.054 0.124 0.083 -0.008 0.073 0.083 0.104 0.133 0.144 0.118 0.105 0.141 0.159 0.152
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.266 0.010 0.084 0.868 0.132 0.086 0.031 0.006 0.003 0.014 0.030 0.003 0.001 0.002
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R19 Correlation Coefficient 0.185 0.156 0.073 0.082 0.160 0.031 0.181 0.168 0.089 0.052 0.057 0.079 0.059 0.110
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Reasons for using Facebook
Kendall’s Tau-b
Do you provide the following information on your Facebook profile?
Your high school
Your post-secondary education
Your job(s)
Your hom
etow
n
Your current city
Your relationship status
A list of fam
ily m
em
bers/
relatives
Som
ething ‘About You’
Your favourite quote(s)
Your religious view
s
Your political view
s
Your phone num
ber(s)
Your address
W
hether you are ‘interested in’
w
om
en or m
en
R1 Correlation Coefficient 0.172 0.178 0.096 0.134 0.189 0.158 0.206 0.084 0.083 0.068 0.082 0.063 0.003 0.153Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.001 0.121 0.082 0.001 0.508 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.274 0.225 0.095 0.210 0.020
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R20
Correlation Coefficient 0.148 0.094 0.077 0.127 0.150 0.064 0.179 0.157 0.109 0.103 0.136 0.081 0.042 0.180
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.049 0.107 0.008 0.002 0.180 0.000 0.001 0.023 0.031 0.005 0.093 0.385 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R21 Correlation Coefficient 0.133 0.120 0.111 0.133 0.177 0.078 0.116 0.162 0.106 0.138 0.107 0.160 0.111 0.155Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006 0.013 0.022 0.006 0.000 0.106 0.017 0.001 0.029 0.004 0.027 0.001 0.022 0.001
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R22
Correlation Coefficient 0.169 0.222 0.127 0.145 0.153 0.143 0.213 0.197 0.154 0.133 0.153 0.128 0.098 0.170
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.035 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R23 Correlation Coefficient 0.138 0.108 0.103 0.091 0.067 0.078 0.149 0.087 0.026 0.076 0.081 0.038 -0.029 0.117Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.020 0.027 0.050 0.146 0.092 0.001 0.060 0.582 0.101 0.080 0.412 0.539 0.011
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R24
Correlation Coefficient 0.163 0.141 0.142 0.125 0.089 0.066 0.118 0.110 0.064 0.080 0.080 0.066 -0.032 0.173
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.055 0.154 0.011 0.018 0.166 0.086 0.086 0.156 0.485 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391
R1. To keep in touch with friends
R2. To keep in touch with family
R3. To keep in touch with people from my past
R4.To make new friends
R5. To meet new romantic or sexual partners
R6. To find out more about potential or new friends or partners
R7. To be there for others
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
R8. To ask for advice or help
R9. To feel less lonely
R10. To enhance my image
R11. To project my best self
R12. To express who I am
R13. To express myself in ways that I can’t offline
R14. To share my news
R15. To share my thoughts and feelings
R16. To find like-minded people
R17. To find people who share similar interests
R18. To work with others who have similar goals
R19. To find out about people I am curious about
R20. To keep an eye on someone
R21. To expand my network
R22. To have fun
R23. To put off doing my work
R24. Because I’m bored
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Table B21. Reasons for using Facebook and profile information provided (likes) – Kendall’s Tau-b
Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s Tau-b
Have you added the following information to your profile?M
ovies w
atched, w
anting to
w
atch, or liked
TV show
s w
atched, w
anting
to w
atch, or liked
Books read, w
anting to read,
or liked
M
usic liked, or w
anting to
listen to
Likes
Sports team
s or athletes liked
To keep in touch with friends Correlation Coefficient 0.123 0.086 0.178 0.082 0.104 0.096
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.011 0.075 0.000 0.089 0.032 0.048
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To keep in touch with family Correlation Coefficient 0.067 0.054 0.073 0.041 0.029 0.067
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.156 0.252 0.118 0.383 0.541 0.154
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To keep in touch with people from my past Correlation Coefficient 0.094 0.094 0.133 0.079 0.127 0.145
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.046 0.045 0.005 0.093 0.007 0.002
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To make new friends Correlation Coefficient 0.187 0.194 0.083 0.150 0.207 0.159
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.088 0.002 0.000 0.001
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To meet new romantic or sexual partners Correlation Coefficient 0.105 0.076 0.111 0.069 0.082 0.142
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.037 0.133 0.028 0.173 0.103 0.005
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To find out more about potential or new friends or 
partners
Correlation Coefficient 0.170 0.187 0.154 0.179 0.127 0.211
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To be there for others 
(i.e., to be supportive, offer help or show an interest)
Correlation Coefficient 0.138 0.130 0.197 0.142 0.201 0.103
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.027
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To ask for advice or help Correlation Coefficient 0.150 0.188 0.188 0.185 0.210 0.189
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To feel less lonely Correlation Coefficient 0.132 0.156 0.124 0.101 0.186 0.099
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.035 0.000 0.039
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To enhance my image Correlation Coefficient 0.111 0.124 0.168 0.132 0.090 0.136
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.023 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.067 0.005
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To project my best self Correlation Coefficient 0.125 0.133 0.184 0.140 0.126 0.110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.023
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To express who I am Correlation Coefficient 0.209 0.244 0.278 0.221 0.184 0.221
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To express myself in ways that I can’t offline Correlation Coefficient 0.210 0.224 0.254 0.185 0.165 0.186
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To share my news Correlation Coefficient 0.093 0.118 0.136 0.048 0.078 0.073
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.048 0.012 0.004 0.310 0.094 0.121
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To share my thoughts and feelings Correlation Coefficient 0.179 0.219 0.225 0.159 0.149 0.145
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To find like-minded people Correlation Coefficient 0.257 0.278 0.243 0.223 0.230 0.164
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To find people who share similar interests Correlation Coefficient 0.244 0.255 0.218 0.196 0.245 0.134
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To work with others who have similar goals Correlation Coefficient 0.160 0.179 0.190 0.146 0.215 0.104
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.031
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To find out about people I am curious about Correlation Coefficient 0.206 0.215 0.203 0.178 0.220 0.114
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Reasons for using Facebook Kendall’s Tau-b
Have you added the following information to your profile?M
ovies w
atched, w
anting to
w
atch, or liked
TV show
s w
atched, w
anting
to w
atch, or liked
Books read, w
anting to read,
or liked
M
usic liked, or w
anting to
listen to
Likes
Sports team
s or athletes liked
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To keep an eye on someone Correlation Coefficient 0.159 0.137 0.135 0.100 0.179 0.110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.036 0.000 0.022
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To expand my network Correlation Coefficient 0.171 0.203 0.114 0.162 0.185 0.110
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.000 0.023
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To have fun Correlation Coefficient 0.224 0.238 0.226 0.182 0.168 0.217
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
To put off doing my work Correlation Coefficient 0.111 0.109 0.111 0.054 0.108 0.026
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.246 0.019 0.573
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
Because I’m bored Correlation Coefficient 0.158 0.126 0.138 0.112 0.112 0.107
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.016 0.016 0.021
N 391 391 391 391 391 391
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